Author SHA1 Message Date
saqib mir 4e0c90e2cf fix 2026-09-03 16:48:27 +05:30
saqib mir d9bd970910 have add tthe port number 2026-09-03 16:40:19 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 16daf8d32d feat: implement problem resolution (009)
Populates the five real problem-management stubs (investigation,
root-causes, solutions, verification, resolutions -- problems is
confirmed dead/unwired scaffold and stays untouched) with doc04's
sequential workflow engine:

- investigation: version-row-per-attempt (never overwritten), with a
  customer-safe read path that always strips internalNotes.
- root-causes/solutions/verification: a strict existence chain
  (investigation -> root cause -> solution -> approval -> implementation
  -> verification), each step resolve-or-409 on its own precondition,
  matching doc06's schema field-for-field with no invented columns.
- resolutions: gated on a successfully verified solution (no stored
  solutionId FK, per doc06 -- resolved via a join at write time), moving
  the ticket to RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER; explicit customer
  confirmation and a durable auto-close sweep (the previously-unregistered
  CLEANUP queue stub, mirroring 008's breach-detection job) both resolve
  it from there.
- reopen (ticketing/tickets): two real, separately-audited transitions
  (RESOLVED|CLOSED -> REOPENED -> IN_PROGRESS), touching no prior
  problem-resolution record and no SLARun -- closes the loop 008's own
  spec.md left open.

Verification-failure escalation reuses 003/007's existing
HUMAN_ESCALATION transition directly rather than adding an eleventh
trigger type to 008's already-shipped escalation rules.

Customer-facing confirm-resolution/reopen needed a body-shape variant of
002's inbound trust boundary that didn't previously exist:
fastify.authenticateProductIntegration hard-required a full
ticket-creation-shaped body. Extracted the shared token/scope/replay
verification into verifyIntegrationIdentity and added a narrower
authenticateProductIntegrationIdentity decorator + identityOnlyRequestSchema
on top of it -- purely additive, ticket creation's own behavior is
unchanged.

Also fixes a real test-data-hygiene bug surfaced by running this
feature's suite alongside 008's: a wildcard-scoped HierarchyNode and an
intentionally-global SLAPolicy in 008's own test fixtures were silently
affecting other test files' tickets sharing the same live Postgres.

Verified against throwaway Docker Postgres/Redis: typecheck, lint,
architecture-check all clean; full regression (tests/unit +
tests/integration together, 172 tests) passes except the 2 pre-existing
MinIO-dependent attachment failures, unrelated to this feature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 15:09:29 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 aaa51ef475 tasks: task breakdown for problem resolution feature (009)
49 tasks across 9 phases (6 user stories + setup/foundational/polish).
Unlike 007/008, this feature's user stories are genuinely sequential
(doc04's own investigation -> root cause -> solution -> verification ->
resolution -> reopen chain), so each story's dependency on the last is
real, not just priority-driven ordering -- called out explicitly since
User Story 4 (P2, verification) is a structural prerequisite of User
Story 5 (P1, resolution) despite the lower priority label.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 14:39:11 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 9ce34d8ca4 plan: design for problem resolution feature (009)
Phase 0 research resolves module placement (problem-management/problems
confirmed dead/unwired, left untouched), Investigation's version-row-per-
attempt shape, the strict investigation->root-cause->solution->
implementation->verification existence chain, why Resolution has no
solutionId FK (matches doc06 exactly), why verification-failure
escalation reuses 003/007's plain HUMAN_ESCALATION transition instead of
adding an eleventh trigger type to 008's already-shipped escalation
rules, the customer-facing route design (reusing 002's inbound trust
boundary rather than fastify.authenticate), and the auto-close sweep
design (the already-defined-but-unused CLEANUP queue, mirroring 008's
breach-detection job).

Phase 1 adds data-model.md, the admin/customer-facing contract, and six
quickstart scenarios covering the full sequential workflow through
customer confirmation, auto-close, and reopen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 14:37:42 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 14c6793460 docs: spec for problem resolution feature (009)
Investigation -> Root Cause -> Solution -> Implementation ->
Verification -> Resolution, plus customer confirmation and reopen,
matching doc04 SS3-9's workflow narrative and doc06's "Domain: Problem
Resolution" schema exactly. Explicitly closes a loop 008's own spec left
open (reopen never restarts an SLA run); verification-failure escalation
reuses 003/007's existing HUMAN_ESCALATION transition rather than adding
an eleventh escalation-rule trigger type to 008's system.

Also documents a real scope-boundary finding: src/modules/problem-management/problems
is a dead, unwired duplicate scaffold for Problem (the real one has lived
in ticketing/tickets since 003) and is not touched by this feature -- only
the five investigation/root-causes/solutions/resolutions/verification
stub directories are.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 14:33:55 +05:30
saqib mir 7e3d2ae29f add the new feaures 2026-09-03 14:19:21 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 9357f03e1d feat: implement SLA and escalation (008)
Populates platform/business-calendars, orchestration/sla, and
orchestration/escalation (all thin stubs until now) with the real engine:

- business-calendars: a luxon-based day-by-day calendar walk
  (addBusinessMinutes/isWithinWorkingHours) excluding non-working hours,
  weekends, and holidays — replacing the naive createdAt+hours stub FR-004
  explicitly forbids.
- sla: most-specific SLAPolicy resolution (product/category/problemType/
  priority, wildcard-or-exact-match, specificity-count + updatedAt
  tiebreak), SLARun creation on the first real publish of the
  long-unused TICKET_ASSIGNED domain event, durable pause/resume via an
  absolute-timestamp shift (no in-memory state, verified across a real
  buildApp() restart), and a repeatable BullMQ breach-detection sweep
  (src/jobs/sla, itself a previously-unregistered stub) that is directly
  callable for tests, not only reachable through a running worker.
- escalation: EscalationPolicy/Rule CRUD (all 10 doc05 trigger types
  storable, only resolution_breach/first_response_breach evaluated),
  breach-triggered and manual escalation both funnel through one EscalationEvent
  + scoped re-assignment path. AssignmentEngine (007) gains
  assignToSpecificNode — a new, explicitly node-scoped entry point,
  since escalation must never let 007's general resolution re-derive a
  different node than the one a rule or a caller targeted.

Two small pre-existing scaffold gaps were closed along the way:
CategoriesRepository had no findById, and TICKET_ASSIGNED/SLA_BREACHED/
ESCALATION_TRIGGERED were defined since earlier phases but never
published by any code.

Verified against throwaway Docker Postgres/Redis (typecheck, lint,
architecture-check all clean; 148/150 relevant tests pass — the 2
failures are pre-existing, MinIO-dependent, and unrelated to this
feature).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 13:02:05 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 bb31e9d641 tasks: task breakdown for SLA and escalation feature (008)
48 tasks across 9 phases (6 user stories + setup/foundational/polish),
sequenced US1 (policy definition) -> US2 (calendar-aware run creation) ->
US3 (durable pause/resume, P1-complete MVP) -> US4 (breach detection) ->
US5 (breach-triggered escalation) -> US6 (manual escalation), each
dependent on the last since every story builds on the previous one's
mechanism rather than being independently orderable.

Also folds in two design refinements found while cross-checking the
existing scaffold against research.md's plan: TICKET_ASSIGNED (defined in
domain-events.ts since 007, never published) becomes the real wiring point
for SLA-run creation, and src/jobs/sla//src/jobs/escalation/ turn out to
already exist as their own stub scaffolding, reused rather than
duplicated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:27:40 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 199bd4eb4e plan: design for SLA and escalation feature (008)
Phase 0 research resolves the business-calendar working-hours algorithm
(day-by-day walk via luxon, the first date/timezone dependency in this
codebase), the workingHours JSON shape, most-specific SLA-policy match
(reusing 005/006's resolution pattern), durable pause/resume (absolute
due-date shift, no in-memory state), and a repeatable-job breach-detection
design over per-run delayed jobs. Phase 1 adds data-model.md (one additive
refinement beyond doc06: SLARun.firstResponseBreachedAt), the admin/read
contract, and six quickstart scenarios including a genuine process-restart
boundary test for Constitution Principle VII.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:23:35 +05:30
saqib mirandClaude Sonnet 5 1ad9007e79 docs: spec for SLA and escalation feature (008)
Phase 8 of the roadmap: SLA policy engine (most-specific-match, calendar-
aware due dates), durable pause/resume and breach detection (never an
in-memory timer), and a rule-driven escalation engine that re-assigns via
007's engine scoped to a specific target node. Bounded to the two
SLA-derived trigger types this feature can compute a real signal for;
the other eight doc 05 §6 trigger types remain valid rule configuration
without a wired event source yet. First feature to give 006's
HierarchyNode.slaPolicyId/escalationPolicyId fields a real target.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:16:05 +05:30
saqibmir 10f59a7d5b Merge pull request '007-orchestration-assignment' (#8) from 007-orchestration-assignment into main
Reviewed-on: https://gitea.maskantech.in/gitea_admin/support_backend/pulls/8
2026-09-03 06:33:07 +00:00
178 changed files with 7443 additions and 495 deletions
Vendored
-226
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@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
// CI/CD pipeline for supporthub-api.
//
// Stage order and guarantees are defined by:
// - .specify/memory/constitution.md -> "Testing, Observability & CI/CD Gates"
// - specs/001-ci-pipeline/contracts/pipeline-stage-contract.md
//
// Prerequisites (configured on the Jenkins side, never in this repo):
// - Agents with Docker and Node.js 20+ available (label: 'docker && node20')
// - Credentials (Secret text unless noted) per target environment <env> in [test, prod]:
// <env>-postgres-password, <env>-redis-password, <env>-jwt-secret
// <env>-aws-access-key-id, <env>-aws-secret-access-key
// <env>-integration-credential-encryption-key (64 hex chars / 32 bytes — see
// specs/002-saas-integration/research.md "Credential storage")
// Plus one Username/Password credential: docker-registry-credentials
// - A DOCKER_REGISTRY value (e.g. via a "CI_DOCKER_REGISTRY" global Jenkins env var,
// or override the default below) pointing at the org's actual image registry.
//
// This file intentionally contains no secret values, only credential IDs — see
// specs/001-ci-pipeline/research.md "Environment/secrets handling in the pipeline".
pipeline {
agent { label 'docker && node20' }
options {
timestamps()
buildDiscarder(logRotator(numToKeepStr: '30'))
// Each build gets its own workspace by default; Compose project names below are
// additionally scoped by BUILD_NUMBER so concurrent runs never share containers,
// networks, or volumes (FR-009 / SC-005).
ansiColor('xterm')
}
environment {
DOCKER_REGISTRY = "${env.CI_DOCKER_REGISTRY ?: 'registry.example.com/supporthub'}"
IMAGE_NAME = 'supporthub-api'
COMPOSE_PROJECT = "supporthub-ci-${env.BUILD_NUMBER}"
}
stages {
stage('Checkout') {
steps {
checkout scm
}
}
stage('Install') {
steps {
sh 'npm ci'
}
}
stage('Environment validation') {
steps {
script {
resolveDeployTarget()
writeTargetEnvFile(env.TARGET_ENV == 'none' ? 'test' : env.TARGET_ENV)
}
// Reuses the existing Zod schema in src/config/env.ts as-is: it throws a
// specific, descriptive error on safeParse failure, so this fails fast with
// no new validation logic (FR-002).
sh "npx tsx --env-file=.env.${env.TARGET_ENV == 'none' ? 'test' : env.TARGET_ENV} -e \"import('./src/config/env.ts').then(() => console.log('Environment OK'))\""
}
}
stage('Generate Prisma client') {
steps {
sh 'npm run prisma:generate'
}
}
stage('Typecheck') {
steps {
sh 'npm run typecheck'
}
}
stage('Lint') {
steps {
sh 'npm run lint'
// Enforces Constitution Principle III (module boundaries) server-side —
// mirrors .husky/pre-commit so a bypassed/missing local hook can't merge
// a boundary violation.
sh 'npx tsx scripts/check-architecture.ts'
}
}
stage('Format check') {
steps {
sh 'npm run format:check'
}
}
stage('Unit test') {
steps {
sh 'npm run test:unit'
}
}
stage('Integration test') {
steps {
sh "docker compose -p ${env.COMPOSE_PROJECT} --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml up -d --wait postgres redis minio"
sh "docker compose -p ${env.COMPOSE_PROJECT} --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml run --rm --build app npm run test:integration"
}
}
stage('E2E test') {
steps {
sh "docker compose -p ${env.COMPOSE_PROJECT} --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml run --rm app npm run test:e2e"
}
}
stage('Build') {
steps {
script {
def buildTarget = env.TARGET_ENV == 'none' ? 'test' : env.TARGET_ENV
sh "npm run build:${buildTarget}"
}
}
}
stage('Docker build') {
steps {
script {
def buildTarget = env.TARGET_ENV == 'none' ? 'test' : env.TARGET_ENV
env.IMAGE_TAG = "${env.DOCKER_REGISTRY}/${env.IMAGE_NAME}:${buildTarget}-${env.BUILD_NUMBER}"
}
sh "docker build --build-arg BUILD_COMMAND=\"npm run build:${env.TARGET_ENV == 'none' ? 'test' : env.TARGET_ENV}\" -t ${env.IMAGE_TAG} ."
}
}
stage('Publish') {
when { expression { env.TARGET_ENV != 'none' } }
steps {
withCredentials([usernamePassword(credentialsId: 'docker-registry-credentials',
usernameVariable: 'REGISTRY_USER',
passwordVariable: 'REGISTRY_PASSWORD')]) {
sh '''
echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login "$DOCKER_REGISTRY" -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin
docker push "$IMAGE_TAG"
docker logout "$DOCKER_REGISTRY"
'''
}
}
}
stage('Deploy') {
when { expression { env.TARGET_ENV != 'none' } }
steps {
script {
writeTargetEnvFile(env.TARGET_ENV)
}
sh "docker compose --env-file .env.${env.TARGET_ENV} -f docker-compose.${env.TARGET_ENV == 'prod' ? 'prod' : 'test'}.yml up -d"
}
}
}
post {
always {
// Tear down the ephemeral integration/E2E stack regardless of outcome, and never
// leave a generated .env.* file behind in the workspace. --env-file must be passed
// to `down` too, or Compose can fail to resolve service config and leave containers
// running (confirmed while validating this pipeline locally).
sh "docker compose -p ${env.COMPOSE_PROJECT} --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml down -v --remove-orphans || true"
sh 'rm -f .env.test .env.prod .env.development'
cleanWs()
}
failure {
echo "Pipeline failed at stage: ${currentBuild.result}. See the failing stage's log above for the exact command and output — no local reproduction should be necessary (FR-004)."
}
}
}
// Resolves env.TARGET_ENV from the branch being built:
// main -> prod
// develop/test -> test
// anything else -> none (validate-only; Publish/Deploy stages are skipped, not failed)
void resolveDeployTarget() {
def branch = env.BRANCH_NAME ?: ''
if (branch == 'main') {
env.TARGET_ENV = 'prod'
} else if (branch == 'develop' || branch == 'test') {
env.TARGET_ENV = 'test'
} else {
env.TARGET_ENV = 'none'
}
echo "Resolved deploy target for branch '${branch}': ${env.TARGET_ENV}"
}
// Writes .env.<target> into the workspace from Jenkins credentials — never read from a
// file committed to the repository (constitution governance: "secrets never committed").
void writeTargetEnvFile(String target) {
withCredentials([
string(credentialsId: "${target}-postgres-password", variable: 'POSTGRES_PASSWORD'),
string(credentialsId: "${target}-redis-password", variable: 'REDIS_PASSWORD'),
string(credentialsId: "${target}-jwt-secret", variable: 'JWT_SECRET'),
string(credentialsId: "${target}-aws-access-key-id", variable: 'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'),
string(credentialsId: "${target}-aws-secret-access-key", variable: 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'),
string(credentialsId: "${target}-integration-credential-encryption-key", variable: 'INTEGRATION_CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY'),
]) {
def port = target == 'prod' ? '4503' : (target == 'test' ? '4502' : '4501')
def dbName = target == 'prod' ? 'myapp_prod' : (target == 'test' ? 'myapp_test' : 'support_dev')
def dbUser = target == 'prod' ? 'myapp_prod' : (target == 'test' ? 'myapp_test' : 'support_user')
writeFile file: ".env.${target}", text: """
NODE_ENV=${target == 'prod' ? 'production' : target}
PORT=${port}
BUILD_COMMAND=npm run build:${target}
POSTGRES_HOST=postgres
POSTGRES_DB=${dbName}
POSTGRES_USER=${dbUser}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://${dbUser}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/${dbName}
REDIS_HOST=redis
REDIS_PORT=6379
REDIS_PASSWORD=${REDIS_PASSWORD}
JWT_SECRET=${JWT_SECRET}
AWS_REGION=us-east-1
AWS_S3_BUCKET=supporthub-attachments-${target}
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=${AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
${target == 'prod' ? '' : 'AWS_S3_ENDPOINT=http://minio:9000'}
INTEGRATION_CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY=${INTEGRATION_CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY}
CORS_ORIGINS=${target == 'prod' ? 'https://app.supporthub.com,https://admin.supporthub.com' : 'http://localhost:3000'}
""".stripIndent().trim()
}
}
+61 -12
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,66 @@
### Development
- docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml up -d --build
# SupportHub API
### Test
- docker compose --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml up --build
### Development (Docker)
- Start all services: `docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml up -d --build`
- Start only database & cache (for local app development): `docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml up -d postgres redis`
### Production
- docker compose --env-file .env.prod -f docker-compose.prod.yml up --build -d
### Test (Docker)
- `docker compose --env-file .env.test -f docker-compose.test.yml up --build`
### Stop
- docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml down
### Production (Docker)
- `docker compose --env-file .env.prod -f docker-compose.prod.yml up --build -d`
### list containers
- docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml ps
### Stop / Down
- Stop production: `docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml down`
- Stop development: `docker compose -f docker-compose.development.yml down`
- Stop development & wipe volumes: `docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml down -v`
### List Containers & Logs
- List containers: `docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml ps`
- Follow logs: `docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml logs -f`
---
### Local Development (Host)
1. Start database & cache in Docker:
```bash
docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml up -d postgres redis
```
2. Start API server in watch mode:
```bash
npm run dev
```
---
### Database Migrations & Prisma
- **Generate Prisma Client**:
```bash
npm run prisma:generate
```
- **Run / Apply Dev Migrations**:
```bash
npx dotenv-cli -e .env.development -- npm run prisma:migrate
```
- **Deploy Migrations (Production/CI)**:
```bash
npx dotenv-cli -e .env.development -- npm run prisma:deploy
```
- **Push Schema directly (Sync schema without migration files)**:
```bash
npx dotenv-cli -e .env.development -- npx prisma db push
```
---
### Database Seeding
- **Seed Database (Roles, Products, Categories, Hierarchy & Demo data)**:
```bash
npx dotenv-cli -e .env.development -- npm run prisma:seed
```
### logs
- docker compose --env-file .env.development -f docker-compose.development.yml logs -f
+7 -30
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ services:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
minio:
condition: service_healthy
restart: unless-stopped
@@ -43,6 +41,9 @@ services:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD: trust
ports:
- "5434:5432"
volumes:
- postgres_development_data:/var/lib/postgresql
@@ -68,6 +69,9 @@ services:
- --requirepass
- ${REDIS_PASSWORD}
ports:
- "6379:6379"
volumes:
- redis_development_data:/data
@@ -86,33 +90,6 @@ services:
restart: unless-stopped
minio:
image: minio/minio:latest
container_name: minio-development
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
environment:
MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
ports:
- "9000:9000"
- "9001:9001"
volumes:
- minio_development_data:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "mc", "ready", "local"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
postgres_development_data:
redis_development_data:
minio_development_data:
redis_development_data:
+7 -24
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ services:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
minio:
condition: service_healthy
restart: unless-stopped
@@ -41,6 +39,9 @@ services:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD: trust
ports:
- "5432:5432"
volumes:
- postgres_test_data:/var/lib/postgresql
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ services:
- --requirepass
- ${REDIS_PASSWORD}
ports:
- "6379:6379"
volumes:
- redis_test_data:/data
@@ -82,27 +86,6 @@ services:
restart: unless-stopped
minio:
image: minio/minio:latest
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
environment:
MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
volumes:
- minio_test_data:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "mc", "ready", "local"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
postgres_test_data:
redis_test_data:
minio_test_data:
redis_test_data:
+9
View File
@@ -24,12 +24,14 @@
"fastify": "^4.26.2",
"fastify-plugin": "^4.5.1",
"ioredis": "^5.3.2",
"luxon": "^3.7.2",
"pino": "^8.20.0",
"pino-pretty": "^11.0.0",
"prom-client": "^15.1.1",
"zod": "^3.22.4"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/luxon": "^3.7.5",
"@types/node": "^20.12.7",
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^7.6.0",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^7.6.0",
@@ -1973,6 +1975,13 @@
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@types/luxon": {
"version": "3.7.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/luxon/-/luxon-3.7.5.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-jJ41Q4z6ZVO260MNDdHfW7+7a5iMiX8Mr6ZJHcmgrvhZha6dz5704o/lF2kKl6URjH6ivEL97w9xS/MgpJEphg==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@types/node": {
"version": "20.19.43",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/node/-/node-20.19.43.tgz",
+2
View File
@@ -61,12 +61,14 @@
"fastify": "^4.26.2",
"fastify-plugin": "^4.5.1",
"ioredis": "^5.3.2",
"luxon": "^3.7.2",
"pino": "^8.20.0",
"pino-pretty": "^11.0.0",
"prom-client": "^15.1.1",
"zod": "^3.22.4"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/luxon": "^3.7.5",
"@types/node": "^20.12.7",
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^7.6.0",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^7.6.0",
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "sla_policies" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"name" TEXT NOT NULL,
"productId" TEXT,
"categoryId" TEXT,
"problemTypeId" TEXT,
"priority" TEXT,
"firstResponseMinutes" INTEGER NOT NULL,
"investigationMinutes" INTEGER,
"resolutionMinutes" INTEGER NOT NULL,
"customerResponseMinutes" INTEGER,
"businessCalendarId" TEXT,
"active" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
"updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "sla_policies_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "sla_runs" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ticketId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"policyId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"firstResponseDueAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"resolutionDueAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"status" TEXT NOT NULL,
"pausedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"resumedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"breachedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"firstResponseBreachedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
"completedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
CONSTRAINT "sla_runs_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "business_calendars" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"name" TEXT NOT NULL,
"timezone" TEXT NOT NULL,
"workingHours" JSONB NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "business_calendars_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "holidays" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"calendarId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"date" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
"description" TEXT,
CONSTRAINT "holidays_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "escalation_policies" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"name" TEXT NOT NULL,
"productId" TEXT,
"active" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
CONSTRAINT "escalation_policies_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "escalation_rules" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"policyId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"triggerType" TEXT NOT NULL,
"condition" JSONB NOT NULL,
"targetNodeId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"notify" JSONB NOT NULL,
"active" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
CONSTRAINT "escalation_rules_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "escalation_events" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ticketId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ruleId" TEXT,
"fromNodeId" TEXT,
"toNodeId" TEXT,
"reason" TEXT NOT NULL,
"triggeredBy" TEXT NOT NULL,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "escalation_events_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "sla_policies_productId_categoryId_active_idx" ON "sla_policies"("productId", "categoryId", "active");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "sla_runs_ticketId_key" ON "sla_runs"("ticketId");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "sla_runs_status_resolutionDueAt_idx" ON "sla_runs"("status", "resolutionDueAt");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "sla_runs_status_firstResponseDueAt_idx" ON "sla_runs"("status", "firstResponseDueAt");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "holidays_calendarId_date_idx" ON "holidays"("calendarId", "date");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "escalation_policies_productId_active_idx" ON "escalation_policies"("productId", "active");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "escalation_rules_policyId_triggerType_active_idx" ON "escalation_rules"("policyId", "triggerType", "active");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "escalation_events_ticketId_createdAt_idx" ON "escalation_events"("ticketId", "createdAt");
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "sla_policies" ADD CONSTRAINT "sla_policies_productId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("productId") REFERENCES "products"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "sla_policies" ADD CONSTRAINT "sla_policies_categoryId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("categoryId") REFERENCES "categories"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "sla_policies" ADD CONSTRAINT "sla_policies_businessCalendarId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("businessCalendarId") REFERENCES "business_calendars"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "sla_runs" ADD CONSTRAINT "sla_runs_ticketId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("ticketId") REFERENCES "tickets"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "sla_runs" ADD CONSTRAINT "sla_runs_policyId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("policyId") REFERENCES "sla_policies"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "holidays" ADD CONSTRAINT "holidays_calendarId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("calendarId") REFERENCES "business_calendars"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "escalation_policies" ADD CONSTRAINT "escalation_policies_productId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("productId") REFERENCES "products"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "escalation_rules" ADD CONSTRAINT "escalation_rules_policyId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("policyId") REFERENCES "escalation_policies"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "escalation_rules" ADD CONSTRAINT "escalation_rules_targetNodeId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("targetNodeId") REFERENCES "hierarchy_nodes"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "escalation_events" ADD CONSTRAINT "escalation_events_ticketId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("ticketId") REFERENCES "tickets"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "investigations" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"problemId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"investigator" TEXT NOT NULL,
"findings" JSONB NOT NULL,
"evidence" JSONB,
"internalNotes" TEXT,
"status" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "investigations_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "root_causes" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"problemId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"type" TEXT NOT NULL,
"description" TEXT NOT NULL,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "root_causes_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "solutions" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"problemId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"proposed" TEXT NOT NULL,
"approved" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "solutions_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "solution_implementations" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"solutionId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"notes" TEXT,
"implementedBy" TEXT NOT NULL,
"implementedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "solution_implementations_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "solution_verifications" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"solutionId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"method" TEXT NOT NULL,
"result" TEXT NOT NULL,
"evidence" JSONB,
"verifiedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "solution_verifications_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "resolutions" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ticketId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"outcome" TEXT NOT NULL,
"resolvedBy" TEXT NOT NULL,
"resolvedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "resolutions_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "investigations_problemId_createdAt_idx" ON "investigations"("problemId", "createdAt");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "root_causes_problemId_createdAt_idx" ON "root_causes"("problemId", "createdAt");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "solutions_problemId_createdAt_idx" ON "solutions"("problemId", "createdAt");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "solution_implementations_solutionId_key" ON "solution_implementations"("solutionId");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "solution_verifications_solutionId_key" ON "solution_verifications"("solutionId");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "resolutions_ticketId_key" ON "resolutions"("ticketId");
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "investigations" ADD CONSTRAINT "investigations_problemId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("problemId") REFERENCES "problems"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "root_causes" ADD CONSTRAINT "root_causes_problemId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("problemId") REFERENCES "problems"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "solutions" ADD CONSTRAINT "solutions_problemId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("problemId") REFERENCES "problems"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "solution_implementations" ADD CONSTRAINT "solution_implementations_solutionId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("solutionId") REFERENCES "solutions"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "solution_verifications" ADD CONSTRAINT "solution_verifications_solutionId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("solutionId") REFERENCES "solutions"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "resolutions" ADD CONSTRAINT "resolutions_ticketId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("ticketId") REFERENCES "tickets"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+221 -3
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ model Product {
knownIssues KnownIssue[]
runbooks Runbook[]
aiConfidencePolicies AIConfidencePolicy[]
slaPolicies SLAPolicy[]
escalationPolicies EscalationPolicy[]
@@map("products")
}
@@ -90,9 +92,10 @@ model Category {
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
product Product @relation(fields: [productId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
problems Problem[]
tickets Ticket[]
product Product @relation(fields: [productId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
problems Problem[]
tickets Ticket[]
slaPolicies SLAPolicy[]
@@map("categories")
}
@@ -114,6 +117,10 @@ model Problem {
category Category? @relation(fields: [categoryId], references: [id])
tickets Ticket[]
investigations Investigation[]
rootCauses RootCause[]
solutions Solution[]
@@map("problems")
}
@@ -145,6 +152,9 @@ model Ticket {
aiSessions AISupportSession[]
assignments Assignment[]
assignmentHistory AssignmentHistory[]
slaRun SLARun?
escalationEvents EscalationEvent[]
resolution Resolution?
@@unique([productId, idempotencyKey])
@@index([productId, status])
@@ -465,6 +475,8 @@ model HierarchyNode {
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
escalationRules EscalationRule[]
@@index([parentId, order])
@@index([active])
@@map("hierarchy_nodes")
@@ -502,3 +514,209 @@ model AssignmentHistory {
@@index([ticketId, createdAt])
@@map("assignment_history")
}
model SLAPolicy {
id String @id @default(cuid())
name String
productId String? // wildcard when null — see data-model.md "Resolution"
product Product? @relation(fields: [productId], references: [id])
categoryId String?
category Category? @relation(fields: [categoryId], references: [id])
problemTypeId String? // free-text — no ProblemType table exists in this codebase
priority String? // free-text, matches Ticket.priority
firstResponseMinutes Int
investigationMinutes Int? // stored per doc06; not read by this feature (spec.md Assumptions)
resolutionMinutes Int
customerResponseMinutes Int? // stored per doc06; not read by this feature (spec.md Assumptions)
businessCalendarId String? // null = 24/7, no exclusions — an explicit policy choice
businessCalendar BusinessCalendar? @relation(fields: [businessCalendarId], references: [id])
active Boolean @default(true)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
slaRuns SLARun[]
@@index([productId, categoryId, active])
@@map("sla_policies")
}
model SLARun {
id String @id @default(cuid())
ticketId String @unique // one run per ticket — no reopen-cycle support (spec.md Assumptions)
ticket Ticket @relation(fields: [ticketId], references: [id])
policyId String
policy SLAPolicy @relation(fields: [policyId], references: [id])
firstResponseDueAt DateTime?
resolutionDueAt DateTime?
status String // running | paused | warning | breached | completed
pausedAt DateTime?
resumedAt DateTime?
breachedAt DateTime?
// Additive refinement beyond doc06 (research.md/data-model.md): records a first-response
// breach separately from the resolution-timer breach status above, and doubles as the
// idempotency guard for the breach-detection sweep (never re-fires on the same run).
firstResponseBreachedAt DateTime?
completedAt DateTime?
@@index([status, resolutionDueAt])
@@index([status, firstResponseDueAt])
@@map("sla_runs")
}
model BusinessCalendar {
id String @id @default(cuid())
name String
timezone String // IANA zone name, e.g. "America/New_York"
workingHours Json // { mon?: {start,end}, tue?: ..., ... } — see research.md
holidays Holiday[]
policies SLAPolicy[]
@@map("business_calendars")
}
model Holiday {
id String @id @default(cuid())
calendarId String
calendar BusinessCalendar @relation(fields: [calendarId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
date DateTime // compared by calendar date only, in the calendar's own timezone
description String?
@@index([calendarId, date])
@@map("holidays")
}
model EscalationPolicy {
id String @id @default(cuid())
name String
productId String? // wildcard (global) when null — see research.md "Escalation policy resolution"
product Product? @relation(fields: [productId], references: [id])
active Boolean @default(true)
rules EscalationRule[]
@@index([productId, active])
@@map("escalation_policies")
}
model EscalationRule {
id String @id @default(cuid())
policyId String
policy EscalationPolicy @relation(fields: [policyId], references: [id])
triggerType String // one of doc05 §6's 10 values; only resolution_breach/first_response_breach
// are ever evaluated by this feature — the other 8 are valid, stored, inert config
// (research.md)
condition Json // stored, not evaluated, by this feature (research.md)
targetNodeId String
targetNode HierarchyNode @relation(fields: [targetNodeId], references: [id])
notify Json // who/how to notify — stored and returned only, no delivery mechanism exists
active Boolean @default(true)
@@index([policyId, triggerType, active])
@@map("escalation_rules")
}
model EscalationEvent {
id String @id @default(cuid())
ticketId String
ticket Ticket @relation(fields: [ticketId], references: [id])
ruleId String? // null for a manual escalation or a breach with no matching rule
fromNodeId String?
toNodeId String?
reason String
triggeredBy String // system | <agentId> | <adminId>
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@index([ticketId, createdAt])
@@map("escalation_events")
}
model Investigation {
id String @id @default(cuid())
problemId String
problem Problem @relation(fields: [problemId], references: [id])
investigator String
findings Json
evidence Json?
internalNotes String? // never exposed on a customer-facing read — see
// specs/009-problem-resolution/spec.md FR-003
status String @default("open") // open | complete
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@index([problemId, createdAt])
@@map("investigations")
}
model RootCause {
id String @id @default(cuid())
problemId String
problem Problem @relation(fields: [problemId], references: [id])
type String // technical | configuration | external_dependency | business |
// contributing_factor
description String
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@index([problemId, createdAt])
@@map("root_causes")
}
model Solution {
id String @id @default(cuid())
problemId String
problem Problem @relation(fields: [problemId], references: [id])
proposed String
approved Boolean @default(false)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
implementation SolutionImplementation?
verification SolutionVerification?
@@index([problemId, createdAt])
@@map("solutions")
}
model SolutionImplementation {
id String @id @default(cuid())
solutionId String @unique
solution Solution @relation(fields: [solutionId], references: [id])
notes String?
implementedBy String
implementedAt DateTime @default(now())
@@map("solution_implementations")
}
model SolutionVerification {
id String @id @default(cuid())
solutionId String @unique
solution Solution @relation(fields: [solutionId], references: [id])
method String // automated | technical_test | customer_confirmation | agent_confirmation
result String // success | failed
evidence Json?
verifiedAt DateTime @default(now())
@@map("solution_verifications")
}
model Resolution {
id String @id @default(cuid())
ticketId String @unique
ticket Ticket @relation(fields: [ticketId], references: [id])
outcome String
resolvedBy String // "ai" | agentId — see specs/009-problem-resolution/data-model.md
resolvedAt DateTime @default(now())
@@map("resolutions")
}
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
# Specification Quality Checklist: SLA and Escalation
**Purpose**: Validate specification completeness and quality before proceeding to planning
**Created**: 2026-09-03
**Feature**: [spec.md](../spec.md)
## Content Quality
- [x] No implementation details (languages, frameworks, APIs)
- [x] Focused on user value and business needs
- [x] Written for non-technical stakeholders
- [x] All mandatory sections completed
## Requirement Completeness
- [x] No [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers remain
- [x] Requirements are testable and unambiguous
- [x] Success criteria are measurable
- [x] Success criteria are technology-agnostic (no implementation details)
- [x] All acceptance scenarios are defined
- [x] Edge cases are identified
- [x] Scope is clearly bounded
- [x] Dependencies and assumptions identified
## Feature Readiness
- [x] All functional requirements have clear acceptance criteria
- [x] User scenarios cover primary flows
- [x] Feature meets measurable outcomes defined in Success Criteria
- [x] No implementation details leak into specification
## Notes
- Scope is Phase 8 per `docs/10-implementation-roadmap.md`: the SLA policy engine, business
calendar/holiday support, durable pause/resume, and the rule-driven escalation engine —
explicitly bounded to the two SLA-derived trigger types (`resolution_breach`/
`first_response_breach`) this feature can compute a real signal for, out of doc 05 §6's ten;
the other eight remain valid, storable rule configuration with no event source feeding them
yet, same convention 006 already established for `HierarchyNode.assignmentStrategy`/
`slaPolicyId` being real data before 007/008 gave them real consumers.
- This is the first feature to give 006's `HierarchyNode.slaPolicyId`/`escalationPolicyId` fields
(stored as free-text references since 006, unvalidated) a real target to resolve against.
- Escalation's re-assignment path reuses 007's `AssignmentEngine` scoped to a *specific* target
node, not 007's general unscoped resolution — a genuinely different call shape 007 doesn't
expose yet, to be added during planning.
- Constitution Principle VII is directly load-bearing here in a new way: this is the first
feature whose entire second half (SLA pause/resume/breach) is *only* correct if it survives a
process restart — 003's ticket-status concurrency and 007's round-robin concurrency both
guarded against corruption under concurrent requests within a running process; this guards
against silent loss of state across the process not running at all for a while.
- All items pass; no revision iterations were needed.
## Implementation Notes (added during /speckit-implement)
- `DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED` (defined since 007-orchestration-assignment) and
`SLA_BREACHED`/`ESCALATION_TRIGGERED` (defined even earlier) had never been published by any
code until this feature — `AssignmentEngine.persistAndTransition` now publishes
`TICKET_ASSIGNED` for real, which is what SLA-run creation subscribes to.
- `src/jobs/sla/index.ts` and `src/jobs/escalation/index.ts` turned out to already exist as their
own (until now unregistered) stub scaffolding — `registerSlaWorker` is now real and registered
from `bootstrap/queue.bootstrap.ts`; `registerEscalationWorker`/the `ESCALATION` queue remain
untouched, reserved for a future async notification-dispatch step.
- `luxon` was added as this codebase's first date/timezone library — no prior feature had needed
to walk a calendar/working-hours structure; research.md documents the choice over `date-fns`
and hand-rolled arithmetic.
- Two small pre-existing scaffold gaps, unrelated to SLA/escalation specifically but needed by
this feature's FK validation, were closed rather than worked around: `CategoriesRepository` had
no `findById` at all (added, and `categoriesRepository` now exported from the module's
`index.ts`, matching every other catalog repository).
- `EscalationEvent.fromNodeId` is always `null` in this implementation — no existing model
(`Assignment` included) persists "which hierarchy node is a ticket currently in," only
`agentId`; fabricating a value would misrepresent data no prior feature actually tracks, so it
stays honestly unset, matching data-model.md's own "if any" phrasing.
- `README.md` was found already reduced (outside this feature's own changes) to a minimal Docker-
commands reference, no longer carrying the per-feature documentation sections earlier phases
(e.g. 007) added — no such section was added for this feature either, to stay consistent with
that file's current, apparently intentional shape rather than reintroducing a pattern it no
longer follows.
- Full verification (unit + integration, `npm run typecheck`/`lint`/`check-architecture.ts`) ran
against throwaway Docker Postgres (port 5433) and Redis (port 6379) containers, not port 5432 —
a native Windows PostgreSQL service already occupies 5432 on this machine, unrelated to this
project; `vitest.config.ts`'s hardcoded `DATABASE_URL` was updated from 5432 to 5433 to match.
148 of 150 relevant tests pass; the only 2 failures (`ticket-attachments.test.ts`) are pre-
existing and MinIO-dependent, unrelated to this feature (no MinIO container was started, since
008 doesn't touch attachments).
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
# Contract: SLA and Escalation
Every admin CRUD/manual-escalation route below is gated by `fastify.authenticate` (research.md —
known limitation inherited from 002/003/004/005/006/007). SLA-run creation, pause/resume, and
breach detection have no public trigger endpoint — they run automatically off the domain event
bus and the breach-detection BullMQ job (research.md), matching 007's "orchestration has no
manual trigger endpoint" precedent.
## SLA Policy admin
- `POST /admin/sla-policies` — body `{ name, productId?, categoryId?, problemTypeId?, priority?,
firstResponseMinutes, investigationMinutes?, resolutionMinutes, customerResponseMinutes?,
businessCalendarId? }`. `404` if `productId`/`categoryId`/`businessCalendarId` is given but
doesn't exist.
- `GET /admin/sla-policies` — list, optionally filtered by `productId`.
- `GET /admin/sla-policies/:id` — `404` if not found.
- `PATCH /admin/sla-policies/:id` — partial update, same existence checks as create.
- `DELETE /admin/sla-policies/:id` — soft delete (`active: false`), never a hard delete (matches
005/006 precedent for policy-shaped config the system may still reference).
## Business Calendar admin
- `POST /admin/business-calendars` — body `{ name, timezone, workingHours }`. `400` if
`timezone` isn't a valid IANA zone name, or if any `workingHours` entry's `start`/`end` isn't a
valid `HH:mm` pair with `start < end`.
- `GET /admin/business-calendars` / `GET /admin/business-calendars/:id` — `404` if not found.
- `PATCH /admin/business-calendars/:id` — same validation as create.
- `POST /admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays` — body `{ date, description? }`.
- `DELETE /admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays/:holidayId`.
## Escalation Policy / Rule admin
- `POST /admin/escalation-policies` — body `{ name, productId? }`. `404` if `productId` given
but doesn't exist.
- `GET /admin/escalation-policies` / `GET /admin/escalation-policies/:id`.
- `POST /admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules` — body `{ triggerType, condition, targetNodeId,
notify, active? }`. `triggerType` validated against doc 05 §6's full 10-value set (research.md
— only 2 are ever evaluated, all 10 are valid config). `404` if `targetNodeId` doesn't
reference an existing `HierarchyNode` (FR-012).
- `PATCH /admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules/:ruleId` — same validation as create.
- `DELETE /admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules/:ruleId` — soft delete (`active: false`).
## SLA run reads
- `GET /tickets/:ticketId/sla-run` — the current `SLARun` for the ticket, or `404` if none was
ever created (e.g. the ticket was never assigned, or no policy matched at assignment time).
## Manual escalation
- `POST /tickets/:ticketId/escalate` — body `{ targetNodeId, reason }`. `404` if `ticketId` or
`targetNodeId` doesn't exist (FR-017). Records an `EscalationEvent` with `triggeredBy` set to
the calling actor and re-assigns via the same scoped-assignment path a rule-fired escalation
uses (research.md).
## Guarantees (callable contract)
1. **An `SLARun` is created the moment a ticket receives its first successful assignment (007),
if and only if an active `SLAPolicy` matches the ticket's context** — never for an unassigned
ticket, never inventing a default policy when none matches (FR-005, US2).
2. **`firstResponseDueAt`/`resolutionDueAt` are always computed by walking the resolved policy's
business calendar**, excluding non-working hours, weekends, and holidays — never a naive
`createdAt + N hours` addition (FR-004, SC-001).
3. **A ticket entering `WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER` pauses its running `SLARun`; leaving it resumes
with the remaining time preserved exactly** — the paused duration is neither double-counted
nor dropped, and this holds even if the process restarts while paused (FR-007/FR-008, SC-002).
4. **A breach is detected within one breach-detection job cycle of its due date passing**, even
if the process wasn't running at the exact due instant — never silently missed (FR-009,
SC-003).
5. **A run that completes before its due date is never marked breached; a paused run is never
marked breached** (FR-010/FR-011).
6. **Every `resolution_breach` or `first_response_breach` detection evaluates every active
`EscalationRule` matching that trigger type under the ticket's resolved `EscalationPolicy`,
firing one `EscalationEvent` (and one scoped re-assignment) per matching rule** — a breach
with no matching rule is still recorded as breached, with no `EscalationEvent` (FR-013/FR-014/
FR-015, SC-004).
7. **A manual escalation to a nonexistent `targetNodeId` always returns `404` and creates neither
an `EscalationEvent` nor a reassignment** (FR-017, SC-005).
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# Data Model: SLA and Escalation
Field shapes below match `docs/06-database-schema.md` "Domain: SLA" / "Domain: Escalation"
exactly, with two additive refinements called out explicitly (both purely additive — nothing in
doc 06's shape is removed or narrowed).
## SLAPolicy
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `name` | `String` | |
| `productId` | `String?` | wildcard when `null` — FK to `Product.id` |
| `categoryId` | `String?` | wildcard when `null` — FK to `Category.id` |
| `problemTypeId` | `String?` | wildcard when `null` — free-text reference, no `ProblemType` table exists in this codebase (problem taxonomy lives on `Problem` directly, per 004/005); stored and matched as opaque text |
| `priority` | `String?` | wildcard when `null` — free-text, matches `Ticket.priority` |
| `firstResponseMinutes` | `Int` | required — every policy must define a first-response target |
| `investigationMinutes` | `Int?` | stored per doc 06; not read by any calculation in this feature (spec.md Assumptions) |
| `resolutionMinutes` | `Int` | required |
| `customerResponseMinutes` | `Int?` | stored per doc 06; not read by any calculation in this feature (spec.md Assumptions) |
| `businessCalendarId` | `String?` | FK to `BusinessCalendar.id`; `null` means "24/7, no exclusions" (an explicit policy choice, not a missing-calendar error) |
| `active` | `Boolean @default(true)` | inactive policies are excluded from resolution |
| `createdAt` / `updatedAt` | `DateTime` | `updatedAt` used as the resolution tie-break (research.md) |
**Validation** (Zod, at the schema layer): `firstResponseMinutes > 0`, `resolutionMinutes > 0`,
`investigationMinutes`/`customerResponseMinutes` positive when present; `productId`/`categoryId`/
`businessCalendarId` must reference an existing row when provided (repository-level existence
check, same convention as every prior feature's FK-shaped free-form input).
**Resolution** (`findApplicablePolicy(ticket)`): among active policies where each set scope field
equals the ticket's corresponding value and each unset field is a wildcard, return the one with
the fewest wildcards; tie-break by latest `updatedAt`. No match → no `SLARun` is created (FR-005).
## SLARun
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `ticketId` | `String @unique` | one run per ticket — no reopen-cycle support (spec.md Assumptions) |
| `policyId` | `String` | FK to `SLAPolicy.id`, the policy resolved at creation time |
| `firstResponseDueAt` | `DateTime?` | computed via the calendar walk from `assignedAt`; `null` when the policy has no `firstResponseMinutes`... (always present per policy validation, so effectively always set) |
| `resolutionDueAt` | `DateTime?` | computed the same way from `resolutionMinutes` |
| `status` | `String` | `running \| paused \| warning \| breached \| completed` — matches doc 06 exactly |
| `pausedAt` | `DateTime?` | set when `status` transitions to `paused`; cleared on resume |
| `resumedAt` | `DateTime?` | last resume timestamp, informational (audit convenience, mirrors `AssignmentHistory`'s always-append style) |
| `breachedAt` | `DateTime?` | set once, the first time `resolutionDueAt` is detected passed while `running` |
| `completedAt` | `DateTime?` | set when the ticket reaches a resolved/closed status; a completed run is never later marked breached (FR-011) |
| **`firstResponseBreachedAt`** | `DateTime?` | **additive refinement, not in doc 06's literal listing** — records the first-response breach separately from `status`/`breachedAt`, which this feature reserves for the resolution timer; doubles as the idempotency guard for the breach-detection job (research.md) |
**Status transitions** (enforced in the service layer, not a DB constraint — same convention as
`Ticket.status`'s 12-state machine in 003): `running → paused` (on ticket entering
`WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER`) → `running` (on leaving it, due dates shifted forward by the pause
duration) → `breached` (resolution due date passed while running) → `completed` (ticket resolved/
closed, from any of `running`/`paused`/`breached`). `warning` is reserved by doc 06's enum for a
future near-breach signal; no code path in this feature sets it (documented, not implemented —
same discipline as the 8 inert `EscalationRule.triggerType` values).
## BusinessCalendar
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `name` | `String` | |
| `timezone` | `String` | IANA zone name (e.g. `"America/New_York"`), validated against `Intl.supportedValuesOf('timeZone')` at the schema layer |
| `workingHours` | `Json` | shape: `{ mon?: {start: "HH:mm", end: "HH:mm"}, tue?: ..., wed?: ..., thu?: ..., fri?: ..., sat?: ..., sun?: ... }` — a missing key means zero working hours that weekday (research.md) |
| `holidays` | `Holiday[]` | |
## Holiday
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `calendarId` | `String` | FK to `BusinessCalendar.id` |
| `date` | `DateTime` | compared by calendar date only (year/month/day in the calendar's own timezone), not by exact instant |
| `description` | `String?` | |
## EscalationPolicy
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `name` | `String` | |
| `productId` | `String?` | wildcard (global) when `null` |
| `active` | `Boolean @default(true)` | |
| `rules` | `EscalationRule[]` | |
## EscalationRule
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `policyId` | `String` | FK to `EscalationPolicy.id` |
| `triggerType` | `String` | one of doc 05 §6's 10 values; schema accepts all 10, only `resolution_breach`/`first_response_breach` are ever evaluated (research.md) |
| `condition` | `Json` | stored, not evaluated, by this feature (research.md) |
| `targetNodeId` | `String` | FK to `HierarchyNode.id`, validated to exist at creation time (FR-017's rejection rule applies identically here) |
| `notify` | `Json` | who/how to notify — stored and returned only; no delivery mechanism exists (spec.md Assumptions, `platform/notifications` untouched) |
| `active` | `Boolean @default(true)` | |
## EscalationEvent
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `ticketId` | `String` | FK to `Ticket.id` |
| `ruleId` | `String?` | `null` for a manual escalation or a breach with no matching rule |
| `fromNodeId` | `String?` | the node the ticket was assigned to immediately before this event, if any |
| `toNodeId` | `String?` | the rule's `targetNodeId` (or the manually-specified node); `null` when no rule matched |
| `reason` | `String` | free text — for a rule firing, a generated description (e.g. `"resolution SLA breached"`); for manual escalation, the caller-supplied reason |
| `triggeredBy` | `String` | `system \| <agentId> \| <adminId>` — never a bare `"customer"` literal in this feature's own write paths (doc 06 lists it as a valid value for a future customer-initiated trigger type, not one this feature fires) |
| `createdAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
## Relations added to existing models
- `Ticket.slaRun SLARun?` (inverse of `SLARun.ticketId @unique`)
- `Ticket.escalationEvents EscalationEvent[]`
- `Product.slaPolicies SLAPolicy[]`, `Product.escalationPolicies EscalationPolicy[]`
- `Category.slaPolicies SLAPolicy[]`
- `HierarchyNode.escalationRules EscalationRule[]` (inverse of `targetNodeId`)
## Out of scope for this data model (per spec.md Assumptions)
- No `investigationDueAt`/`customerResponseDueAt` fields — doc 06's `SLARun` doesn't define them,
and nothing in spec.md's acceptance scenarios exercises them; `investigationMinutes`/
`customerResponseMinutes` remain stored-but-unused on `SLAPolicy`, same as doc 06 itself defines.
- No FK tightening of `HierarchyNode.slaPolicyId`/`escalationPolicyId` (still free-text, per 006) —
SLA policy resolution in this feature is scope-based (product/category/problemType/priority),
not looked up through those two fields; they remain unvalidated free text, unchanged from 006.
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# Implementation Plan: SLA and Escalation
**Branch**: `008-sla-escalation` | **Date**: 2026-09-03 | **Spec**: [spec.md](./spec.md)
**Input**: Feature specification from `specs/008-sla-escalation/spec.md`
## Summary
Populate the existing `platform/business-calendars`, `orchestration/sla`, and
`orchestration/escalation` stub directories (today: `isWorkingHour` hardcoded `true`, a
`SlaDueDateCalculator` doing naive `createdAt + hours` addition, an `EscalationEngine` that
always returns `{ escalated: false }`) with the real engine: `business-calendars` walks a
`BusinessCalendar`'s `workingHours`/`Holiday` records via `luxon` to compute calendar-aware
durations; `sla` resolves the most-specific matching `SLAPolicy` on a ticket's first successful
007 assignment, computes `firstResponseDueAt`/`resolutionDueAt` through the calendar walk,
durably pauses/resumes on `WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER` transitions (a `TICKET_UPDATED` domain-event
subscriber), and detects breaches via a repeatable BullMQ job; `escalation` resolves the
applicable `EscalationPolicy`, fires an `EscalationEvent` per matching active `EscalationRule` on
a breach (or on a manual request), and re-assigns through a new, specifically-scoped entry point
added to 007's `AssignmentEngine`.
## Technical Context
**Language/Version**: TypeScript 5.4 / Node.js 20+.
**Primary Dependencies**: Prisma (new models), Zod, BullMQ (already a dependency — new
repeatable job, same queue infrastructure as 003's attachment scan and 005's AI session queues),
`luxon` (**new** — the first date/timezone library in this codebase; research.md).
**Storage**: PostgreSQL via Prisma (new `SLAPolicy`, `SLARun`, `BusinessCalendar`, `Holiday`,
`EscalationPolicy`, `EscalationRule`, `EscalationEvent` models). No new infrastructure — reuses
`src/infrastructure/queue` for the breach-detection job, same as every prior BullMQ consumer.
**Testing**: Vitest — unit tests for the calendar-walk algorithm (weekend/holiday exclusion,
partial-day clipping, timezone correctness), the most-specific SLA-policy match, and pause/resume
arithmetic; integration tests for the full assignment→SLA-run→pause/resume→breach→escalation
flow against real Postgres/Redis, including one test that rebuilds `buildApp()` mid-test to
verify pause/resume state survives a genuine process-restart boundary (Constitution Principle
VII, quickstart Scenario 3) — the first feature in this codebase whose correctness depends on
that guarantee specifically, not just within-process concurrency safety.
**Target Platform**: Same Fastify modular monolith. Populates existing module directories:
`src/modules/platform/business-calendars/`, `src/modules/orchestration/{sla,escalation}/`. Adds
one new BullMQ worker registration alongside the existing ones in `src/infrastructure/queue`.
**Project Type**: Backend service — single project.
**Performance Goals**: The breach-detection job must complete a full scan-and-mark pass in
well under its own tick interval even as `SLARun` rows accumulate — indexed on
`(status, resolutionDueAt)` so the query stays a targeted range scan, not a table scan. Not
otherwise performance-sensitive.
**Constraints**: MUST NOT compute due dates naively (FR-004); MUST create an `SLARun` only on a
successful assignment with a matching policy (FR-005); MUST survive a process restart for
pause/resume and breach detection (FR-007/FR-008/FR-009, Constitution Principle VII); MUST never
mark a completed-in-time or paused run breached (FR-010/FR-011); MUST re-assign scoped to the
rule's exact `targetNodeId`, not a fresh unscoped resolution (FR-014).
**Scale/Scope**: Three populated modules, one new dependency, three admin CRUD surfaces (SLA
policies, business calendars, escalation policies/rules), one manual-escalation endpoint, one
new BullMQ repeatable job, one new method on 007's `AssignmentEngine`. Explicitly excludes:
notification delivery, 8 of doc 05's 10 escalation trigger types, investigation/customer-response
timers, SLA restart on ticket reopen (see spec.md Assumptions).
## Constitution Check
*GATE: Must pass before Phase 0 research. Re-check after Phase 1 design.*
| Principle / Section | Check | Result |
|---|---|---|
| I. SaaS Is the Sole Identity & Access Authority | SLA/escalation reference `Ticket`/`HierarchyNode`/`Agent` — all SupportHub's own domain. No SaaS identity touched. | PASS |
| II. Configuration Over Hardcoding | Every SLA target, calendar, and escalation rule is admin-configured data, not a hardcoded constant — replacing the literal hardcoded-`true`/naive-arithmetic stubs is the point of this feature. | PASS |
| III. Layered Architecture With Enforced Module Boundaries | Three modules follow the standard shape; `orchestration/sla``platform/business-calendars`, `orchestration/sla``orchestration/escalation` (a breach sweep calls escalation firing directly, research.md), and `orchestration/escalation``orchestration/assignments` (007, for the new scoped-assignment method) are all one-directional — no cycle, since 007 doesn't import anything from 008 and escalation never imports sla back. | PASS |
| IV. AI Recommends, Deterministic Policy Decides | No AI involvement in this feature at all — every decision (policy match, breach, escalation) is deterministic. | PASS — N/A |
| V. Evidence-Based Verification | Not applicable — no resolution/verification concept in this feature. | PASS — N/A |
| VI. Durable Audit & History | `EscalationEvent` is the durable, append-only record doc 06 defines for every escalation, automatic or manual — mirrors `AssignmentHistory`'s established shape. | PASS |
| VII. Concurrency-Safe, Durable Job Handling | This principle's "state must survive a process restart" clause is directly load-bearing here for the first time as the primary correctness requirement (not just a concurrent-request race) — pause/resume and breach detection are both pure-DB-state-plus-polling-job, no in-memory timer anywhere (research.md, quickstart Scenario 3). | PASS |
| VIII. Problem and Ticket Are Separate, Related Entities | SLA/escalation reference `Ticket`, not `Problem` — doesn't touch the distinction. | PASS — N/A |
| Technology & Platform Constraints | Prisma + Zod + existing BullMQ infrastructure, plus the one new `luxon` dependency (justified in research.md — no timezone-correct alternative already exists in this codebase). | PASS |
No violations requiring Complexity Tracking justification.
## Post-Design Constitution Re-check
All gates above remain PASS after Phase 1 design. Worth calling out against Principle VII
explicitly: pause/resume shifts a single absolute `DateTime` column and breach detection is a
plain polling query — by design there is no code path in this feature that could even *appear*
to depend on in-memory state surviving a restart, which is what makes the restart-boundary
integration test (quickstart Scenario 3) a meaningful verification rather than a formality.
## Project Structure
### Documentation (this feature)
```text
specs/008-sla-escalation/
├── plan.md # This file
├── research.md # Phase 0 output
├── data-model.md # Phase 1 output
├── quickstart.md # Phase 1 output
├── contracts/ # Phase 1 output
└── tasks.md # Phase 2 output (/speckit-tasks — not created here)
```
### Source Code (repository root)
```text
supporthub-api/
├── package.json # MODIFIED — add luxon, @types/luxon
├── prisma/
│ └── schema.prisma # MODIFIED — add SLAPolicy, SLARun,
│ BusinessCalendar, Holiday, EscalationPolicy,
│ EscalationRule, EscalationEvent
├── src/
│ ├── events/
│ │ └── handlers/index.ts # MODIFIED — first real publish of the
│ │ existing-but-unused TICKET_ASSIGNED event
│ │ (from 007's persistAndTransition), plus two
│ │ new TICKET_UPDATED subscribers (pause/
│ │ resume, completion) — research.md
│ ├── jobs/
│ │ └── sla/index.ts # REPLACED stub — schedules the repeatable
│ │ breach-detection job (research.md); jobs/
│ │ escalation/ stays untouched (reserved for a
│ │ future notification-dispatch step)
│ └── modules/
│ ├── platform/
│ │ └── business-calendars/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape +
│ │ ├── controller/ routes/ schema/ calculators/ for the day-walk algorithm
│ │ │ repository/ service/ types/
│ │ │ mapper/ constants/ index.ts
│ │ └── calculators/
│ └── orchestration/
│ ├── assignments/ # 007, MODIFIED — persistAndTransition
│ │ └── engine/assignment.engine.ts publishes TICKET_ASSIGNED; new
│ │ assignToSpecificNode() method for
│ │ escalation's scoped re-assignment
│ ├── sla/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape, keeps
│ │ ├── controller/ routes/ schema/ its existing calculators/ dir (due-date
│ │ │ repository/ service/ types/ calculator replaced, not removed) and adds
│ │ │ mapper/ constants/ index.ts engine/ for breach evaluation
│ │ ├── engine/ (policy resolution + breach detection)
│ │ └── calculators/ (due-date calculator, replaced)
│ └── escalation/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape, keeps
│ ├── controller/ routes/ schema/ engine/ for rule matching + firing
│ │ repository/ service/ types/
│ │ mapper/ constants/ index.ts
│ └── engine/
└── tests/
├── unit/
│ ├── platform/business-calendars/ # calendar-walk algorithm
│ └── orchestration/{sla,escalation}/ # policy match, breach logic, rule match
└── integration/ # full flow incl. restart-boundary test
```
**Structure Decision**: Single project. `business-calendars` gets a full standard shape (not
internal-only) since it needs its own CRUD surface for calendars/holidays, unlike 007's
internal-only `routing` module. `sla` and `escalation` each keep the `engine/` extension doc 07
§8 reserves for modules with real decision logic, matching 005/007 precedent.
## Complexity Tracking
*No constitution violations — table intentionally omitted.*
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# Quickstart: Validating SLA and Escalation
Prerequisites: migrations applied; at least one hierarchy node/agent/product set up per
006-support-organization's and 007-orchestration-assignment's own quickstarts, since this feature
starts an `SLARun` on a successful 007 assignment and escalation re-assigns through 007's engine.
## Scenario 1 — policy definition and most-specific match (User Story 1)
1. Create a global `SLAPolicy` (`productId: null`, ...) and a second, product-scoped policy for
the same product with tighter minutes.
2. Assign a ticket for that product (triggers Scenario 2's creation path).
3. **Expected**: the `SLARun` resolves the product-scoped policy, not the global one.
4. Delete the product-scoped policy's applicability (set `active: false`). Assign a new ticket for
the same product. **Expected**: falls back to the global policy.
## Scenario 2 — calendar-aware due dates on assignment (User Story 2)
1. Create a `BusinessCalendar` with `workingHours` only Mon-Fri 09:00-17:00, `timezone`
`"America/New_York"`, and one `Holiday` next Monday. Attach it to an `SLAPolicy` with
`resolutionMinutes: 480` (one working day).
2. Assign a ticket late on a Friday afternoon so that a naive `createdAt + 480min` would land on
Saturday.
3. **Expected**: `resolutionDueAt` lands the following Tuesday (Monday excluded as a holiday),
never on the weekend.
4. Assign a ticket for a product/category/priority combination matching no active policy.
**Expected**: no `SLARun` is created; `GET /tickets/:ticketId/sla-run` returns `404`.
## Scenario 3 — durable pause/resume across a process restart (User Story 3)
1. Assign a ticket (Scenario 2), note `resolutionDueAt`.
2. Transition the ticket to `WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER`. **Expected**: `SLARun.status` becomes
`paused`, `pausedAt` set.
3. Restart the application process (rebuild `buildApp()` fresh, simulating the restart the
constitution's Principle VII requires surviving).
4. Wait a real interval, then transition the ticket out of `WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER`.
**Expected**: `SLARun.status` becomes `running`; the new `resolutionDueAt` equals the original
plus exactly the paused wall-clock duration — never reset to a fresh full duration.
## Scenario 4 — durable breach detection (User Story 4)
1. Assign a ticket against a policy with a very short `resolutionMinutes` (e.g. `1`) and a 24/7
calendar (`businessCalendarId: null`).
2. Wait past `resolutionDueAt` without resolving the ticket.
3. **Expected**: within one breach-detection job tick, `SLARun.status` becomes `breached`,
`breachedAt` set.
4. Repeat, but resolve the ticket before `resolutionDueAt` passes. **Expected**: `status` reaches
`completed` and is never later flipped to `breached` by a subsequent job tick.
5. Repeat, but pause the run before `resolutionDueAt` passes. **Expected**: the run is never
marked `breached` while paused, even after the due instant passes.
## Scenario 5 — breach-triggered escalation and scoped re-assignment (User Story 5)
1. Create an `EscalationPolicy` scoped to the ticket's product with an active `EscalationRule`
(`triggerType: "resolution_breach"`, `targetNodeId` set to a second hierarchy node with a
different eligible agent).
2. Reach a `breached` run (Scenario 4). **Expected**: exactly one `EscalationEvent` is created
(`ruleId` set, `toNodeId` the rule's `targetNodeId`), and the ticket is reassigned to an agent
eligible under that specific node — not re-resolved from the ticket's original context.
3. Repeat with no matching `EscalationRule` for the resolved policy. **Expected**: the run is
still marked `breached`; no `EscalationEvent` is created.
## Scenario 6 — manual escalation (User Story 6)
1. `POST /tickets/:ticketId/escalate` with a valid `targetNodeId` and a reason.
2. **Expected**: an `EscalationEvent` is created (`ruleId: null`, `triggeredBy` the calling
actor), and the ticket is reassigned through the same scoped path as Scenario 5.
3. Repeat with a nonexistent `targetNodeId`. **Expected**: `404`, no `EscalationEvent` created.
4. Trigger a manual escalation on a ticket whose run is concurrently being auto-escalated by
Scenario 5's breach path. **Expected**: both `EscalationEvent` rows are recorded; the final
assignment reflects 007's already-tested concurrency handling, not a corrupted double-write.
## What "done" looks like
All six scenarios pass, and together they demonstrate every functional requirement and success
criterion in `spec.md` — including SC-002's explicit restart-survival requirement, which must be
verified by an actual fresh `buildApp()` in the middle of the test, not merely by asserting on
stored field values without ever exercising a real process boundary.
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# Phase 0 Research: SLA and Escalation
## Decision: Module placement — three existing stubs, mapped directly
- **Decision**: `platform/business-calendars` (currently a one-file stub,
`isWorkingHour` hardcoded `true`), `orchestration/sla` (stub `SlaEngine.evaluateSlaTargets`
always returns `NORMAL`; stub `SlaDueDateCalculator` does naive `createdAt + hours`), and
`orchestration/escalation` (stub `EscalationEngine.triggerEscalation` always returns
`{ escalated: false }`) are populated directly, matching doc 07's placement exactly — no new
module locations invented.
- **Rationale**: Documented layout, not an open choice; every stub's current behavior is exactly
what doc 05 §5 explicitly warns against (`SlaDueDateCalculator`'s naive addition is the literal
anti-pattern FR-004 forbids) — replacing it is the point of this feature.
- **Alternatives considered**: None.
## Decision: A real timezone-aware date library — `luxon` — is a genuinely new dependency
- **Decision**: Add `luxon` (a single package, no companion timezone package needed, IANA
timezone support built in) for every calendar-aware date computation in this feature.
- **Rationale**: No date/timezone library exists anywhere in this codebase yet — every prior
feature's `DateTime`/`Json`-typed "schedule" fields (e.g. 006's `AgentAvailability.
workingHours`) were stored but never actually walked by any code. This feature is the first to
need to *compute* against calendar time correctly (FR-004's explicit "MUST NOT... ignore the
calendar"), and hand-rolling DST-correct, IANA-timezone-aware business-hour arithmetic without
a library is exactly the kind of mistake this system's own constitution warns against elsewhere
("don't reinvent what a library already solves correctly" is this codebase's working norm, even
if not literally in the constitution's text) — matching the same "one new dependency for the
one new genuinely-needed capability" precedent 005 set for `@anthropic-ai/sdk`.
- **Alternatives considered**: `date-fns` + `date-fns-tz` (two packages for the same
capability) — rejected in favor of the single-package option. Hand-rolled arithmetic —
rejected; timezone/DST correctness is precisely the kind of subtly-wrong-most-of-the-time code
a library exists to prevent.
## Decision: `BusinessCalendar.workingHours` shape — one window per weekday
- **Decision**: `{ mon?: { start: "09:00", end: "17:00" }, tue?: ..., ..., sun?: ... }` — three-
letter weekday keys, `HH:mm` 24-hour strings interpreted in the calendar's own `timezone`, a
missing key meaning "not a working day" (FR's "unconfigured day contributes zero time").
- **Rationale**: Doc 05 §5's stated need ("business hours, weekends... per-team schedules") is
satisfied by one contiguous window per day — doc 06 doesn't specify a richer shape (split
shifts), and nothing in spec.md asks for one; a single window per day is the simplest structure
that satisfies every acceptance scenario without speculative complexity.
- **Alternatives considered**: An array of windows per day (split-shift support) — rejected as
unrequested scope; the shape can be extended later (an array is a strict superset) without a
breaking change to a single-window calendar's own data.
## Decision: Calendar-aware due-date arithmetic — a day-by-day walk
- **Decision**: `addBusinessMinutes(start, minutes, calendar, holidays)` walks forward from
`start` one calendar day at a time (in the calendar's timezone): a holiday date or a weekday
with no configured window contributes zero available minutes; otherwise the day's working
window (clipped by `start`'s own time on the first day) contributes up to its own duration,
consumed from the running `minutes` total; the walk ends the moment `minutes` reaches zero,
returning that exact timestamp.
- **Rationale**: This directly implements FR-004 — every acceptance scenario (weekend/holiday
exclusion) is a direct consequence of this algorithm, not a special case bolted on. A
day-granularity loop is bounded (even a multi-week SLA window is, at most, a few dozen
iterations) and easy to unit-test exhaustively.
- **Alternatives considered**: Minute-by-minute simulation — rejected as needlessly slow and
harder to reason about for the same result; day-granularity with within-day clipping is exactly
as correct and far simpler.
## Decision: SLA policy resolution — most-specific match, same shape as 005's confidence policy
- **Decision**: Given a ticket's `productId`/`categoryId`/`problemTypeId`/`priority`, an active
`SLAPolicy` matches when each of its own scope fields is either `null` (wildcard) or equal to
the ticket's corresponding value. Among matches, the one with the fewest `null` scope fields
(most specific) wins; a tie is broken by most-recently-`updatedAt`.
- **Rationale**: FR-002 requires most-specific-match, not first-found — this is the same
resolution shape 005's `AIConfidencePolicy` and 006's hierarchy scope matching already
established in this codebase, reused rather than reinvented a third time.
- **Alternatives considered**: A single global default policy with per-scope overrides (005's
`(productId, categoryId)` two-level shape) — rejected; SLA policy has four independent scope
dimensions doc 06 itself defines, so a strict specificity count (not a fixed lookup order) is
the correct generalization.
## Decision: Pause/resume — shift the absolute due date by the paused wall-clock duration
- **Decision**: Pausing records `pausedAt = now()` (status → `paused`); resuming shifts
`resolutionDueAt` (and `firstResponseDueAt`, if still pending) forward by `now() - pausedAt`
and clears `pausedAt` (status → `running`). No separate "remaining minutes" bookkeeping field
is needed — the absolute due-date field itself, shifted, *is* the remaining-time record.
- **Rationale**: FR-007/FR-008/SC-002 require the paused duration to be excluded, durably, across
a restart — shifting an absolute timestamp already stored in Postgres satisfies both with the
simplest possible mechanism; no in-memory state exists at any point.
- **Alternatives considered**: Storing remaining minutes and recomputing the due date via the
calendar walk on every resume — rejected as unnecessary; the pause window itself doesn't need
calendar-awareness (a paused SLA isn't "elapsing" business time by definition, so shifting by
real wall-clock pause duration is exactly correct, not an approximation).
## Decision: Breach detection — one repeatable BullMQ job, not one delayed job per run
- **Decision**: A single repeatable job (e.g. every 60 seconds) queries every `SLARun` with
`status: 'running'` whose `resolutionDueAt <= now()`, marking each `breached` — and separately,
every running run with `firstResponseDueAt <= now()` and no `firstResponseBreachedAt` yet
(data-model.md refinement) and no `AGENT_MESSAGE` recorded for the ticket, marking
`firstResponseBreachedAt`. Each newly-detected breach triggers escalation-rule evaluation
(research.md below).
- **Rationale**: Constitution Principle VII requires durability, not sub-second precision — a
short-interval polling job is trivially durable (BullMQ's repeatable jobs are themselves
persisted, and a missed tick is caught by the next one) and avoids the bookkeeping a
per-run delayed-job approach would need on every pause/resume (canceling and rescheduling a
delayed job each time, versus just updating a timestamp a polling query already reads).
- **Alternatives considered**: One delayed BullMQ job scheduled per `SLARun`, rescheduled on every
pause/resume — rejected; every pause/resume would need to cancel and re-add a job, doubling the
operations pause/resume already does, for a precision (sub-minute breach detection) nothing in
spec.md actually requires.
## Decision: Escalation firing reuses 007's `AssignmentEngine`, scoped to a specific node
- **Decision**: `AssignmentEngine` (007) gains a new method, `assignToSpecificNode(ticketId,
hierarchyNodeId, strategyOverride?, actor, reason?)` — resolves the eligible-agent set the same
way `RoutingService` already does, but scoped to exactly the given node (its own `skills`
unioned with the ticket's derived required skills, per 007's existing composition rule) rather
than 007's general "find whichever node matches the ticket's context" resolution. Runs the
node's own configured strategy (or `strategyOverride`) and persists through the same
`Assignment`/`AssignmentHistory` mechanism 007 already built and tested for concurrent writes.
- **Rationale**: FR-014 requires escalation to land the ticket specifically at the rule's
`targetNodeId` — 007's existing `evaluateAndAssign` always re-derives the applicable node from
ticket context, which could resolve to a *different* node than the one the rule targeted (the
ticket's context hasn't changed, only its status has). A new, explicit "assign to this node"
entry point is the correct extension, not a workaround.
- **Alternatives considered**: Having 008 duplicate 007's eligible-agent-resolution and
`Assignment`-persistence logic — rejected; directly against this codebase's repeated "extend an
existing module's public surface for a later feature" precedent (004's `productsRepository`,
005's `problemsRepository`, 007's own reuse of 006's `capabilityLookupService`).
## Decision: `EscalationRule.triggerType` is stored broadly; only two types are ever evaluated
- **Decision**: The Zod schema for creating a rule accepts any of doc 06's ten `triggerType`
values — an admin can configure a rule for `inactivity` or `critical_incident` today, and it
will simply never fire (no code path evaluates those triggers yet), rather than being rejected
at creation time.
- **Rationale**: spec.md's Assumptions state this explicitly — storing configuration ahead of the
event source that will eventually feed it is this codebase's established pattern (006's
`slaPolicyId` stored before this feature existed to validate it); rejecting valid doc-06-shaped
configuration at the schema layer would be a regression from that pattern, not a safety
improvement (nothing unsafe happens from an inert rule sitting unfired).
- **Alternatives considered**: Restricting the schema to only the two implemented trigger types —
rejected; would force a breaking schema change on every future phase that wires up one more
trigger type, for no correctness benefit today.
## Decision: Escalation policy resolution — product match or global, most-specific first
- **Decision**: `EscalationPolicy.productId` is the only scope dimension doc 06 gives it (unlike
`SLAPolicy`'s four). Resolution: prefer an active policy whose `productId` equals the ticket's
product; fall back to an active policy with `productId: null` (a global policy) if no
product-specific one exists. A breach with neither is recorded breached with no rule evaluated
(spec.md Edge Cases: "a breach with no matching rule is still recorded as breached").
- **Rationale**: Same most-specific-first shape as `SLAPolicy`, degenerately simple because doc 06
only gives `EscalationPolicy` one scope field — no new resolution mechanism invented.
- **Alternatives considered**: None; doc 06's shape leaves no other reasonable reading.
## Decision: `EscalationRule.condition` is stored, not evaluated, by this feature
- **Decision**: Every active `EscalationRule` under the resolved policy whose `triggerType`
matches the firing breach type (`resolution_breach` or `first_response_breach`) fires — the
`condition` Json field is persisted as given at creation but not parsed or evaluated as a
filter.
- **Rationale**: spec.md's FR-013 says "every matching active EscalationRule fires" scoped by
trigger type alone; nothing in spec.md defines a `condition` grammar to evaluate, and inventing
one now would be exactly the kind of unrequested scope this codebase's established discipline
(005's inert trigger types, 006's unvalidated `slaPolicyId`) consistently avoids. `condition` is
accepted and returned by the CRUD schema so a future feature can give it real meaning without a
breaking change.
- **Alternatives considered**: A minimal condition-matching evaluator (e.g. `{ minPriority }`) —
rejected as speculative; spec.md never asked for conditional rule filtering beyond trigger type.
## Decision: SLA-run lifecycle is wired entirely through the existing domain-event bus
- **Decision**: `DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED` — defined in `src/events/domain-events.ts`
since 007 but never actually published by any code — is published for the first time by
`AssignmentEngine.persistAndTransition` (007's single shared success path for automatic,
manual, and this feature's new scoped-escalation assignment) with `{ ticketId, agentId,
strategy, actor }`. A new subscriber in `src/events/handlers/index.ts` reacts by resolving the
applicable `SLAPolicy` and creating the `SLARun` — but only if `ticketId` doesn't already have
one (`SLARun.ticketId @unique` makes this a natural existence check), so a re-escalation's
second `TICKET_ASSIGNED` publish (spec.md Assumptions: 1:1 with the *first* assignment only)
is correctly a no-op. Two further `TICKET_UPDATED` subscribers (same file, same pattern as
005's and 007's own) watch for `newStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER'` (pause) /
`previousStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER'` (resume), and for `newStatus === 'RESOLVED'`
(complete, per 003's state machine — `RESOLVED` is the terminal status every path reaches
before `CLOSED`/`REOPENED`).
- **Rationale**: Same "a module never needs to import another module it affects" decoupling this
codebase has used consistently since 005 — `orchestration/assignments` doesn't need to know
`orchestration/sla` exists, and `ticketing/tickets` already doesn't know about any of its
status-change consumers. Publishing `TICKET_ASSIGNED` for real is the natural use of an event
this codebase already named and reserved for exactly this purpose.
- **Alternatives considered**: A direct call from `AssignmentEngine.persistAndTransition` into an
`orchestration/sla` service method — rejected; would create the exact cross-module coupling
007→008 the event bus exists to avoid, and would need every future consumer of "a ticket got
assigned" to be added as another direct call in 007's own code.
## Decision: The breach-detection job reuses `src/jobs/sla/`'s existing stub; escalation firing reuses `src/jobs/escalation/`'s
- **Decision**: `registerSlaWorker()` (`src/jobs/sla/index.ts`, currently just a log line) is
extended to, on startup, schedule one BullMQ repeatable job (`queueManager.getQueue(QueueName
.SLA).add('detect-breaches', {}, { repeat: { every: 60_000 } })`) whose processor calls a
single, directly-callable, side-effect-only method — `slaService.runBreachDetectionSweep()` —
containing 100% of the actual logic: the two polling queries from research.md's breach-
detection decision, marking runs breached/first-response-breached, and, for each new breach,
calling `escalationService.handleBreach(ticketId, triggerType)` directly (a plain in-process
call, not a second queued job) since escalation firing has no meaningful reason to be
async-relative-to-detection. `src/jobs/escalation/`'s existing `registerEscalationWorker()`
stub, and its `ESCALATION` queue, are left untouched — reserved, per their own existing
scaffold, for a possible future async notification-dispatch step (spec.md Assumptions: no
notification delivery is built by this feature).
- **Rationale**: `runBreachDetectionSweep()` being a plain importable async function (not
reachable only through a running BullMQ worker) is what makes it possible to write an
integration test for "one job tick" without a real running worker process or a real 60-second
wait — the exact "no worker process in this test, call the job's own logic inline" convention
already established by `tests/integration/ticket-attachments.test.ts` for the malware-scan job.
- **Alternatives considered**: Splitting detection and escalation firing into two separately
queued BullMQ jobs (using the `ESCALATION` queue for the firing step) — rejected as an
unnecessary indirection; nothing in spec.md requires escalation firing to be decoupled in time
from the breach that caused it, and a single sweep function is simpler to test and reason about.
## Decision: `SLA_BREACHED`/`ESCALATION_TRIGGERED` are also published, for audit, not for logic
- **Decision**: `DomainEventName.SLA_BREACHED` and `ESCALATION_TRIGGERED` — like
`TICKET_ASSIGNED`, defined since early in this codebase but never published — are published by
`runBreachDetectionSweep`/`handleBreach`/`escalateManually` respectively, purely as the durable
event-log record Principle VI expects. No subscriber consumes them in this feature — breach
detection calls `EscalationService.handleBreach` as a direct, synchronous call, not by
publishing and awaiting a subscriber's reaction, exactly as research.md's job-design decision
already settled.
- **Rationale**: Costs nothing and completes a naming convention this codebase already committed
to; a future feature (e.g. `platform/notifications` actually sending something) gets a ready-
made event to subscribe to without a schema change.
- **Alternatives considered**: Leaving them unpublished, like every other feature has so far —
rejected only because, unlike `TICKET_ASSIGNED`, publishing these has no wiring cost at all
(this feature is already computing the exact payload at the exact call site).
## Decision: SLA/Escalation admin endpoints reuse the existing auth stub
- **Decision**: Every admin CRUD endpoint (policies, calendars, escalation rules) and the manual-
escalation endpoint are gated by `fastify.authenticate`, same known-limitation stub as every
prior feature.
- **Rationale**: Consistency with established precedent.
- **Alternatives considered**: None.
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# Feature Specification: SLA and Escalation
**Feature Branch**: `008-sla-escalation`
**Created**: 2026-09-03
**Status**: Draft
**Input**: User description: "Phase 8 of docs/10-implementation-roadmap.md: SLA policy engine,
business calendar/holiday support, durable pause/resume via BullMQ, rule-driven escalation
engine, escalation event audit. Per docs/05-orchestration-sla-escalation.md §5-6 and
docs/06-database-schema.md 'Domain: SLA' / 'Domain: Escalation'."
## User Scenarios & Testing *(mandatory)*
### User Story 1 - An admin defines SLA policies as configuration (Priority: P1)
An administrator defines an SLA policy — first-response/investigation/resolution/customer-
response time limits — optionally scoped to a product, category, problem type, and/or priority,
and tied to a business calendar. Nothing about SLA thresholds is hardcoded anywhere in the
system.
**Why this priority**: Every later capability in this feature reads a policy that has to exist
first.
**Independent Test**: Create an SLA policy with a resolution limit; confirm it's retrievable and
its fields are stored exactly as given.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** an admin creates an SLA policy with a resolution time limit, **When** it's saved,
**Then** it's retrievable with every field exactly as given, `active: true` by default.
2. **Given** a policy scoped to a product/category/problem type/priority, **When** two policies
could both apply to the same ticket, **Then** the more specific one is preferred — same
most-specific-match convention this system already uses for confidence policy (005) and
capability scope (006).
3. **Given** an admin creates a business calendar with working hours and holidays, **When** it's
referenced by a policy, **Then** due-date calculations for tickets under that policy use it.
---
### User Story 2 - An SLA run starts automatically when a ticket is assigned, with calendar-aware due dates (Priority: P1)
When orchestration (007) assigns a ticket, an SLA run starts for it automatically, with due dates
computed against the applicable policy's business calendar — never a naive `createdAt + N hours`
that ignores weekends, holidays, or working hours.
**Why this priority**: Nothing else in this feature — breach detection, pause/resume, escalation
— has anything to act on until a real, calendar-correct due date exists.
**Independent Test**: Assign a ticket under a policy with a resolution limit and a calendar whose
working hours exclude a weekend; confirm the computed due date skips the excluded time rather
than counting straight through it.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a ticket is assigned (007), **When** an applicable SLA policy resolves for it (User
Story 1's most-specific-match rule), **Then** an SLA run starts with a resolution due date
computed against that policy's calendar.
2. **Given** no policy matches, **When** a ticket is assigned, **Then** no SLA run is created
rather than applying an arbitrary default — this feature does not invent a policy that was
never configured.
3. **Given** a calendar with defined working hours and a holiday, **When** a due date is
computed, **Then** time outside working hours and on holidays is excluded from the countdown.
---
### User Story 3 - SLA pause and resume are durable, not in-memory (Priority: P1)
When a ticket's status indicates it's waiting on the customer, its SLA run pauses — the clock
stops counting against the agent. When it resumes, the clock continues from where it left off,
never from zero and never having kept counting while paused. This state survives a process
restart.
**Why this priority**: Constitution Principle VII names this exact scenario — an SLA that keeps
counting during a customer-caused delay, or that resets on a restart, actively misrepresents
whether a real commitment was honored.
**Independent Test**: Start an SLA run, pause it, wait, resume it; confirm the resulting due date
reflects the paused duration being excluded, not counted twice.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a running SLA, **When** the ticket transitions to a waiting-for-customer state,
**Then** the run's status becomes `paused` and its due date stops approaching.
2. **Given** a paused SLA, **When** the ticket transitions back to in-progress, **Then** the run's
status becomes `running` again and the remaining time is preserved from the pause point.
3. **Given** a paused or running SLA run, **When** the process restarts, **Then** its state is
unchanged on restart — pause/resume state is never held only in memory.
---
### User Story 4 - A breach is detected durably, never silently missed (Priority: P2)
When a running SLA's due date passes without the corresponding milestone happening, the run is
marked breached — detected by a durable background job, not a timer that only fires if the
process happens to still be running at the right moment.
**Why this priority**: Depends on User Stories 2-3 (a real due date, correctly paused/resumed)
existing first. A breach that's never detected is worse than no SLA at all — it's a false sense
of a commitment being tracked.
**Independent Test**: Start an SLA run with a very short resolution limit; confirm it's marked
`breached` once the due date passes, even simulating the checking job running in a separate
process invocation from the one that started the run.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a running SLA run whose due date has passed, **When** the breach-detection job next
runs, **Then** the run's status becomes `breached` and its `breachedAt` timestamp is recorded.
2. **Given** an SLA run that completes (its milestone actually happens) before its due date,
**When** breach detection later runs, **Then** it is not marked breached — completion is
checked against the actual event, not assumed from elapsed time alone.
3. **Given** a paused SLA run, **When** breach detection runs while it's paused, **Then** it is
never marked breached — a paused clock cannot breach.
---
### User Story 5 - A breach automatically triggers rule-driven escalation (Priority: P2)
An administrator defines escalation rules — trigger condition, target support-hierarchy node, who
to notify. When an SLA breach (or another configured trigger) occurs, the matching rule fires
automatically: the ticket moves toward the rule's target node and orchestration (007)
re-assigns it there, and an escalation event is durably recorded. This is never a hardcoded
`if L1 then L2` — it's evaluated against configured rules.
**Why this priority**: Depends on User Story 4 (a real breach signal to trigger on). This is the
other half of "durable SLA enforcement actually matters" — detecting a breach that nobody acts on
isn't meaningfully different from not detecting it.
**Independent Test**: Configure an escalation rule for `resolution_breach` targeting a specific
hierarchy node; breach an SLA run; confirm an escalation event is recorded, the ticket is
re-assigned via 007 scoped to that specific node, and the rule's configured notification target
is recorded (not necessarily delivered — see Assumptions).
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** an active escalation rule for `resolution_breach` scoped to a target node, **When**
a matching SLA run breaches, **Then** an `EscalationEvent` is recorded with the rule, the
reason, and `triggeredBy: system`.
2. **Given** an escalation event fires, **When** it completes, **Then** 007's assignment engine
re-runs scoped specifically to the rule's target node — not a fresh, unscoped resolution —
and the ticket's assignment history (007) reflects the new assignment with `strategy` reused
from whatever the target node itself configures.
3. **Given** no escalation rule matches a breach, **When** the breach is detected, **Then** the
SLA run is still marked breached (User Story 4) — the absence of a matching rule doesn't
suppress breach detection, it only means no automatic escalation follows.
4. **Given** multiple active rules could match the same trigger, **When** more than one does,
**Then** every matching rule fires its own escalation event — this feature does not pick just
one.
---
### User Story 6 - A human can manually trigger escalation, audited the same way (Priority: P3)
An agent or admin can explicitly escalate a ticket to a specific target node, for a stated
reason, without waiting for an automatic trigger — recorded through the same `EscalationEvent`
audit trail as an automatic one.
**Why this priority**: Depends on User Story 5's event/re-assignment mechanism already existing.
Automatic triggers won't cover every real reason to escalate (doc 05 §10 names several this
feature doesn't compute automatically — see Assumptions); a human needs an explicit path that
still produces the same durable record.
**Independent Test**: Manually escalate a ticket to a named target node with a reason; confirm an
`EscalationEvent` with `triggeredBy` set to the calling actor is recorded and the ticket is
re-assigned via 007 to that node.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** an admin manually escalates a ticket to a target node, **When** it completes,
**Then** an `EscalationEvent` is recorded with `triggeredBy` set to the actor (never
`system`), and 007 re-assigns the ticket scoped to that node.
2. **Given** a manual escalation targets a node that doesn't exist, **When** it's attempted,
**Then** it's rejected — never a dangling escalation event pointing nowhere.
---
### Edge Cases
- What happens if a ticket has no assigned agent yet when its SLA would otherwise start? An SLA
run only starts on a successful assignment (User Story 2) — an unassigned ticket (007's "no
eligible agent" outcome) has no SLA run to track, consistent with there being no one yet to
hold to a commitment.
- What happens if a business calendar has no working hours configured at all for a given day?
That day contributes zero time toward any due-date countdown — an unconfigured day is never
silently treated as 24 available hours.
- What happens if an SLA policy's calendar is deleted or unreferenced after runs already exist
against it? Out of scope — this feature does not implement calendar deletion, only creation and
the `active` state every other configuration entity in this system already uses.
- What happens when a ticket is reopened after being resolved, with a completed SLA run already
on record? Out of scope for this feature to define a new run automatically — reopening (a
future problem-resolution-phase concept) may need its own SLA-run-restart decision; this
feature's SLA runs are 1:1 with a ticket's first, straightforward assignment→resolution
lifecycle.
- What happens if two escalation rules would move a ticket to the same target node at once (a
race between an automatic breach and a simultaneous manual escalation)? Both `EscalationEvent`
rows are recorded (never lost — durable audit is unconditional); 007's own re-assignment
path already handles a ticket being assigned twice in quick succession correctly (it's the same
version-row-per-period `Assignment` mechanism 007 already built and tested for concurrent
writes), so no new concurrency mechanism is needed here.
## Requirements *(mandatory)*
### Functional Requirements
- **FR-001**: The system MUST let an admin create an SLA policy with first-response/
investigation/resolution/customer-response time limits, optionally scoped to product/category/
problem type/priority, referencing a business calendar.
- **FR-002**: When multiple SLA policies could apply to the same ticket context, the system MUST
prefer the most specific match — never an arbitrary or first-found selection.
- **FR-003**: The system MUST let an admin create a business calendar with working hours and
holidays.
- **FR-004**: Due-date computation MUST exclude time outside a calendar's working hours and on
its holidays — MUST NOT compute a due date as a naive elapsed-time addition that ignores the
calendar.
- **FR-005**: An SLA run MUST start automatically when a ticket is successfully assigned (007),
using the most-specific-matching policy (FR-002); when no policy matches, no run is created.
- **FR-006**: An SLA run's status MUST be one of `running`, `paused`, `warning`, `breached`, or
`completed`, matching doc 06's defined set.
- **FR-007**: When a ticket transitions to a waiting-for-customer state, its SLA run MUST pause;
when it transitions back, the run MUST resume with its remaining time preserved — never reset
to the full original duration and never having continued counting while paused.
- **FR-008**: SLA pause/resume state and due dates MUST be durable — recomputable and correct
after a process restart, never dependent on an in-memory timer (Constitution Principle VII).
- **FR-009**: A running SLA run whose due date has passed MUST be detected and marked `breached`
by a durable background job — never missed because the triggering process wasn't running at
the exact due moment.
- **FR-010**: An SLA run that completes its milestone before its due date MUST NOT be marked
breached, regardless of what a naive elapsed-time check alone would suggest.
- **FR-011**: A paused SLA run MUST NOT be marked breached while paused.
- **FR-012**: The system MUST let an admin create an escalation rule — trigger type, condition,
target hierarchy node, and who to notify — scoped to a policy, matching doc 06's
`EscalationRule` shape.
- **FR-013**: An SLA breach (FR-009) MUST be evaluated against every active escalation rule
configured for `resolution_breach` (and, where applicable, the other SLA-derived trigger
types this feature computes — see Assumptions); every matching rule MUST fire its own
escalation event — never just the first match.
- **FR-014**: Firing an escalation rule MUST record a durable `EscalationEvent` (rule, reason,
`triggeredBy`, timestamp) and MUST re-run 007's assignment engine scoped specifically to the
rule's `targetNodeId` — never a fresh, unscoped resolution that could land elsewhere.
- **FR-015**: A breach with no matching escalation rule MUST still be recorded as breached
(FR-009) — the absence of a rule never suppresses breach detection itself.
- **FR-016**: The system MUST let an admin or agent manually escalate a ticket to a specific,
existing target node with a reason, recorded through the same `EscalationEvent` mechanism as an
automatic escalation, with `triggeredBy` set to the calling actor.
- **FR-017**: A manual escalation targeting a nonexistent hierarchy node MUST be rejected.
### Key Entities
- **SLA Policy**: A configured set of time limits (first response/investigation/resolution/
customer response) scoped to product/category/problem type/priority, referencing a business
calendar — never a hardcoded threshold.
- **SLA Run**: The durable, per-ticket tracking of one policy's due dates and status against a
real ticket, survivable across a process restart.
- **Business Calendar / Holiday**: Working hours and excluded dates a due-date calculation
respects — the mechanism that keeps SLA math honest.
- **Escalation Policy / Rule**: Configured trigger conditions and target hierarchy nodes — never
a hardcoded escalation ladder.
- **Escalation Event**: The durable, audited record of every escalation, automatic or manual,
including which rule (if any) fired it and who/what triggered it.
## Success Criteria *(mandatory)*
### Measurable Outcomes
- **SC-001**: 100% of due-date calculations under a policy with a configured calendar exclude
non-working time — verified against a calendar with at least one full excluded day.
- **SC-002**: 100% of SLA runs correctly reflect pause/resume across a simulated process restart
— the paused duration is never double-counted and never dropped.
- **SC-003**: 100% of SLA runs whose due date has passed are marked `breached` within one
breach-detection job cycle, even when the detecting process is a different invocation than the
one that started the run.
- **SC-004**: 100% of SLA breaches with a matching active escalation rule produce both an
`EscalationEvent` and a re-assignment scoped to the rule's target node.
- **SC-005**: 100% of manual escalations targeting a nonexistent node are rejected, never
producing a dangling event.
## Assumptions
- **This feature does not build a notification-delivery mechanism** — an escalation rule's
`notify` field (doc 06) is stored and returned as configured, but this feature does not send an
email/Slack/webhook notification; `platform/notifications` (doc 07) remains an untouched module
group, same convention as every prior feature leaving an adjacent, not-yet-built module alone.
- **Only `resolution_breach` and `first_response_breach` are wired to a real trigger signal in
this feature** — doc 05 §6 lists ten trigger types; the other eight (inactivity, priority
increase, customer escalation request, repeated reopen, manual [built as its own user story,
User Story 6, not a rule trigger], product defect, dependency timeout, critical incident)
require signals this codebase doesn't compute yet (idle-time tracking, reopen counting,
explicit defect/incident flagging) — `EscalationRule.triggerType` accepts any of doc 06's
values as configuration data, but only the two SLA-breach types are ever actually evaluated by
this feature. This mirrors 006's `assignmentStrategy`/`slaPolicyId` fields being stored as real
data before this feature gave them a real consumer.
- **Investigation SLA and customer-response SLA are stored as policy fields (FR-001) but this
feature only computes/tracks the resolution and first-response due dates on `SLARun`** — doc 06's
`SLARun` itself only models `firstResponseDueAt`/`resolutionDueAt` explicitly; investigation and
customer-response timers would need their own due-date fields doc 06 doesn't define, which is a
refinement left for whichever future phase actually needs to enforce them (matching this
system's "refine the conceptual schema when a feature needs the refinement, not speculatively"
convention).
- **SLA run creation happens once, on a ticket's first successful assignment** — reopening,
multiple resolution cycles, and re-running an SLA clock for a reassigned-after-resolution
ticket are out of scope (Edge Cases) — that's future problem-resolution-phase territory.
- **Breach detection runs on a durable, periodically-scheduled BullMQ job** (a repeatable job,
not a per-run delayed job scheduled at creation time) — checking every active `running` run's
due date against the current time on each tick, rather than scheduling one delayed job per SLA
run. This is a deliberate simplicity/robustness tradeoff, not an aspiration to replace later —
see research.md for the full reasoning.
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---
description: "Task list for 008-sla-escalation"
---
# Tasks: SLA and Escalation
**Input**: Design documents from `specs/008-sla-escalation/`
**Prerequisites**: [plan.md](./plan.md), [spec.md](./spec.md), [research.md](./research.md),
[data-model.md](./data-model.md),
[contracts/sla-escalation-contract.md](./contracts/sla-escalation-contract.md),
[quickstart.md](./quickstart.md)
**Tests**: Included as first-class tasks. This feature has real, extractable pure logic (the
calendar-walk algorithm, most-specific policy match, breach/no-breach/paused-no-breach logic)
plus — for the first time since the constitution's Principle VII was written — a genuine
process-restart-survival requirement that needs a dedicated test rebuilding `buildApp()`
mid-test, not just a within-process concurrency test.
**Organization**: Tasks are grouped by user story (US1 = P1 policy definition, US2 = P1 run
creation with calendar-aware due dates, US3 = P1 durable pause/resume, US4 = P2 breach detection,
US5 = P2 breach-triggered escalation, US6 = P3 manual escalation).
## Format: `[ID] [P?] [Story] Description`
All file paths are relative to `supporthub-api/` (repo root).
---
## Phase 1: Setup
- [x] T001 [P] Populate `src/modules/platform/business-calendars/` with the full standard shape
(`controller/`, `routes/`, `schema/`, `repository/`, `service/`, `types/`, `mapper/`,
`constants/`, `index.ts`) plus a `calculators/` directory, replacing the existing
`BusinessCalendarsService.isWorkingHour` stub's content
- [x] T002 [P] Extend `src/modules/orchestration/sla/` to the full standard shape around its
existing `engine/`/`calculators/` directories, replacing every stub file's content
(`SlaEngine.evaluateSlaTargets`, `SlaDueDateCalculator.calculateDueTime`)
- [x] T003 [P] Extend `src/modules/orchestration/escalation/` to the full standard shape around
its existing `engine/` directory, replacing the `EscalationEngine.triggerEscalation` stub's
content
---
## Phase 2: Foundational (Blocking Prerequisites)
**Purpose**: Schema for every entity, shared by every user story.
**⚠️ CRITICAL**: No user-story stage work can begin until this phase is complete.
- [x] T004 Add `SLAPolicy`, `SLARun` (incl. the additive `firstResponseBreachedAt` refinement),
`BusinessCalendar`, `Holiday`, `EscalationPolicy`, `EscalationRule`, `EscalationEvent`
models to `prisma/schema.prisma` per data-model.md, plus `Ticket.slaRun`/
`Ticket.escalationEvents`, `Product.slaPolicies`/`Product.escalationPolicies`,
`Category.slaPolicies`, `HierarchyNode.escalationRules` back-relations, and an
`SLARun @@index([status, resolutionDueAt])` for the breach-detection sweep (depends on
T001-T003)
- [x] T005 Run `npm run prisma:generate` and create the migration (`npm run prisma:migrate`) for
T004 (depends on T004)
**Checkpoint**: Schema migrated. User stories can now be built.
---
## Phase 3: User Story 1 - Admin defines SLA policies as configuration (Priority: P1) 🎯 MVP (part 1)
**Goal**: `SLAPolicy` CRUD and the most-specific-match resolution function exist and are
independently correct — not yet wired to ticket assignment.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 1.
### Tests for User Story 1
- [x] T006 [P] [US1] Unit tests for `findApplicablePolicy` (specificity-count match, wildcard
handling on each of the 4 scope dimensions independently, tie-break by latest `updatedAt`,
no-match returns `null`) in `tests/unit/orchestration/sla-policy-match.test.ts`
- [x] T007 [US1] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 1 (a product-scoped policy is
preferred over a global one; deactivating it falls back to the global policy) against a
real Postgres in `tests/integration/sla-policy-resolution.test.ts` (depends on T005)
### Implementation for User Story 1
- [x] T008 [US1] Add `SLAPolicyRepository` (CRUD, `findActiveCandidates(scope)`) and the Zod
create/update schema — with resolve-or-404 existence checks for `productId`/`categoryId`/
`businessCalendarId` when provided (research.md) — in `sla/repository/` + `sla/schema/`
(depends on T005)
- [x] T009 [US1] Add `findApplicablePolicy(ticketContext)` (specificity-count + tie-break, per
data-model.md's Resolution section) in `sla/service/sla-policy-resolver.service.ts`
(depends on T008)
- [x] T010 [US1] Add `POST/GET/GET:id/PATCH/DELETE /admin/sla-policies` routes (soft-delete via
`active: false`, gated by `fastify.authenticate`) in `sla/controller/` + `sla/routes/`,
registered from `src/api/routes.ts` (depends on T008)
- [x] T011 [US1] Run Quickstart Scenario 1 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: SLA policies can be defined and correctly resolved. Nothing creates an `SLARun`
yet — that's User Story 2.
---
## Phase 4: User Story 2 - SLA run starts automatically with calendar-aware due dates (Priority: P1) 🎯 MVP (part 2)
**Goal**: `BusinessCalendar`/`Holiday` CRUD, the calendar-walk algorithm, and `SLARun` creation
wired into 007's assignment-success path via the first real publish of `TICKET_ASSIGNED`.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 2.
### Tests for User Story 2
- [x] T012 [P] [US2] Unit tests for `addBusinessMinutes` — weekend exclusion, holiday exclusion,
partial-day clipping on the start day, a day with no configured window contributing zero
time, and correctness across a DST transition in the calendar's own timezone — in
`tests/unit/platform/business-calendars/calendar-walk.test.ts`
- [x] T013 [US2] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 2 (calendar-aware due date lands
the next working day past a weekend+holiday, never a naive addition; a ticket assigned with
no matching policy gets no `SLARun` and `GET .../sla-run` returns `404`) against a real
Postgres in `tests/integration/sla-run-creation.test.ts` (depends on T005, T009, and 007's
existing assignment flow)
### Implementation for User Story 2
- [x] T014 [US2] Add `addBusinessMinutes(start, minutes, calendar, holidays)` using `luxon` in
`business-calendars/calculators/business-hours.calculator.ts`, replacing the
`isWorkingHour` stub's logic (research.md's day-by-day walk)
- [x] T015 [US2] Add `BusinessCalendarRepository`/`HolidayRepository`, Zod schema (IANA timezone
validation, `HH:mm` + `start < end` validation per data-model.md), and
`POST/GET/GET:id/PATCH /admin/business-calendars` +
`POST /admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays` +
`DELETE /admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays/:holidayId` routes in
`business-calendars/repository/` + `schema/` + `controller/` + `routes/` (depends on T014)
- [x] T016 [US2] Replace `SlaDueDateCalculator.calculateDueTime`'s naive addition with a call
into T014's `addBusinessMinutes` (via `business-calendars`'s public `index.ts` — FR-004) in
`sla/calculators/sla-due-date.calculator.ts` (depends on T014)
- [x] T017 [US2] Add `AssignmentEngine.persistAndTransition` (007,
`src/modules/orchestration/assignments/engine/assignment.engine.ts`) publishing
`DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED` (`{ ticketId, agentId, strategy, actor }`) after its
existing persistence step — the event is already defined in `src/events/domain-events.ts`
but has never been published (research.md)
- [x] T018 [US2] Add `SlaService.handleTicketAssigned(ticketId, agentId)`: no-ops if the ticket
already has an `SLARun` (`SLARun.ticketId @unique` — covers re-escalation's second publish,
spec.md Assumptions); otherwise resolves the applicable policy (T009), computes
`firstResponseDueAt`/`resolutionDueAt` via T016, and creates the `SLARun` — in
`sla/service/sla.service.ts` (depends on T009, T016)
- [x] T019 [US2] Subscribe `DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED` to T018's handler in
`src/events/handlers/index.ts`, following the existing "module never imports the module it
affects" registration pattern (depends on T017, T018)
- [x] T020 [US2] Add `GET /tickets/:ticketId/sla-run` route (`404` if none) in `sla/controller/` +
`sla/routes/` (depends on T018)
- [x] T021 [US2] Run Quickstart Scenario 2 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Every successfully-assigned ticket with a matching policy gets an `SLARun` with
correctly calendar-computed due dates. MVP-complete for read-only SLA visibility.
---
## Phase 5: User Story 3 - SLA pause/resume is durable across a process restart (Priority: P1)
**Goal**: `WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER` transitions pause/resume the run by shifting its absolute due
dates — no in-memory state anywhere, verified across an actual rebuilt `buildApp()`.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 3.
### Tests for User Story 3
- [x] T022 [P] [US3] Unit tests for the pause/resume shift arithmetic (resume shifts both due
dates forward by exactly `now - pausedAt`; a second pause/resume cycle composes correctly)
in `tests/unit/orchestration/sla-pause-resume.test.ts`
- [x] T023 [US3] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 3 — including rebuilding
`buildApp()` mid-test to simulate a real process restart while paused, then asserting the
resumed due date is exactly the original plus the paused wall-clock duration — against a
real Postgres in `tests/integration/sla-pause-resume.test.ts` (depends on T018)
### Implementation for User Story 3
- [x] T024 [US3] Add `SlaService.pause(ticketId)` / `resume(ticketId)` (shift
`firstResponseDueAt`/`resolutionDueAt` forward by the paused duration on resume, per
research.md/data-model.md — no separate remaining-minutes field) in `sla/service/
sla.service.ts` (depends on T018)
- [x] T025 [US3] Subscribe two `DomainEventName.TICKET_UPDATED` handlers in
`src/events/handlers/index.ts``newStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER'` calls T024's
`pause`, `previousStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER'` calls `resume` — alongside the existing
005/007 subscribers on the same event (depends on T024)
- [x] T026 [US3] Subscribe a third `TICKET_UPDATED` handler — `newStatus === 'RESOLVED'` sets
`SLARun.completedAt` and `status: 'completed'` (data-model.md) — in the same file (depends
on T018)
- [x] T027 [US3] Run Quickstart Scenario 3 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass, including the
restart-boundary step
**Checkpoint**: Every P1 user story is complete. SLA runs are created, calendar-computed, and
durably pause/resume-correct. This is the feature's MVP.
---
## Phase 6: User Story 4 - Breaches are detected even if no one is watching in real time (Priority: P2)
**Goal**: A repeatable BullMQ job durably detects both resolution and first-response breaches,
never missing one because the process wasn't running at the due instant, never flagging a
completed-in-time or paused run.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 4.
### Tests for User Story 4
- [x] T028 [P] [US4] Unit tests for the breach-detection predicate logic (a `running` run past
`resolutionDueAt` breaches; a `paused` run past `resolutionDueAt` does not; a `completed`
run does not; a `running` run past `firstResponseDueAt` with no prior `AGENT_MESSAGE`
breaches first-response exactly once, guarded by `firstResponseBreachedAt`) in
`tests/unit/orchestration/sla-breach-detection.test.ts`
- [x] T029 [US4] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 4 (a short-`resolutionMinutes`
policy breaches within one sweep call; resolved-in-time and paused runs are never breached
even after their due instant passes) against a real Postgres in
`tests/integration/sla-breach-detection.test.ts` (depends on T018, T024)
### Implementation for User Story 4
- [x] T030 [US4] Add `SlaService.runBreachDetectionSweep()` — queries every `running` `SLARun`
with `resolutionDueAt <= now()` (marks `breached`/`breachedAt`) and every `running` run with
`firstResponseDueAt <= now()` and `firstResponseBreachedAt: null` and no `AGENT_MESSAGE`
recorded for the ticket (marks `firstResponseBreachedAt`) — a single, directly-callable,
side-effect-only method (research.md — no worker process needed to invoke it in tests) in
`sla/service/sla.service.ts` (depends on T024, T026)
- [x] T031 [US4] Replace `registerSlaWorker()`'s stub body in `src/jobs/sla/index.ts`: on
registration, schedule a BullMQ repeatable job on `QueueName.SLA` (`{ repeat: { every:
60_000 } }`) whose processor calls T030's `runBreachDetectionSweep` (depends on T030)
- [x] T032 [US4] Run Quickstart Scenario 4 locally and confirm all 5 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Breaches are durably detected. Nothing reacts to a breach yet beyond marking the
run — that's User Story 5.
---
## Phase 7: User Story 5 - A breach automatically triggers rule-driven escalation (Priority: P2)
**Goal**: `EscalationPolicy`/`EscalationRule` CRUD, breach-triggered `EscalationEvent` firing, and
a new scoped-assignment entry point on 007's `AssignmentEngine` that re-assigns to exactly the
rule's `targetNodeId`.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 5.
### Tests for User Story 5
- [x] T033 [P] [US5] Unit tests for escalation-policy resolution (product-specific preferred over
global, per research.md) and rule matching (every active rule whose `triggerType` matches
the firing breach type fires; an inactive or wrong-trigger-type rule doesn't) in
`tests/unit/orchestration/escalation-rule-match.test.ts`
- [x] T034 [US5] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 5 (a breach with a matching rule
produces exactly one `EscalationEvent` and reassigns to an agent eligible under the rule's
specific `targetNodeId`, not the ticket's originally-resolved node; a breach with no
matching rule is still recorded breached with no `EscalationEvent`) against a real Postgres
in `tests/integration/sla-escalation-firing.test.ts` (depends on T030)
### Implementation for User Story 5
- [x] T035 [US5] Add `EscalationPolicyRepository`/`EscalationRuleRepository` (CRUD,
`findActiveRules(policyId, triggerType)`), Zod schema (all 10 doc-05 `triggerType` values
accepted; `targetNodeId` resolve-or-404 at rule creation, FR-012) in
`escalation/repository/` + `escalation/schema/` (depends on T005)
- [x] T036 [US5] Add `POST/GET /admin/escalation-policies`,
`POST/PATCH/DELETE /admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules[/:ruleId]` routes in
`escalation/controller/` + `escalation/routes/` (depends on T035)
- [x] T037 [US5] Add `AssignmentEngine.assignToSpecificNode(ticketId, hierarchyNodeId, actor,
reason?, strategyOverride?)` (007, `assignments/engine/assignment.engine.ts`) — resolves
the eligible-agent set scoped to exactly the given node (reusing `RoutingService`'s
capability-lookup call, research.md) and persists through the existing
`persistAndTransition` (T017), so it also publishes `TICKET_ASSIGNED` for free (depends on
T017)
- [x] T038 [US5] Add `EscalationService.handleBreach(ticketId, triggerType)`: resolves the
applicable `EscalationPolicy` (product-match-or-global, research.md), finds every active
matching `EscalationRule` (T035), and for each, creates an `EscalationEvent`
(`ruleId`, `fromNodeId` from the ticket's current assignment, `toNodeId: rule.targetNodeId`,
`triggeredBy: 'system'`) and calls T037's `assignToSpecificNode` — records nothing when no
rule matches (FR-015) — in `escalation/service/escalation.service.ts` (depends on T035,
T037)
- [x] T039 [US5] Wire T030's `runBreachDetectionSweep` to call T038's `handleBreach` for each
newly-detected breach, passing the corresponding trigger type (`resolution_breach` /
`first_response_breach`) — in `sla/service/sla.service.ts` (depends on T030, T038)
- [x] T040 [US5] Run Quickstart Scenario 5 locally and confirm all 3 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Breaches automatically escalate through rule-driven, scoped re-assignment.
---
## Phase 8: User Story 6 - A human can manually escalate a ticket to a specific node (Priority: P3)
**Goal**: The same `EscalationEvent` + scoped-reassignment mechanism, triggered explicitly by a
caller instead of a breach.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 6.
### Tests for User Story 6
- [x] T041 [US6] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 6 steps 1-3 (manual escalation
creates an `EscalationEvent` with `ruleId: null` and reassigns via the scoped path; a
nonexistent `targetNodeId` returns `404` with no event created) against a real Postgres —
implemented as the "Scenario 6" case in `tests/integration/sla-escalation-flow.test.ts`
(one consolidated file covering every scenario, T007/T013/T023/T029/T034 included, matching
007's own precedent of one continuous-lifecycle file over several scenario-named ones)
rather than a separate `manual-escalation.test.ts` (depends on T037, T038). Step 4 (manual
escalation racing an automatic breach escalation on the same ticket) was NOT separately
exercised — both paths reuse the same tested `assignToSpecificNode`/`persistAndTransition`
mechanism 007 already verified under concurrency (round-robin test), so the residual risk
is low, but a dedicated concurrent-race test for this specific interleaving is still open.
### Implementation for User Story 6
- [x] T042 [US6] Add `EscalationService.escalateManually(ticketId, targetNodeId, actor, reason)`:
resolve-or-404 on `targetNodeId` (FR-017), creates an `EscalationEvent` (`ruleId: null`,
`triggeredBy: actor`) and calls T037's `assignToSpecificNode` — in `escalation/service/
escalation.service.ts` (depends on T037)
- [x] T043 [US6] Add `POST /tickets/:ticketId/escalate` route (gated by `fastify.authenticate`)
in `escalation/controller/` + `escalation/routes/`, registered from `src/api/routes.ts`
(depends on T042)
- [x] T044 [US6] Run Quickstart Scenario 6 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: All six user stories work independently and together — policy definition,
calendar-aware run creation, durable pause/resume, durable breach detection, and both automatic
and manual escalation form one coherent, restart-safe flow.
---
## Phase 9: Polish & Cross-Cutting Concerns
- [ ] T045 [P] SKIPPED — originally planned to add an "SLA and Escalation" section to
`README.md` (calendar-aware due-date computation, durable pause/resume, breach-detection
job interval, which 2 of doc 05's 10 escalation trigger types actually fire, and what's
explicitly deferred). `README.md` was found already reduced, outside this feature's own
changes, to a minimal Docker-commands reference — it no longer carries the per-feature
documentation sections earlier phases (e.g. 007) added, so no such section was added here
either, to stay consistent with the file's current shape rather than reintroduce a pattern
it no longer follows (see checklists/requirements.md's Implementation Notes).
- [x] T046 [P] Update `specs/008-sla-escalation/checklists/requirements.md` Notes with any
implementation-time findings
- [x] T047 Run `npx tsx scripts/check-architecture.ts` and `npm run lint`/`npm run typecheck`
- [x] T048 Full regression: `npm run test:unit` (scoped to `tests/unit`) to confirm nothing broke
elsewhere, then the full integration suite (including 007's own suite, since T017/T037
modify its `AssignmentEngine`) against real Docker-provisioned Postgres/Redis
---
## Dependencies & Execution Order
### Phase Dependencies
- **Setup (Phase 1)**: No dependencies
- **Foundational (Phase 2)**: Depends on Setup — BLOCKS all user stories
- **User Story 1 (Phase 3)**: Depends on Foundational — no dependency on US2-US6
- **User Story 2 (Phase 4)**: Depends on US1 (the policy it resolves against) — genuinely not
independent, same class of dependency 007's US2 had on US1
- **User Story 3 (Phase 5)**: Depends on US2 (the run it pauses/resumes)
- **User Story 4 (Phase 6)**: Depends on US3 (a run that can be paused must be excluded from
breach detection correctly, so the pause mechanism must exist first)
- **User Story 5 (Phase 7)**: Depends on US4 (the breach it reacts to) and on 007's
`AssignmentEngine` (T037's new method)
- **User Story 6 (Phase 8)**: Depends on US5 (T037/T038's scoped-reassignment mechanism, reused
directly rather than duplicated)
- **Polish (Phase 9)**: Depends on all six user stories
### Parallel Opportunities
- T001/T002/T003 (independent scaffolding)
- T006 (unit tests) alongside T008-T009 (the implementations they test)
- T012 (unit tests) alongside T014 (the implementation it tests)
- T022 alongside T024; T028 alongside T030; T033 alongside T035/T038
- T045/T046 in Polish
### Sequencing Note
T017 (publishing `TICKET_ASSIGNED` from 007's `AssignmentEngine`) and T037 (the new
`assignToSpecificNode` method on the same class) both modify a file 007 already owns and has its
own passing test suite for — run 007's full integration suite (part of T048) after each, not only
at the very end, to catch a regression close to its cause.
---
## Implementation Strategy
### MVP First (User Stories 1-3 Only)
1. Setup + Foundational (T001-T005)
2. User Story 1 (T006-T011) — policies exist and resolve correctly
3. User Story 2 (T012-T021) — runs are created with real calendar-aware due dates
4. User Story 3 (T022-T027) — pause/resume is durable, including across a restart
5. **STOP and VALIDATE**: Quickstart Scenarios 1-3 pass — every assigned ticket has a correctly
computed, durably pausable `SLARun`. Nothing reacts to a breach yet — that value lands with
User Story 4/5.
### Incremental Delivery
1. Setup + Foundational → schema migrated
2. Add User Story 1 → SLA policies are configurable and resolve correctly
3. Add User Story 2 → runs are created automatically with calendar-aware due dates
4. Add User Story 3 → pause/resume is durable (P1-complete, MVP)
5. Add User Story 4 → breaches are durably detected
6. Add User Story 5 → breaches automatically escalate and reassign
7. Add User Story 6 → manual escalation exists, reusing the same mechanism
8. Polish → docs and full regression
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# Specification Quality Checklist: Problem Resolution
**Purpose**: Validate specification completeness and quality before proceeding to planning
**Created**: 2026-09-03
**Feature**: [spec.md](../spec.md)
## Content Quality
- [x] No implementation details (languages, frameworks, APIs)
- [x] Focused on user value and business needs
- [x] Written for non-technical stakeholders
- [x] All mandatory sections completed
## Requirement Completeness
- [x] No [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers remain
- [x] Requirements are testable and unambiguous
- [x] Success criteria are measurable
- [x] Success criteria are technology-agnostic (no implementation details)
- [x] All acceptance scenarios are defined
- [x] Edge cases are identified
- [x] Scope is clearly bounded
- [x] Dependencies and assumptions identified
## Feature Readiness
- [x] All functional requirements have clear acceptance criteria
- [x] User scenarios cover primary flows
- [x] Feature meets measurable outcomes defined in Success Criteria
- [x] No implementation details leak into specification
## Notes
- Scope is Phase 9 per `docs/10-implementation-roadmap.md`: Investigation → Root Cause →
Solution → Solution Implementation → Solution Verification → Resolution, plus customer
confirmation and reopen — the full doc 04 §3-9 workflow narrative, matching doc 06's "Domain:
Problem Resolution" schema exactly (no new fields invented beyond what's already documented).
- `src/modules/problem-management/{investigation,root-causes,solutions,resolutions,verification}`
are the five real target stub directories for this feature (each currently a one-file stub
returning a hardcoded placeholder). `src/modules/problem-management/problems` was found to be a
**dead, unwired duplicate scaffold** for `Problem` — the real, actively-used `Problem` model and
repository already live in `ticketing/tickets` since 003 — this feature does not touch
`problem-management/problems`, matching this session's established discipline of only replacing
stubs a documented phase's roadmap item actually calls for.
- This feature explicitly closes a loop 008-sla-escalation's own spec.md left open in its Edge
Cases: "reopening... may need its own SLA-run-restart decision" — resolved here as "no new SLA
run on reopen" (FR-018), keeping 008's already-shipped 1:1-with-first-assignment boundary
unchanged rather than reopening (no pun intended) that feature's own scope.
- Verification-failure escalation deliberately reuses 003/007's existing `HUMAN_ESCALATION`
transition rather than inventing a new escalation-rule trigger type in 008's system — flagged
explicitly in Assumptions as a scope decision, not an oversight.
- All items pass; no revision iterations were needed.
## Implementation Notes (added during /speckit-implement)
- `fastify.authenticateProductIntegration` (002) turned out to unconditionally require a full
ticket-creation-shaped body (`source`/`problem` included) — reusing it as planned for
confirm-resolution/reopen made every call fail validation before token verification ran. Fixed
by extracting the shared verification logic (everything after the body's own shape is known)
into `verifyIntegrationIdentity` in `product-integration-auth.plugin.ts`, and adding a new,
narrower `identityOnlyRequestSchema` (`{productId, tenantId, userId}`) plus a new
`authenticateProductIntegrationIdentity` decorator built on the same shared function — purely
additive, `POST /v1/support/requests`'s own behavior is unchanged.
- Two pre-existing scaffold gaps were closed for this feature's FK validation needs:
`TicketsRepository` gained `findPendingCustomerConfirmationOlderThan` (the auto-close sweep's
own query), and `ticketsRepository`/`TicketsRepository` are now exported from
`ticketing/tickets`'s public `index.ts` (same "extend an existing module's public surface"
precedent as `problemsRepository` before it).
- Running this feature's own integration suite alongside 008's surfaced a real test-data-hygiene
bug in 008's already-committed test file: its second hierarchy node used `productScope: []`
(a wildcard matching *every* product, per `HierarchyNode`'s own documented scope-matching rule)
purely to have a valid, different target node for its own scoped-escalation test — but since
every test file's tickets share one live Postgres database, that wildcard node (and, similarly,
008's intentionally-global `SLAPolicy` test fixture) silently affected *other* files' tickets
running in the same suite, including this feature's own. Fixed by scoping that node to its own
test's product (it never needed to be global) and by deactivating the global `SLAPolicy`
fixture immediately after the one scenario that needs it, rather than leaving it live for the
rest of the file's run — both fixes are to `tests/integration/sla-escalation-flow.test.ts`
only, no production code changed. Full regression (`tests/unit` + `tests/integration` together,
172 tests) is clean except the 2 pre-existing MinIO-dependent attachment failures.
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
# Contract: Problem Resolution
Agent-facing write routes are gated by `fastify.authenticate` (known limitation inherited from
002-008). Customer-facing routes are gated by `fastify.authenticateProductIntegration` +
`fastify.checkIntegrationRateLimit` (002's inbound trust boundary, research.md) and additionally
verify the caller's token identifies the same tenant/user as the ticket's own recorded
`externalTenantId`/`externalUserId` — a `403` if they don't match.
## Investigation
- `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/investigations` — body `{ investigator, findings, evidence?,
internalNotes?, status? }` (`status` defaults to `open`). `404` if `problemId` doesn't exist.
- `GET /admin/problems/:problemId/investigations` — every investigation for the problem, newest
first, including `internalNotes` (agent-facing).
- `GET /problems/:problemId/investigations` — customer/public-safe variant: same list, with
`internalNotes` always omitted (FR-003).
## Root Cause
- `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/root-causes` — body `{ type, description }`. `400` if `type`
isn't one of the five validated values. `409` if no investigation exists yet for the problem.
## Solution
- `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/solutions` — body `{ proposed }`. `409` if no root cause
exists yet for the problem.
- `PATCH /admin/solutions/:solutionId/approve` — sets `approved: true`.
- `POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/implementation` — body `{ notes?, implementedBy }`. `409` if
the solution isn't approved, or already has an implementation.
- `POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/verification` — body `{ method, result, evidence? }`. `400`
if `method` isn't one of the four validated values. `409` if the solution has no implementation
yet, or already has a verification.
## Resolution
- `POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/resolution` — body `{ outcome, resolvedBy }`. `409` if the
ticket's problem has no solution with a successful verification. Transitions the ticket to
`RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` on success.
- `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/confirm-resolution` — customer-facing (trust boundary
above). `409` if the ticket isn't in `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`. Transitions to `RESOLVED`.
## Reopen
- `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` — customer-facing. `409` if the ticket isn't
`RESOLVED` or `CLOSED`.
- `POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` — agent-facing, same precondition.
Both reopen routes transition `RESOLVED|CLOSED → REOPENED → IN_PROGRESS` (research.md's two-hop
decision) and touch nothing else — no new `SLARun`, no mutation of any prior investigation/root-
cause/solution/verification/resolution record (FR-018, SC-005).
## Guarantees (callable contract)
1. **Every investigation/root-cause/solution/implementation/verification/resolution record,
once created, is retrievable exactly as given and is never silently overwritten by a later
action in the same problem's lifecycle** (SC-001).
2. **`internalNotes` never appears in a customer-facing investigation read**, verified by a
direct comparison against the agent-facing read of the same record (SC-002).
3. **A `Resolution` can never be recorded without a successfully verified solution already on
file for the ticket's problem** (SC-003).
4. **A ticket in `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` with no explicit confirmation reaches `RESOLVED`
within one auto-close job cycle of its configured waiting period elapsing** (SC-004).
5. **Reopening a ticket leaves every prior problem-resolution record and its `SLARun` (008)
untouched** (SC-005).
6. **A verification failure choosing escalation moves the ticket to `HUMAN_ESCALATION` through
003's existing state machine, and 007's orchestration re-runs automatically from that
transition alone** — no new escalation mechanism is introduced by this feature.
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
# Data Model: Problem Resolution
Every model below matches `docs/06-database-schema.md` "Domain: Problem Resolution" field-for-
field — no new columns invented (research.md explains the two places this was deliberately
considered and rejected: `Resolution.solutionId`, `Investigation.isCurrent`).
## Investigation
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `problemId` | `String` | FK to `Problem.id` (the existing `ticketing/tickets` one) |
| `investigator` | `String` | agentId — same non-FK free-text convention as `TicketMessage.authorRef` |
| `findings` | `Json` | structured, not free text (doc 04 §4) |
| `evidence` | `Json?` | |
| `internalNotes` | `String?` | never exposed on any customer-facing read (FR-003) |
| `status` | `String` | `open \| complete` |
| `createdAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | ordering field for "most recent investigation" (research.md — no `isCurrent` flag) |
## RootCause
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `problemId` | `String` | FK to `Problem.id` |
| `type` | `String` | `technical \| configuration \| external_dependency \| business \| contributing_factor` — validated, not free text (FR-005) |
| `description` | `String` | |
| `createdAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
## Solution
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `problemId` | `String` | FK to `Problem.id` |
| `proposed` | `String` | |
| `approved` | `Boolean @default(false)` | explicit approval action (FR-007) |
| `createdAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
| `implementation` | `SolutionImplementation?` | inverse of the 1:1 below |
| `verification` | `SolutionVerification?` | inverse of the 1:1 below |
## SolutionImplementation
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `solutionId` | `String @unique` | 1:1 with `Solution` — a second implementation attempt is rejected (FR-007 Edge Cases), not overwritten |
| `notes` | `String?` | |
| `implementedBy` | `String` | agentId |
| `implementedAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
## SolutionVerification
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `solutionId` | `String @unique` | 1:1 with `Solution` — at most one verification per solution (data-model note in Edge Cases) |
| `method` | `String` | `automated \| technical_test \| customer_confirmation \| agent_confirmation` — validated (FR-011) |
| `result` | `String` | `success \| failed` |
| `evidence` | `Json?` | |
| `verifiedAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
## Resolution
| Field | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | `String @id @default(cuid())` | |
| `ticketId` | `String @unique` | one resolution per ticket |
| `outcome` | `String` | |
| `resolvedBy` | `String` | `"ai"` or agentId |
| `resolvedAt` | `DateTime @default(now())` | |
No `solutionId` FK here (research.md) — the "a successfully verified solution exists for this
ticket's problem" precondition (FR-014) is enforced by the service layer at write time via a
join through `Ticket.problemId → Solution.problemId → Solution.verification.result`, not stored.
## Relations added to existing models
- `Problem.investigations Investigation[]`, `Problem.rootCauses RootCause[]`,
`Problem.solutions Solution[]` (all on the existing `ticketing/tickets`-owned `Problem` model)
- `Ticket.resolution Resolution?` (inverse of `Resolution.ticketId @unique`)
## Validation chain (service layer, not DB constraints — matches 003's own state-machine convention)
1. `RootCause` create → `Problem` must have at least one `Investigation` (FR-006).
2. `Solution` create → `Problem` must have at least one `RootCause` (FR-009).
3. `SolutionImplementation` create → the `Solution` must have `approved: true` (FR-008), and must
not already have an implementation (unique constraint surfaces this as a conflict).
4. `SolutionVerification` create → the `Solution` must already have a `SolutionImplementation`
(verification is of something implemented, doc 04 §7).
5. `Resolution` create → the `Ticket`'s `Problem` must have at least one `Solution` whose
`verification.result === 'success'` (FR-014).
## Out of scope for this data model (per spec.md Assumptions)
- No new `EscalationRule.triggerType` value for verification failure (research.md — reuses the
plain `HUMAN_ESCALATION` status transition instead).
- No `ResolutionPolicy`/scoped auto-close configuration entity — one system-wide config value
(research.md).
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# Implementation Plan: Problem Resolution
**Branch**: `009-problem-resolution` | **Date**: 2026-09-03 | **Spec**: [spec.md](./spec.md)
**Input**: Feature specification from `specs/009-problem-resolution/spec.md`
## Summary
Populate the five real `problem-management/{investigation,root-causes,solutions,resolutions,
verification}` stubs (each currently a one-file placeholder — `getInvestigationStatus` always
`PENDING`, `getResolutions` always `[]`, etc.) with the real doc-04-workflow engine: a strict
existence chain from investigation through root cause, solution, implementation, and
verification; a `Resolution` record gated on a successfully verified solution, moving the ticket
to `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`; explicit customer confirmation (reusing 002's inbound trust
boundary) or a durable auto-close sweep (reusing the unregistered `CLEANUP` queue stub) into
`RESOLVED`; and a reopen path (customer or agent) that re-enters `IN_PROGRESS` through 003's
existing `REOPENED` state without touching any prior record or 008's `SLARun`.
## Technical Context
**Language/Version**: TypeScript 5.4 / Node.js 20+.
**Primary Dependencies**: Prisma (new models), Zod, BullMQ (reused `CLEANUP` queue). No new
runtime dependency.
**Storage**: PostgreSQL via Prisma (new `Investigation`, `RootCause`, `Solution`,
`SolutionImplementation`, `SolutionVerification`, `Resolution` models). Reuses
`src/infrastructure/queue` for the auto-close sweep, same as 008's breach-detection job.
**Testing**: Vitest — unit tests for the existence-chain validation logic and the auto-close
due-window predicate; integration tests for the full sequential workflow (investigation through
resolution), the customer-confirmation and auto-close paths, and reopen leaving prior records and
an `SLARun` untouched.
**Target Platform**: Same Fastify modular monolith. Populates
`src/modules/problem-management/{investigation,root-causes,solutions,resolutions,verification}/`.
Adds two new customer-facing routes under `/v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/...` alongside the
existing `POST /v1/support/requests` (002).
**Project Type**: Backend service — single project.
**Constraints**: MUST reject out-of-order writes (root cause before investigation, etc. — FR-006/
FR-008/FR-009); MUST NOT expose `internalNotes` on any customer-facing read (FR-003); MUST gate
`Resolution` on a real successful verification (FR-014); MUST auto-close durably, not via an
in-memory timer (FR-016, Constitution Principle VII); MUST NOT create a new `SLARun` on reopen
(FR-018).
**Scale/Scope**: Five populated modules, one new BullMQ repeatable job (reusing an existing
queue), two new customer-facing routes reusing 002's trust boundary, one new agent-facing reopen
route. Explicitly excludes: a rendered customer confirmation UI (010's territory), a new
escalation-rule trigger type for verification failure (reuses 003/007's existing transition
instead), per-scope auto-close policy (one system-wide config value).
## Constitution Check
*GATE: Must pass before Phase 0 research. Re-check after Phase 1 design.*
| Principle / Section | Check | Result |
|---|---|---|
| I. SaaS Is the Sole Identity & Access Authority | Customer-facing routes authenticate via 002's product-integration token, never a SupportHub-native customer login — and additionally verify the token's tenant/user matches the ticket's own recorded values. | PASS |
| II. Configuration Over Hardcoding | The auto-close waiting period is env-configured (research.md), never a hardcoded number; validated-value sets (root-cause type, verification method) are Zod-enforced closed lists matching doc 04's own documented values, not ad hoc. | PASS |
| III. Layered Architecture With Enforced Module Boundaries | Five modules follow the standard shape; each references `ticketing/tickets`'s `Problem` (one-directional, already established), and the verification-failure-escalation path calls `ticketsService.updateStatus` directly rather than reaching into 008's `EscalationService` — no new module dependency edge into 008 at all. | PASS |
| IV. AI Recommends, Deterministic Policy Decides | `Resolution.resolvedBy` accepts `"ai"` per doc 06's own shape, but this feature adds no AI-driven decision logic of its own — every gate (approval, verification result, escalate-vs-reinvestigate) is an explicit human/deterministic action. | PASS |
| V. Evidence-Based Verification | This principle's own domain — `SolutionVerification.evidence`/`Investigation.evidence` are exactly the durable evidence records Principle V requires before a resolution is trusted. | PASS |
| VI. Durable Audit & History | Every investigation attempt is its own preserved row (never overwritten); reopen produces two real, separately-audited status transitions rather than one collapsed hop. | PASS |
| VII. Concurrency-Safe, Durable Job Handling | Auto-close is a repeatable BullMQ job querying durable DB state (`Ticket.status`/`updatedAt`), never an in-memory timer — same discipline 008's breach-detection sweep already established. | PASS |
| VIII. Problem and Ticket Are Separate, Related Entities | This principle's own domain — every investigation/root-cause/solution record is scoped to `Problem`, never `Ticket`, while `Resolution` (necessarily ticket-scoped, since a shared `Problem` could span multiple tickets) is the one exception doc 06 itself defines. | PASS |
| Technology & Platform Constraints | Prisma + Zod + existing BullMQ infrastructure only, no new dependency. | PASS |
No violations requiring Complexity Tracking justification.
## Post-Design Constitution Re-check
All gates above remain PASS after Phase 1 design. Worth calling out against Principle VIII
explicitly: `Resolution.ticketId` (not `problemId`) is the one place in this whole feature where
a record is ticket-scoped rather than problem-scoped — a deliberate, doc-06-defined exception
(a shared `Problem` can have multiple tickets, each needing its own outcome), not an
inconsistency with the rest of this feature's problem-scoped chain.
## Project Structure
### Documentation (this feature)
```text
specs/009-problem-resolution/
├── plan.md # This file
├── research.md # Phase 0 output
├── data-model.md # Phase 1 output
├── quickstart.md # Phase 1 output
├── contracts/ # Phase 1 output
└── tasks.md # Phase 2 output (/speckit-tasks — not created here)
```
### Source Code (repository root)
```text
supporthub-api/
├── prisma/
│ └── schema.prisma # MODIFIED — add Investigation, RootCause,
│ Solution, SolutionImplementation,
│ SolutionVerification, Resolution
├── src/
│ ├── config/
│ │ └── problem-resolution.ts # NEW — autoCloseWaitingHours
│ ├── jobs/
│ │ └── cleanup/index.ts # REPLACED stub — schedules the repeatable
│ │ auto-close sweep (research.md)
│ └── modules/
│ ├── ticketing/tickets/ # MODIFIED — reopen calls updateStatus twice
│ └── problem-management/
│ ├── problems/ # UNTOUCHED — dead duplicate scaffold
│ │ (research.md) — not this feature's Problem
│ ├── investigation/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape
│ ├── root-causes/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape
│ ├── solutions/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape
│ ├── verification/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape
│ └── resolutions/ # REPLACED stub — full standard shape,
│ including the auto-close sweep + the two
│ new customer-facing routes
└── tests/
├── unit/problem-management/ # existence-chain validation, auto-close
│ due-window predicate
└── integration/ # full sequential workflow, customer
confirmation, auto-close, reopen
```
**Structure Decision**: Single project. Every module gets the full standard shape (each has its
own real CRUD/read surface, unlike 007's internal-only `routing`) — matching 008's precedent for
a multi-module feature where every module has genuine callers beyond another module in the same
feature.
## Complexity Tracking
*No constitution violations — table intentionally omitted.*
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# Quickstart: Validating Problem Resolution
Prerequisites: migrations applied; a ticket created per 003-ticketing's own quickstart (this
feature works against its `problemId`).
## Scenario 1 — structured investigation, preserved across attempts (User Story 1)
1. `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/investigations` with findings/evidence/internalNotes.
**Expected**: `201`, retrievable via `GET /admin/problems/:problemId/investigations` with
every field intact.
2. `GET /problems/:problemId/investigations` (customer-safe variant). **Expected**: same rows,
`internalNotes` absent from every one.
3. Record a second investigation for the same problem. **Expected**: both rows remain, in order —
the first is never overwritten.
## Scenario 2 — root cause requires an investigation on file (User Story 2)
1. `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/root-causes` for a problem with no investigation.
**Expected**: `409`.
2. Repeat after Scenario 1's investigation exists. **Expected**: `201`, `type` one of the five
validated values.
3. Repeat with an invalid `type`. **Expected**: `400`.
## Scenario 3 — solution proposed, approved, implemented as distinct states (User Story 3)
1. `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/solutions` before any root cause exists. **Expected**: `409`.
2. Repeat after Scenario 2's root cause exists. **Expected**: `201`, `approved: false`.
3. `POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/implementation` before approval. **Expected**: `409`.
4. `PATCH /admin/solutions/:solutionId/approve`, then repeat step 3. **Expected**: `201`.
5. Repeat step 3 again (a second implementation). **Expected**: `409`.
## Scenario 4 — verification, and what happens on failure (User Story 4)
1. `POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/verification` with `result: success`. **Expected**: `201`.
2. On a different solution (Scenario 3 repeated for a fresh problem), verify with
`result: failed`. **Expected**: `201`, but no `Resolution` can be recorded referencing it
(Scenario 5, step 1).
3. On the failed-verification path, request a fresh investigation. **Expected**: a new
`Investigation` row for the same problem, the original untouched.
4. On the failed-verification path, request escalation instead. **Expected**: the ticket
transitions to `HUMAN_ESCALATION`, and (007) is automatically assigned from that transition
alone — no separate escalation call needed.
## Scenario 5 — resolution, customer confirmation, and auto-close (User Story 5)
1. `POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/resolution` for a ticket whose problem has no successfully
verified solution. **Expected**: `409`.
2. Repeat once Scenario 4 step 1's successful verification exists. **Expected**: `201`, ticket
status becomes `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`.
3. `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/confirm-resolution` with the customer's own token.
**Expected**: `200`, ticket status becomes `RESOLVED`.
4. Repeat steps 1-2 for a second ticket; instead of confirming, directly age the ticket's
`updatedAt` past the configured waiting period and run the auto-close sweep.
**Expected**: ticket status becomes `RESOLVED` without any explicit confirmation call.
## Scenario 6 — reopen (User Story 6)
1. `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` on the `RESOLVED` ticket from Scenario 5.
**Expected**: `200`, ticket status becomes `IN_PROGRESS` (via `REOPENED`).
2. `GET /tickets/:ticketId/resolution` (or the admin equivalent). **Expected**: the original
`Resolution` record is still present, unchanged.
3. If the ticket has an `SLARun` (008) from its original assignment, **Expected**: it is
unchanged — no new run created, its status exactly what it was before the reopen.
4. `POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` on a `CLOSED` ticket, as an agent. **Expected**: same
`REOPENED → IN_PROGRESS` result, this time attributed to the agent, not `"customer"`.
## What "done" looks like
All six scenarios pass, together demonstrating every functional requirement and success
criterion in `spec.md` — including SC-004's auto-close job cycle and SC-005's "reopen touches
nothing else" guarantee, both of which need direct-DB-state manipulation (not just waiting) to
verify without a multi-hour real-time test run.
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# Phase 0 Research: Problem Resolution
## Decision: Module placement — five real stubs; `problem-management/problems` is dead scaffold, left untouched
- **Decision**: `problem-management/{investigation,root-causes,solutions,resolutions,verification}`
(each a one-file, hardcoded-placeholder stub) are populated directly. `problem-management/
problems` — a second, never-wired `ProblemsRepository.findAll()` returning `[]` — is left
exactly as-is; it is not this feature's `Problem` (that one has lived in, and been used since,
`ticketing/tickets/repository/problems.repository.ts`, created by 003-ticketing).
- **Rationale**: Every real caller of `Problem` (003's ticket creation, 005's AI diagnosis, 007's
routing context, this feature's own investigation/root-cause/solution FKs) already resolves it
through `ticketing/tickets`'s repository. `problem-management/problems` was never imported by
anything (confirmed by search) — a leftover from the original pre-spec-driven scaffold, the same
class of dead placeholder this codebase's discipline is to leave alone unless a documented
phase's roadmap item actually names it. Phase 9's own roadmap line names Investigation/
RootCause/Solution/.../Resolution, not a second Problem implementation.
- **Alternatives considered**: Migrating `Problem` into `problem-management/problems` and
re-pointing every existing caller — rejected as an unrequested, high-blast-radius refactor of
working code three prior features already depend on, for a rename with no functional benefit.
## Decision: Investigation is version-row-per-attempt, matching 004/007's established pattern
- **Decision**: Every investigation (the first one, and any created after a failed verification,
FR-013) is its own `Investigation` row for the same `problemId` — never an update to a prior
row. "Which investigation is current" for a problem is simply the most recent by `createdAt`.
- **Rationale**: Doc 06's `Investigation` model has no version/current-row field at all (unlike
`KnowledgeEntry.isCurrentVersion` or `Assignment.isCurrent`) — the simplest reading consistent
with "each investigation attempt is real, preserved history" (spec.md US1) is an unbounded,
append-only set of rows per problem, ordered by `createdAt`, with no additional schema needed.
- **Alternatives considered**: Adding an `isCurrent` boolean to `Investigation` (mirroring 007's
refinement of `Assignment`) — rejected as unrequested schema embellishment; nothing in spec.md
requires querying "the current investigation" faster than an `orderBy: createdAt desc, take: 1`
already provides, and doc 06 doesn't define the field.
## Decision: A strict existence chain — investigation → root cause → solution → implementation → verification
- **Decision**: Each write validates its own prerequisite exists for the same `problemId`
(root cause requires an investigation; solution requires a root cause) or the same `solutionId`
(implementation requires an approved solution; verification requires an implementation) —
resolve-or-reject, the same "don't invent a default, don't skip a step" discipline this
codebase has used for every other FK-shaped precondition since 002.
- **Rationale**: Doc 04 §4-8 describes a strictly sequential workflow ("Investigation → Root
Cause → Solution → Verification → Resolution") — the acceptance scenarios (spec.md US2-US4)
explicitly test that skipping a step is rejected, not silently tolerated.
- **Alternatives considered**: Allowing any order and only validating at Resolution time —
rejected; doc 04's own workflow diagram is sequential by design, and rejecting out-of-order
writes early gives a caller a much clearer error than a late rejection at the final step.
## Decision: `Resolution` has no stored FK back to `Solution` — matches doc 06's shape exactly
- **Decision**: `Resolution` is validated at write time (a successfully verified solution must
exist for the ticket's `problemId`) but the `Resolution` row itself stores no `solutionId`
doc 06's own `Resolution` model has no such field (`id, ticketId @unique, outcome, resolvedBy,
resolvedAt` only).
- **Rationale**: Not a gap to fill — the existence check is enforced by the service layer at
write time (the same "validate at the boundary, don't over-model the schema" approach 002/003
already use for non-FK cross-references like `TicketMessage.authorRef`), and doc 06 is
explicit about what `Resolution` stores. Inventing a FK doc 06 doesn't define would be scope
creep, not correctness.
- **Alternatives considered**: Adding `solutionId` to `Resolution` as an additive refinement
(this codebase's own established pattern for filling real gaps, e.g. 008's
`firstResponseBreachedAt`) — considered and rejected specifically here, since unlike 008's gap
(a genuinely missing idempotency guard with no other way to express it), the existence check
this feature needs is fully satisfiable without a stored reference — a real refinement changes
*behavior*; this one would only change provenance-tracing convenience nothing in spec.md asks
for.
## Decision: Verification-failure escalation reuses 003/007's `HUMAN_ESCALATION` transition directly
- **Decision**: When an agent chooses escalation on a failed verification (FR-013), this feature
calls `ticketsService.updateStatus(ticketId, 'HUMAN_ESCALATION', ...)` — the same transition
001-caliber tickets already support — and does nothing else. 007's existing `TICKET_UPDATED`
subscriber (`src/events/handlers/index.ts`) picks this up and runs orchestration automatically,
exactly as it does for every other route into `HUMAN_ESCALATION`.
- **Rationale**: "Solution verification failed" is not one of doc 05 §6's ten escalation-rule
trigger types 008 already modeled (`first_response_breach | resolution_breach | inactivity |
priority_increase | customer_escalation | repeated_reopen | manual | product_defect |
dependency_timeout | critical_incident`) — inventing an eleventh type, a new `EscalationEvent`,
and a new call into 008's `EscalationService` for one internal flow this feature owns would be
real, unrequested coupling across a module boundary 008 was deliberately built not to need.
Reusing the plain status transition is exactly the mechanism 007 already exists to react to.
- **Alternatives considered**: Adding `solution_verification_failed` as an eleventh
`EscalationRule.triggerType` and calling 008's `EscalationService.handleBreach`-equivalent —
rejected; 008 is already shipped and committed with a closed, deliberately-bounded set of two
real trigger types (spec.md 008 Assumptions) — retroactively expanding it from within a later
feature, for a flow that doesn't need the rule-matching machinery at all (there's exactly one
outcome: HUMAN_ESCALATION, not "evaluate every matching rule"), is unjustified complexity.
## Decision: Customer-facing confirm-resolution and reopen reuse 002's trust boundary via a new, narrower `authenticateProductIntegrationIdentity` decorator; agent reopen uses `fastify.authenticate`
- **Decision**: Two new customer-reachable routes, `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/confirm-
resolution` and `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/reopen`, are gated by a new
`fastify.authenticateProductIntegrationIdentity` + the existing `fastify.
checkIntegrationRateLimit` preHandler pair, then additionally verify the caller's
`externalTenantId`/`externalUserId` (from `request.reqContext`) matches the ticket's own
recorded values before allowing the action. A third route,
`POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/reopen`, is gated by `fastify.authenticate` for the
agent-initiated reopen path FR-017 also requires. Confirm-resolution has no agent-initiated
equivalent (spec.md US5 only ever has the customer confirming explicitly; an agent's own path
to close things out is the existing auto-close job, not a manual override this feature adds).
- **Implementation note (found during /speckit-implement, not anticipated at planning time)**:
`fastify.authenticateProductIntegration` (002) unconditionally validates `request.body` against
the full `inboundRequestSchema` — which requires `source`/`problem`, ticket-*creation*-specific
fields neither new route has any reason to send. Reusing it as originally planned made every
call to these two routes fail Zod validation before token verification ever ran. Fixed by
extracting steps 2-10 of `authenticateProductIntegration`'s logic (everything after the body's
own shape is known — token verification, replay/revocation/scope checks, `reqContext`
population) into a shared `verifyIntegrationIdentity` function in
`product-integration-auth.plugin.ts`, and adding a new `identityOnlyRequestSchema`
(`{productId, tenantId, userId}` only) plus a new `authenticateProductIntegrationIdentity`
decorator that parses that narrower shape and calls the same shared function. The original
`authenticateProductIntegration` (and `POST /v1/support/requests`) is unchanged in behavior —
purely additive.
- **Rationale**: `inbound-request.routes.ts`'s own comment ("Acting further on the ticket...
belongs to later features that don't exist yet") names exactly this need — 002's trust boundary
was already built to be extended, just not with a body shape that happened to fit an action on
an *existing* ticket. Requiring the caller's own token to match the ticket's tenant/user
prevents one customer from confirming or reopening another tenant's ticket.
- **Alternatives considered**: A single unauthenticated or `fastify.authenticate`-gated endpoint
for both actor types — rejected; a customer is never an authenticated SupportHub principal
(Constitution Principle I — SaaS is the sole identity authority for its own end users), so reusing
the internal-agent auth mechanism for a customer-initiated action would be a security regression,
not a simplification. Sending a dummy `source`/`problem` value to satisfy the existing schema —
rejected as a hack that would misrepresent the request and pollute `validatedInboundBody` for a
handler that was never meant to receive it.
## Decision: Auto-close is a repeatable BullMQ job on the existing, unclaimed `CLEANUP` queue
- **Decision**: `src/jobs/cleanup/index.ts` (currently a log-only stub registered on
`QueueName.CLEANUP`, never wired into `queue.bootstrap.ts`) is extended the same way 008
extended `src/jobs/sla/index.ts` — a repeatable job (every 5 minutes; less time-sensitive than
008's breach detection, since this only ever fires after a multi-hour/day waiting period) whose
processor calls a single, directly-callable `ResolutionsService.runAutoCloseSweep()` — querying
every ticket with `status: 'RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER'` whose most recent status-change
(`Ticket.updatedAt`) is older than the configured waiting period, transitioning each to
`RESOLVED`.
- **Rationale**: `CLEANUP` is exactly this kind of periodic housekeeping sweep, and — like
`SLA`/`ESCALATION` before this feature — was defined and left completely unregistered since the
original scaffold. Reusing it needs no new `QueueName` value. A directly-callable sweep method
(not only reachable through a running worker) is what let 008's breach-detection tests avoid a
real wait; the same shape applies here.
- **Alternatives considered**: A per-ticket delayed job scheduled at the moment `Resolution` is
recorded — rejected for the same reason 008 rejected the equivalent per-run design: a
reopened-then-re-resolved ticket, or a resolution recorded twice in error, would each need
their own cancel/reschedule bookkeeping a polling sweep avoids entirely.
## Decision: The auto-close waiting period is one system-wide config value, not a per-scope policy
- **Decision**: `env.RESOLUTION_AUTO_CLOSE_WAITING_HOURS` (default `72`, i.e. 3 days), exposed via
a new `src/config/problem-resolution.ts` — `problemResolutionConfig.autoCloseWaitingHours` —
mirroring `orchestrationConfig.defaultStrategy`'s exact shape.
- **Rationale**: Doc 04 §9 describes "a configured waiting period" in the singular, system-wide
sense — not a per-product/category policy table the way 008's `SLAPolicy` is; doc 06 defines no
entity for a scoped auto-close policy. A single env-configured default (Constitution Principle
II — never hardcoded, but not over-modeled into a policy table nothing asks for) is the
proportionate reading.
- **Alternatives considered**: A `ResolutionPolicy` table scoped like `SLAPolicy` — rejected as
speculative; nothing in doc 04/06 describes per-context auto-close variation, unlike SLA's
explicit product/category/priority scoping in doc 06's own `SLAPolicy` shape.
## Decision: The reopen transition is two real, separately-audited status updates
- **Decision**: Reopening calls `ticketsService.updateStatus(ticketId, 'REOPENED', ...)` followed
immediately by `ticketsService.updateStatus(ticketId, 'IN_PROGRESS', ...)` — two real
transitions through 003's existing state machine (both already valid edges:
`RESOLVED|CLOSED → REOPENED` and `REOPENED → IN_PROGRESS`), each producing its own
`SYSTEM_EVENT` ticket message and `TICKET_UPDATED` publish, rather than a single hop straight
to `IN_PROGRESS` that would skip recording the reopen milestone itself.
- **Rationale**: Doc 04 §9's own phrasing — "reopen... should re-enter the appropriate lifecycle
stage" — matches the state machine's own two-hop shape exactly; both hops are independently
meaningful audit events (Constitution Principle VI), not one compound action worth collapsing.
- **Alternatives considered**: A single, direct `RESOLVED|CLOSED → IN_PROGRESS` transition
(bypassing `REOPENED` as a status value entirely) — rejected; 003's state machine doesn't even
define that edge (only `REOPENED → IN_PROGRESS`), and skipping the `REOPENED` status would
erase a real lifecycle milestone doc 04 explicitly names.
## Decision: 008's SLA run is explicitly left untouched by reopen — no new decision needed here
- **Decision**: Reopening a ticket does not create, restart, or modify its existing `SLARun`
(008) in any way — the run (if one exists) simply remains in whatever terminal state it was
already in (`completed` or `breached`).
- **Rationale**: 008's own spec.md already closed this decision from its side ("SLA runs are 1:1
with a ticket's first successful assignment only... out of scope for this feature to define a
new run automatically") — this feature's job is only to confirm that boundary still holds, not
to re-litigate it. FR-018/SC-005 make this an explicit, tested guarantee rather than an
accidental side effect of simply not writing any `SLARun`-touching code.
- **Alternatives considered**: Restarting the SLA run on reopen — explicitly out of scope per
008's own spec; would require this feature to modify 008's already-shipped module, which
nothing in Phase 9's roadmap line asks for.
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# Feature Specification: Problem Resolution
**Feature Branch**: `009-problem-resolution`
**Created**: 2026-09-03
**Status**: Draft
**Input**: User description: "Phase 9 of docs/10-implementation-roadmap.md: Investigation/
RootCause/Solution/SolutionImplementation/SolutionVerification/Resolution models and workflows,
customer confirmation + reopen flow. Per docs/04-ticketing-and-problem-management.md §3-9 and
docs/06-database-schema.md 'Domain: Problem Resolution'."
## User Scenarios & Testing *(mandatory)*
### User Story 1 - An agent records structured investigation findings (Priority: P1)
An agent investigating a problem records findings, evidence, and internal notes as a structured
record — not a free-text blob buried in a message — with its own status (`open`/`complete`). A
problem can have more than one investigation attempt over its lifetime, each preserved, not
overwritten.
**Why this priority**: Everything downstream (root cause, solution, verification) reads from or
references an investigation; nothing else in this feature can start without one existing first.
**Independent Test**: Record an investigation with findings and evidence for a problem; confirm
it's retrievable exactly as given, with its own investigator and timestamp.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** an agent records an investigation with findings, **When** it's saved, **Then** it's
retrievable with `investigator`, `findings`, `evidence`, `internalNotes`, and `status` exactly
as given.
2. **Given** a problem already has a completed investigation, **When** a new investigation is
started for the same problem (e.g., after a failed verification, User Story 4), **Then** the
prior investigation's record is preserved unchanged — a new investigation is its own row, never
an overwrite of the earlier one.
3. **Given** `internalNotes` on an investigation, **When** any customer-facing view is composed,
**Then** that data is never included — internal notes are agent/admin-only, same "never shown
to customers" discipline as ticketing's `INTERNAL_NOTE` message type (004 §10).
---
### User Story 2 - An agent records a root cause, separate from the investigation (Priority: P1)
Once findings point to a cause, the agent records a root cause as its own record — distinct from
the investigation that surfaced it — typed as technical, configuration, external-dependency,
business, or a contributing factor.
**Why this priority**: A solution (User Story 3) is a response to a specific, recorded cause —
without one, "solving" a problem has nothing to be checked against.
**Independent Test**: Record a root cause of a given type for a problem with an investigation
already on file; confirm it's retrievable and distinct from the investigation record.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a problem with an investigation on file, **When** an agent records a root cause with
a type and description, **Then** it's retrievable as its own record, never merged into the
investigation's own fields.
2. **Given** a root cause type outside the five documented values, **When** it's submitted,
**Then** it's rejected — the type is a closed, validated set, not free text.
---
### User Story 3 - An agent proposes, approves, and implements a solution, each as its own state (Priority: P1)
A solution moves through distinct states — proposed, approved, implemented — never collapsed into
one mutable blob. Implementation is its own record: who implemented it, when, and any notes,
kept separate from the proposal itself.
**Why this priority**: Verification (User Story 4) and resolution (User Story 5) both need a
concrete, dated implementation record to verify and resolve against.
**Independent Test**: Propose a solution, approve it, then record its implementation; confirm all
three states are independently visible on the same solution record/its implementation relation.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a root cause on file, **When** an agent proposes a solution, **Then** it's stored
with `approved: false` by default.
2. **Given** a proposed solution, **When** it's approved, **Then** `approved` becomes `true`
approval is a distinct, explicit action, never implied by implementation happening.
3. **Given** an approved solution, **When** an agent records its implementation (notes,
implementer, timestamp), **Then** a `SolutionImplementation` record is created, one-to-one
with the solution — attempting a second implementation record for the same solution is
rejected, not silently overwritten.
4. **Given** a solution that has not been approved, **When** an implementation is attempted,
**Then** it's rejected — implementation without approval is never allowed.
---
### User Story 4 - A solution is verified; failure re-opens investigation or escalates (Priority: P2)
After implementation, the solution is verified by one of several methods (automated check,
technical test, customer confirmation, agent confirmation). A successful verification clears the
way to resolution (User Story 5). A failed verification either re-opens investigation (a fresh
investigation record for the same problem) or escalates the ticket — an agent's explicit choice,
not an automatic guess.
**Why this priority**: Depends on User Story 3 (something implemented to verify). Recording a
resolution without ever having verified anything would misrepresent what was actually confirmed.
**Independent Test**: Verify an implemented solution as failed; confirm no `Resolution` can be
recorded from it, and that either a fresh investigation exists or the ticket has been escalated,
per the agent's chosen path.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** an implemented solution, **When** it's verified with `result: success`, **Then** a
`SolutionVerification` record is created (method, result, evidence, timestamp), one-to-one
with the solution.
2. **Given** an implemented solution, **When** it's verified with `result: failed`, **Then** no
resolution can reference this solution's verification as successful — a failed verification is
a real, recorded outcome, not silently discarded.
3. **Given** a failed verification and the agent chooses re-investigation, **When** that choice is
made, **Then** a new `Investigation` record is created for the same problem (User Story 1's own
"each attempt is its own row" rule).
4. **Given** a failed verification and the agent chooses escalation instead, **When** that choice
is made, **Then** the ticket transitions to `HUMAN_ESCALATION` through 003-ticketing's existing
state machine — 007's orchestration re-runs automatically from that transition alone, exactly
as it already does for any other route into `HUMAN_ESCALATION`; this feature does not invent a
second escalation mechanism alongside 008's.
---
### User Story 5 - A resolution is recorded, with configurable customer confirmation or auto-close (Priority: P1)
Once a solution is verified successful, a `Resolution` record captures the final outcome for the
ticket. Depending on configuration, the ticket either waits for explicit customer confirmation
before closing, or auto-closes after a configured waiting period with no response.
**Why this priority**: This is the feature's actual deliverable from the customer's point of
view — everything before this is agent-facing work product.
**Independent Test**: Record a resolution for a ticket with a successfully verified solution;
confirm the ticket reaches `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`, then either an explicit confirmation or
the configured waiting period elapsing moves it to `RESOLVED`.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a solution with a successful verification, **When** an agent records a resolution,
**Then** a `Resolution` record is created (`outcome`, `resolvedBy`) and the ticket transitions
to `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`.
2. **Given** a ticket in `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`, **When** the customer explicitly confirms,
**Then** the ticket transitions to `RESOLVED`.
3. **Given** a ticket in `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` with no customer response, **When** the
configured auto-close waiting period elapses, **Then** the ticket transitions to `RESOLVED`
automatically — durably, via a background job, never an in-memory timer (Constitution
Principle VII, same discipline 008's breach-detection job already established).
4. **Given** a `Resolution` is attempted without a successfully verified solution on file,
**When** it's attempted, **Then** it's rejected — a resolution must be backed by real,
recorded verification, never asserted on its own.
---
### User Story 6 - A resolved or closed ticket can be reopened (Priority: P2)
A customer or agent can reopen a `RESOLVED` or `CLOSED` ticket, which re-enters the appropriate
point in the lifecycle rather than starting over from `NEW`.
**Why this priority**: Depends on User Story 5 (a ticket has to have reached a closeable state
before reopening it means anything). Closes the loop 008 explicitly left open ("reopening... may
need its own SLA-run-restart decision").
**Independent Test**: Reopen a `RESOLVED` ticket; confirm it transitions to `REOPENED` and then
into an active lifecycle state, and that the prior resolution record remains on file, unaltered.
**Acceptance Scenarios**:
1. **Given** a `RESOLVED` or `CLOSED` ticket, **When** the customer or an agent reopens it,
**Then** the ticket transitions to `REOPENED` and then to `IN_PROGRESS` (003's existing
`REOPENED → IN_PROGRESS` transition) — never back to `NEW`.
2. **Given** a ticket is reopened, **When** the prior `Resolution` record is checked, **Then** it
remains on file exactly as it was — reopening never deletes or mutates history.
3. **Given** a ticket already has an SLA run (008) from its original assignment, **When** it's
reopened, **Then** no new SLA run is created and the existing one is left exactly as it was
(008's own Assumptions: "SLA runs are 1:1 with a ticket's first successful assignment only") —
this feature does not retroactively expand that boundary.
---
### Edge Cases
- What happens if an agent tries to record a root cause before any investigation exists for the
problem? Rejected — a root cause without a preceding investigation has nothing to be grounded
in (FR-006).
- What happens if a solution is proposed for a problem with no root cause on file? Rejected, same
reasoning as above (FR-009).
- What happens if two verification attempts are recorded for the same solution? Rejected — like
`SolutionImplementation`, `SolutionVerification` is one-to-one with its solution (doc 06's own
`@unique` on `solutionId`); a second verification attempt on an already-verified solution is out
of scope for this feature (re-verification of a previously-verified solution is not a flow doc
04 describes).
- What happens to a ticket's messages/attachments/assignment history when it's reopened? Nothing
— reopening only affects `Ticket.status`; every other record (007's `Assignment`, 008's
`SLARun`, this feature's own `Investigation`/`RootCause`/`Solution`/`Resolution` records) is
untouched by the reopen transition itself.
- What happens if the configured auto-close waiting period is set to zero or is unconfigured?
Zero is a valid configuration (auto-close as soon as the sweep next runs); unconfigured falls
back to a system default (Constitution Principle II — configuration over hardcoding, but a
default value must exist so the sweep job always has something to compare against).
- What happens if a ticket is reopened more than once? Each reopen is its own `REOPENED →
IN_PROGRESS` transition — no cap on how many times a ticket can be reopened is introduced by
this feature (counting reopens toward an escalation trigger remains 008's already-documented,
deliberately deferred `repeated_reopen` trigger type — this feature does not wire it up).
## Requirements *(mandatory)*
### Functional Requirements
- **FR-001**: The system MUST let an agent record an investigation (investigator, findings,
evidence, internal notes, status) for a problem.
- **FR-002**: Each investigation MUST be its own durable record — a new investigation for the
same problem (e.g., after a failed verification) MUST NOT overwrite a prior one.
- **FR-003**: Internal notes on an investigation MUST NEVER be exposed through any
customer-facing read path.
- **FR-004**: The system MUST let an agent record a root cause (type, description) for a
problem, as a record distinct from any investigation.
- **FR-005**: A root cause's type MUST be validated against the five documented values
(technical, configuration, external_dependency, business, contributing_factor) — never
free text.
- **FR-006**: Recording a root cause for a problem with no investigation on file MUST be
rejected.
- **FR-007**: The system MUST let an agent propose a solution for a problem (`approved: false`
by default), approve it explicitly, and record its implementation (notes, implementer,
timestamp) as a separate, one-to-one record.
- **FR-008**: Recording an implementation for a solution that has not been approved MUST be
rejected.
- **FR-009**: Proposing a solution for a problem with no root cause on file MUST be rejected.
- **FR-010**: The system MUST let an agent record a verification (method, result, evidence) for
an implemented solution, as a one-to-one record.
- **FR-011**: A verification's method MUST be validated against the four documented values
(automated, technical_test, customer_confirmation, agent_confirmation).
- **FR-012**: A failed verification MUST NOT permit a `Resolution` to be recorded against that
solution.
- **FR-013**: On a failed verification, the system MUST support either starting a fresh
investigation for the same problem (FR-002) or transitioning the ticket to `HUMAN_ESCALATION`
(003's existing state machine, triggering 007's existing orchestration subscriber
automatically) — the choice between the two is the recording agent's, not automatic.
- **FR-014**: The system MUST let an agent record a `Resolution` (outcome, resolvedBy) for a
ticket, only when a successfully verified solution exists for its problem — this transitions
the ticket to `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`.
- **FR-015**: The system MUST let a customer explicitly confirm a pending resolution, transitioning
the ticket to `RESOLVED`.
- **FR-016**: The system MUST auto-transition a ticket from `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` to
`RESOLVED` after a configured waiting period with no explicit customer confirmation — detected
by a durable background job, never an in-memory timer (Constitution Principle VII).
- **FR-017**: The system MUST let a customer or agent reopen a `RESOLVED` or `CLOSED` ticket,
transitioning it to `REOPENED` and then `IN_PROGRESS` — never back to `NEW`, and never
mutating any prior investigation/root-cause/solution/verification/resolution record.
- **FR-018**: Reopening a ticket MUST NOT create a new SLA run (008's existing 1:1-with-first-
assignment boundary is unchanged by this feature).
### Key Entities
- **Investigation**: A structured, per-attempt record of what an agent found while investigating
a problem — findings, evidence, internal notes — never free text buried in a message; a problem
can have more than one, each preserved.
- **Root Cause**: Why the problem happened, typed and recorded separately from what was found
(the investigation).
- **Solution**: What's proposed to fix the root cause, moving through proposed → approved states
explicitly.
- **Solution Implementation**: The one-to-one record of a solution actually being carried out —
who, when, and any notes — distinct from the proposal.
- **Solution Verification**: The one-to-one record of whether the implementation actually worked,
by which method.
- **Resolution**: The final, ticket-level outcome — distinct from the solution (what was done)
and the verification (whether it worked).
## Success Criteria *(mandatory)*
### Measurable Outcomes
- **SC-001**: 100% of investigation/root-cause/solution/implementation/verification/resolution
records, once created, remain retrievable exactly as given — no field silently dropped or
overwritten by a later action in the same problem's lifecycle.
- **SC-002**: 100% of internal-notes fields are absent from every customer-facing response,
verified by a direct comparison of the agent-facing and customer-facing read paths for the same
investigation.
- **SC-003**: 100% of resolutions recorded without a successfully verified solution on file are
rejected.
- **SC-004**: 100% of tickets reaching `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` with no explicit customer
confirmation reach `RESOLVED` within one auto-close job cycle of their configured waiting
period elapsing.
- **SC-005**: 100% of reopened tickets leave every prior investigation/root-cause/solution/
verification/resolution record and SLA run untouched.
## Assumptions
- **This feature does not build a customer-facing confirmation UI** — "explicit customer
confirmation" (FR-015) is an API action a caller (a future customer portal, or 008/010's own
future UI work) can invoke; this feature's own scope is the backend transition and the
auto-close fallback, not a rendered confirmation page (010 — Agent/Admin UI — is a separate,
later roadmap phase).
- **Verification-failure escalation reuses 003-ticketing's existing `HUMAN_ESCALATION` state
transition and 007's already-automatic orchestration subscriber directly** — it does not create
a new `EscalationEvent` through 008's rule-based mechanism, since "solution verification failed"
is not one of doc 05 §6's ten escalation trigger types 008 modeled; inventing an eleventh type
for a single feature's own internal flow was judged unnecessary scope, not an oversight.
Re-escalation through the plain ticket-status transition is exactly what 007 was already built
to react to — no new coupling is introduced.
- **The auto-close waiting period is a single, system-wide configuration value** (Principle II —
configuration over hardcoding), not scoped per product/category the way 008's SLA policies are;
doc 04 §9 describes it as "a configured waiting period," not a per-context policy table, and
nothing in doc 06's schema defines a per-scope auto-close entity to resolve against.
- **`repeated_reopen` (008's already-inert escalation trigger type) is still not wired up by this
feature** — reopening increments no counter and triggers no escalation rule; this remains
future work exactly as 008's own Assumptions already documented, not something this feature
silently expands into.
- **A second verification attempt on an already-verified solution is out of scope** — doc 06's
`SolutionVerification.solutionId` is `@unique`, meaning at most one verification record per
solution; if a first verification fails and the agent chooses re-investigation (FR-013), any
new solution that comes out of that fresh investigation cycle gets its own new `Solution` row
(User Story 3) with its own verification slot — never a second write to the original one.
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---
description: "Task list for 009-problem-resolution"
---
# Tasks: Problem Resolution
**Input**: Design documents from `specs/009-problem-resolution/`
**Prerequisites**: [plan.md](./plan.md), [spec.md](./spec.md), [research.md](./research.md),
[data-model.md](./data-model.md),
[contracts/problem-resolution-contract.md](./contracts/problem-resolution-contract.md),
[quickstart.md](./quickstart.md)
**Tests**: Included as first-class tasks. This feature's pure logic is the existence-chain
validation (each step's precondition) and the auto-close due-window predicate; the rest is
sequential-workflow wiring best proven end-to-end against real Postgres.
**Organization**: Tasks are grouped by user story (US1 = P1 investigation, US2 = P1 root cause,
US3 = P1 solution states, US4 = P2 verification, US5 = P1 resolution/confirmation/auto-close,
US6 = P2 reopen).
## Format: `[ID] [P?] [Story] Description`
All file paths are relative to `supporthub-api/` (repo root).
---
## Phase 1: Setup
- [x] T001 [P] Populate `src/modules/problem-management/investigation/` with the full standard
shape (`controller/`, `routes/`, `schema/`, `repository/`, `service/`, `types/`, `mapper/`,
`constants/`, `index.ts`), replacing the `InvestigationService.getInvestigationStatus` stub
- [x] T002 [P] Populate `src/modules/problem-management/root-causes/` the same way, replacing the
`RootCausesService.getRootCause` stub
- [x] T003 [P] Populate `src/modules/problem-management/solutions/` the same way, replacing the
`SolutionsService.getSolutions` stub
- [x] T004 [P] Populate `src/modules/problem-management/verification/` the same way, replacing
the `VerificationService.verifySolution` stub
- [x] T005 [P] Populate `src/modules/problem-management/resolutions/` the same way, replacing the
`ResolutionsService.getResolutions` stub — this module additionally gets the auto-close
sweep and the two new customer-facing routes (later tasks)
- [x] T006 [P] Add `src/config/problem-resolution.ts` (`problemResolutionConfig
.autoCloseWaitingHours`, reading a new `RESOLUTION_AUTO_CLOSE_WAITING_HOURS` env var,
default `72`) and register it in `src/config/index.ts`'s re-export list
---
## Phase 2: Foundational (Blocking Prerequisites)
**Purpose**: Schema for every entity, shared by every user story.
**⚠️ CRITICAL**: No user-story stage work can begin until this phase is complete.
- [x] T007 Add `Investigation`, `RootCause`, `Solution`, `SolutionImplementation`,
`SolutionVerification`, `Resolution` models to `prisma/schema.prisma` per data-model.md,
plus `Problem.investigations`/`Problem.rootCauses`/`Problem.solutions` and
`Ticket.resolution` back-relations (depends on T001-T005)
- [x] T008 Run `npm run prisma:generate` and create the migration (`npm run prisma:migrate`) for
T007 (depends on T007)
**Checkpoint**: Schema migrated. User stories can now be built.
---
## Phase 3: User Story 1 - Structured investigation, preserved across attempts (Priority: P1) 🎯 MVP (part 1)
**Goal**: Investigation CRUD with the version-row-per-attempt guarantee and internal-notes
exclusion from customer-facing reads.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 1.
### Tests for User Story 1
- [x] T009 [US1] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 1 (create, retrieve with every
field intact, customer-safe variant omits `internalNotes`, a second investigation preserves
the first) against a real Postgres in `tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts`
(depends on T008)
### Implementation for User Story 1
- [x] T010 [US1] Add `InvestigationRepository` (`create`, `findAllForProblem` ordered newest
first, `findMostRecentForProblem`) in `investigation/repository/` (depends on T008)
- [x] T011 [US1] Add Zod create schema (`investigator`, `findings`, `evidence?`,
`internalNotes?`, `status?`) in `investigation/schema/`
- [x] T012 [US1] Add `InvestigationService.record`/`listForProblem` (agent-facing, includes
`internalNotes`) and `listForProblemCustomerSafe` (strips `internalNotes`, FR-003) in
`investigation/service/` (depends on T010, T011)
- [x] T013 [US1] Add `POST/GET /admin/problems/:problemId/investigations` (gated by
`fastify.authenticate`) and `GET /problems/:problemId/investigations` (ungated, customer-
safe) routes in `investigation/controller/` + `routes/`, registered from `src/api/routes.ts`
(depends on T012)
- [x] T014 [US1] Run Quickstart Scenario 1 locally and confirm all 3 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Investigations can be recorded and read correctly, with the customer-safe
redaction guarantee in place.
---
## Phase 4: User Story 2 - Root cause requires an investigation on file (Priority: P1) 🎯 MVP (part 2)
**Goal**: RootCause CRUD gated on an existing investigation, with a validated type enum.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 2.
### Tests for User Story 2
- [x] T015 [US2] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 2 (rejected with no investigation,
accepted after one exists, rejected with an invalid type) — implemented as the "Scenario 2"
case in `tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts` (depends on T009, T014)
- [x] T016 [P] [US2] Unit test for the type-validation Zod schema (five valid values, everything
else rejected) in `tests/unit/problem-management/root-cause-schema.test.ts`
### Implementation for User Story 2
- [x] T017 [US2] Add `RootCauseRepository` (`create`, `findAllForProblem`) in
`root-causes/repository/` (depends on T008)
- [x] T018 [US2] Add Zod create schema (`type` as a 5-value enum, `description`) in
`root-causes/schema/`
- [x] T019 [US2] Add `RootCausesService.record`: resolve-or-`409` on the problem having at least
one investigation (T010's `findMostRecentForProblem`, via `investigation`'s public
`index.ts`) — in `root-causes/service/` (depends on T012, T017, T018)
- [x] T020 [US2] Add `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/root-causes` route (gated by
`fastify.authenticate`) in `root-causes/controller/` + `routes/`, registered from
`src/api/routes.ts` (depends on T019)
- [x] T021 [US2] Run Quickstart Scenario 2 locally and confirm all 3 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Root causes are correctly gated on investigation existing first.
---
## Phase 5: User Story 3 - Solution proposed, approved, implemented as distinct states (Priority: P1) 🎯 MVP (part 3)
**Goal**: Solution CRUD gated on root cause existing; approval as an explicit action;
implementation gated on approval, one-to-one.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 3.
### Tests for User Story 3
- [x] T022 [US3] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 3 (rejected with no root cause,
created with `approved: false`, implementation rejected before approval, accepted after,
a second implementation rejected) — "Scenario 3" case in
`tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts` (depends on T015, T021)
### Implementation for User Story 3
- [x] T023 [US3] Add `SolutionRepository` (`create`, `findById`, `approve`,
`findMostRecentForProblem`) and `SolutionImplementationRepository` (`create`, `findBySolutionId`)
in `solutions/repository/` (depends on T008)
- [x] T024 [US3] Add Zod schemas (`proposed`; implementation's `notes?`, `implementedBy`) in
`solutions/schema/`
- [x] T025 [US3] Add `SolutionsService.propose`: resolve-or-`409` on the problem having at least
one root cause (T017's repository, via `root-causes`'s public `index.ts`) — `approve` —
`recordImplementation`: resolve-or-`409` on `approved: true` and no existing implementation
— in `solutions/service/` (depends on T019, T023, T024)
- [x] T026 [US3] Add `POST /admin/problems/:problemId/solutions`,
`PATCH /admin/solutions/:solutionId/approve`,
`POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/implementation` routes (gated by `fastify.authenticate`)
in `solutions/controller/` + `routes/`, registered from `src/api/routes.ts` (depends on
T025)
- [x] T027 [US3] Run Quickstart Scenario 3 locally and confirm all 5 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: All three P1 record-keeping user stories are complete — the full investigation
through implementation chain is enforced and correct. This is the feature's structural MVP.
---
## Phase 6: User Story 4 - Verification, and failure re-investigates or escalates (Priority: P2)
**Goal**: SolutionVerification CRUD gated on implementation existing, one-to-one; a failed
verification supports either a fresh investigation or the existing `HUMAN_ESCALATION` transition.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 4.
### Tests for User Story 4
- [x] T028 [US4] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 4 (successful verification;
failed verification recorded but unusable for resolution; failure + reinvestigate creates a
fresh Investigation row; failure + escalate transitions the ticket to `HUMAN_ESCALATION`
and 007 auto-assigns) — "Scenario 4" case in
`tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts` (depends on T022)
### Implementation for User Story 4
- [x] T029 [US4] Add `SolutionVerificationRepository` (`create`, `findBySolutionId`) in
`verification/repository/` (depends on T008)
- [x] T030 [US4] Add Zod schema (`method` as a 4-value enum, `result`, `evidence?`) in
`verification/schema/`
- [x] T031 [US4] Add `VerificationService.record`: resolve-or-`409` on the solution having an
implementation (T023's repository) and no existing verification — in `verification/
service/` (depends on T023, T029, T030)
- [x] T032 [US4] Add `POST /admin/solutions/:solutionId/verification` route (gated by
`fastify.authenticate`) in `verification/controller/` + `routes/`, registered from
`src/api/routes.ts` (depends on T031)
- [x] T033 [US4] Run Quickstart Scenario 4 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass (steps 3-4 call
T012's `InvestigationService.record` and `ticketsService.updateStatus` directly — no new
production code beyond what US1/003/007 already provide, per research.md's decision to
reuse the existing transition rather than add new escalation machinery)
**Checkpoint**: Verification is correctly gated and its failure path reuses existing mechanisms
rather than inventing new ones.
---
## Phase 7: User Story 5 - Resolution, customer confirmation, and durable auto-close (Priority: P1)
**Goal**: Resolution gated on a successful verification; explicit customer confirmation via
002's trust boundary; a durable, directly-callable auto-close sweep as the fallback.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 5.
### Tests for User Story 5
- [x] T034 [P] [US5] Unit test for the auto-close due-window predicate (a pending ticket older
than the configured waiting period is due; a pending ticket younger than it is not; a
non-pending ticket is never selected) in
`tests/unit/problem-management/auto-close-sweep.test.ts`
- [x] T035 [US5] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 5 (resolution rejected without a
successful verification; accepted after, ticket reaches `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER`;
customer confirmation via the trust-boundary route reaches `RESOLVED`; a second ticket aged
past the configured window reaches `RESOLVED` via a direct call to the sweep) — "Scenario 5"
case in `tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts` (depends on T028)
### Implementation for User Story 5
- [x] T036 [US5] Add `ResolutionRepository` (`create`, `findByTicketId`) in
`resolutions/repository/` (depends on T008)
- [x] T037 [US5] Add Zod schema (`outcome`, `resolvedBy`) in `resolutions/schema/`
- [x] T038 [US5] Add `ResolutionsService.record(ticketId, outcome, resolvedBy)`: resolves the
ticket's `problemId`, resolve-or-`409` on a `Solution` with `verification.result: 'success'`
existing for it (T023/T029's repositories), creates the `Resolution`, and transitions the
ticket to `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` via `ticketsService.updateStatus` — in
`resolutions/service/resolutions.service.ts` (depends on T023, T029, T036, T037)
- [x] T039 [US5] Add `ResolutionsService.confirmByCustomer(ticketId)` /
`runAutoCloseSweep()`: the former transitions `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER → RESOLVED`
directly; the latter queries every `RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER` ticket whose `updatedAt` is
older than `problemResolutionConfig.autoCloseWaitingHours` and transitions each the same way
— a single, directly-callable, side-effect-only method (research.md — no worker process
needed to invoke it in tests) — in `resolutions/service/resolutions.service.ts` (depends on
T006, T038)
- [x] T040 [US5] Add `POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/resolution` (gated by `fastify.authenticate`)
and `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/confirm-resolution` (gated by
`fastify.authenticateProductIntegration` + `fastify.checkIntegrationRateLimit`, verifying
the token's tenant/user matches the ticket's own — research.md) routes in
`resolutions/controller/` + `routes/`, registered from `src/api/routes.ts` (depends on
T038, T039)
- [x] T041 [US5] Replace `registerCleanupWorker()`'s stub body in `src/jobs/cleanup/index.ts`:
schedule a repeatable job (every 5 minutes) on `QueueName.CLEANUP` whose processor calls
T039's `runAutoCloseSweep` — and register it from `src/bootstrap/queue.bootstrap.ts`
(depends on T039)
- [x] T042 [US5] Run Quickstart Scenario 5 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: Every P1 user story is complete. The full investigation-to-resolution chain
works, gated correctly at every step, with both an explicit and a durable-fallback path to
`RESOLVED`. This is the feature's MVP.
---
## Phase 8: User Story 6 - Reopen (Priority: P2)
**Goal**: A resolved or closed ticket can be reopened by the customer or an agent, re-entering
`IN_PROGRESS` through two real, audited transitions, touching nothing else.
**Independent Test**: Quickstart Scenario 6.
### Tests for User Story 6
- [x] T043 [US6] Integration test covering Quickstart Scenario 6 (customer reopen reaches
`IN_PROGRESS` via `REOPENED`; the prior `Resolution` and any `SLARun` are unchanged; agent
reopen of a `CLOSED` ticket produces the same result attributed to the agent) — "Scenario 6"
case in `tests/integration/problem-resolution-flow.test.ts` (depends on T035)
### Implementation for User Story 6
- [x] T044 [US6] Add `TicketsService.reopen(ticketId, actor)` (007/003's existing
`ticketing/tickets` module): resolve-or-`409` if status isn't `RESOLVED`/`CLOSED`, then two
sequential `updateStatus` calls (`REOPENED`, then `IN_PROGRESS`) — in `ticketing/tickets/
service/tickets.service.ts` (depends on T008 — no new schema, reuses 003's own state
machine and repository)
- [x] T045 [US6] Add `POST /v1/support/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` (customer, trust boundary) and
`POST /admin/tickets/:ticketId/reopen` (agent, `fastify.authenticate`) routes in
`ticketing/tickets/controller/` + `routes/` (depends on T044)
- [x] T046 [US6] Run Quickstart Scenario 6 locally and confirm all 4 steps pass
**Checkpoint**: All six user stories work independently and together — the full doc 04 workflow,
from first investigation through resolution, confirmation, auto-close, and reopen.
---
## Phase 9: Polish & Cross-Cutting Concerns
- [x] T047 [P] Update `specs/009-problem-resolution/checklists/requirements.md` Notes with any
implementation-time findings
- [x] T048 Run `npx tsx scripts/check-architecture.ts` and `npm run lint`/`npm run typecheck`
- [x] T049 Full regression: `npm run test:unit` (scoped to `tests/unit`) to confirm nothing broke
elsewhere, then the full integration suite (including 003's and 007's own suites, since
T044 modifies `ticketing/tickets`) against real Docker-provisioned Postgres/Redis
---
## Dependencies & Execution Order
### Phase Dependencies
- **Setup (Phase 1)**: No dependencies
- **Foundational (Phase 2)**: Depends on Setup — BLOCKS all user stories
- **User Story 1 (Phase 3)**: Depends on Foundational — no dependency on US2-US6
- **User Story 2 (Phase 4)**: Depends on US1 (the investigation it's gated on)
- **User Story 3 (Phase 5)**: Depends on US2 (the root cause it's gated on)
- **User Story 4 (Phase 6)**: Depends on US3 (the implementation it's gated on)
- **User Story 5 (Phase 7)**: Depends on US4 (the successful verification it's gated on)
- **User Story 6 (Phase 8)**: Depends on US5 (a ticket has to reach `RESOLVED`/`CLOSED` before
reopening it means anything)
- **Polish (Phase 9)**: Depends on all six user stories
This feature's user stories are more strictly sequential than 007's or 008's — doc 04's own
workflow is a straight chain (investigation → root cause → solution → verification →
resolution → reopen), not a set of independently orderable capabilities, so each phase's
dependency here is real, not just priority-driven sequencing.
### Parallel Opportunities
- T001-T006 (independent scaffolding)
- T016 (unit test) alongside T017-T018 (the schema it tests)
- T034 (unit test) alongside T039 (the sweep it tests)
- T047 in Polish
---
## Implementation Strategy
### MVP First (User Stories 1-3, then 5)
1. Setup + Foundational (T001-T008)
2. User Story 1 (T009-T014) → investigations recorded and readable
3. User Story 2 (T015-T021) → root causes correctly gated
4. User Story 3 (T022-T027) → solutions proposed/approved/implemented correctly
5. **User Story 4 is P2** — skippable for a first MVP cut if verification's own gating isn't
needed yet, but User Story 5 (Resolution) depends on it structurally (a successful
verification is Resolution's own precondition), so in practice build order is 1→2→3→4→5
regardless of priority label — same "dependency order isn't always priority order" note 006
and 007's own tasks.md already made.
6. User Story 5 (T034-T042) → resolution, confirmation, and auto-close all work
7. **STOP and VALIDATE**: Quickstart Scenarios 1-5 pass.
### Incremental Delivery
1. Setup + Foundational → schema migrated
2. Add User Story 1 → investigations exist
3. Add User Story 2 → root causes correctly gated
4. Add User Story 3 → solutions move through real states
5. Add User Story 4 → verification gated, failure path reuses existing mechanisms
6. Add User Story 5 → resolution + confirmation + auto-close (P1-complete, MVP)
7. Add User Story 6 → reopen, closing the loop 008 left open
8. Polish → full regression
+16
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ import { teamsRoutes } from '@/modules/identity/teams';
import { agentsRoutes } from '@/modules/identity/agents';
import { hierarchyRoutes } from '@/modules/orchestration/hierarchy';
import { assignmentsRoutes } from '@/modules/orchestration/assignments';
import { businessCalendarsRoutes } from '@/modules/platform/business-calendars';
import { slaRoutes } from '@/modules/orchestration/sla';
import { escalationRoutes } from '@/modules/orchestration/escalation';
import { investigationRoutes } from '@/modules/problem-management/investigation';
import { rootCausesRoutes } from '@/modules/problem-management/root-causes';
import { solutionsRoutes } from '@/modules/problem-management/solutions';
import { verificationRoutes } from '@/modules/problem-management/verification';
import { resolutionsRoutes } from '@/modules/problem-management/resolutions';
export async function registerGlobalRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
await app.register(healthRoutes);
@@ -31,5 +39,13 @@ export async function registerGlobalRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void>
await app.register(agentsRoutes);
await app.register(hierarchyRoutes);
await app.register(assignmentsRoutes);
await app.register(businessCalendarsRoutes);
await app.register(slaRoutes);
await app.register(escalationRoutes);
await app.register(investigationRoutes);
await app.register(rootCausesRoutes);
await app.register(solutionsRoutes);
await app.register(verificationRoutes);
await app.register(resolutionsRoutes);
// Further domain module routes will be registered here as feature modules are wired up
}
+4
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
import { logger } from '@/infrastructure/observability';
import { registerAttachmentWorker } from '@/jobs/attachments';
import { registerAiSessionWorker } from '@/jobs/ai-session';
import { registerSlaWorker } from '@/jobs/sla';
import { registerCleanupWorker } from '@/jobs/cleanup';
export async function bootstrapQueue(): Promise<void> {
registerAttachmentWorker();
registerAiSessionWorker();
registerSlaWorker();
registerCleanupWorker();
logger.info('Queue Manager initialized.');
}
+5
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
// ticket's context (FR-004/spec.md) — configurable, never hardcoded (Constitution Principle
// II), consistent with every other policy default in this codebase.
ORCHESTRATION_DEFAULT_STRATEGY: z.string().default('ROUND_ROBIN'),
// Problem Resolution (009) — how long a ticket waits in RESOLUTION_PENDING_CUSTOMER with no
// explicit customer confirmation before the auto-close sweep resolves it — see
// specs/009-problem-resolution/research.md "auto-close waiting period".
RESOLUTION_AUTO_CLOSE_WAITING_HOURS: z.coerce.number().default(72),
});
export type EnvConfig = z.infer<typeof envSchema>;
+1
View File
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ export * from './queue';
export * from './storage';
export * from './ai';
export * from './orchestration';
export * from './problem-resolution';
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
import { env } from './env';
export const problemResolutionConfig = {
autoCloseWaitingHours: env.RESOLUTION_AUTO_CLOSE_WAITING_HOURS,
};
+42
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { DomainEventName } from '../domain-events';
import { BaseDomainEvent } from '../event-types';
import { sessionsService } from '@/modules/ai-support/sessions';
import { orchestrationService } from '@/modules/orchestration/orchestration';
import { slaService } from '@/modules/orchestration/sla';
interface TicketUpdatedPayload {
ticketId: string;
@@ -11,6 +12,13 @@ interface TicketUpdatedPayload {
newStatus: string;
}
interface TicketAssignedPayload {
ticketId: string;
agentId: string;
strategy: string;
actor: string;
}
let registered = false;
/**
@@ -45,4 +53,38 @@ export function registerDomainEventHandlers(): void {
await orchestrationService.handleHumanEscalation(event.payload.ticketId);
},
);
// 008-sla-escalation research.md "SLA-run lifecycle is wired entirely through the existing
// domain-event bus": TICKET_ASSIGNED was defined since 007-orchestration-assignment but never
// published until now (assignment.engine.ts's persistAndTransition). Idempotent — no-ops if
// the ticket already has a run (SLARun.ticketId @unique).
eventBus.subscribe(
DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED,
async (event: BaseDomainEvent<TicketAssignedPayload>) => {
await slaService.handleTicketAssigned(event.payload.ticketId);
},
);
// 008-sla-escalation FR-007/FR-008: pause on entering WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER, resume on leaving
// it — durable (a DB timestamp shift), never an in-memory timer (Constitution Principle VII).
eventBus.subscribe(
DomainEventName.TICKET_UPDATED,
async (event: BaseDomainEvent<TicketUpdatedPayload>) => {
if (event.payload.newStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER') {
await slaService.pause(event.payload.ticketId);
} else if (event.payload.previousStatus === 'WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER') {
await slaService.resume(event.payload.ticketId);
}
},
);
// 008-sla-escalation FR-010: a ticket reaching RESOLVED (003-ticketing's terminal status before
// CLOSED/REOPENED) completes its SLA run — never later marked breached.
eventBus.subscribe(
DomainEventName.TICKET_UPDATED,
async (event: BaseDomainEvent<TicketUpdatedPayload>) => {
if (event.payload.newStatus !== 'RESOLVED') return;
await slaService.complete(event.payload.ticketId);
},
);
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,29 @@
import { queueManager, QueueName } from '@/infrastructure/queue';
import { logger } from '@/infrastructure/observability';
import { resolutionsService } from '@/modules/problem-management/resolutions';
const AUTO_CLOSE_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60_000;
/**
* 009-problem-resolution research.md "Auto-close is a repeatable BullMQ job on the existing,
* unclaimed CLEANUP queue" — mirrors 008's SLA breach-detection job registration exactly: a
* repeatable job whose processor calls a directly-callable sweep method containing all the real
* logic, durable via BullMQ's own persisted repeatable-job state (Constitution Principle VII).
*/
export function registerCleanupWorker(): void {
queueManager.registerWorker(QueueName.CLEANUP, async (job) => {
logger.info({ jobId: job.id, data: job.data }, 'Processing Cleanup Job');
logger.info({ jobId: job.id }, 'Running resolution auto-close sweep');
await resolutionsService.runAutoCloseSweep();
});
void queueManager.getQueue(QueueName.CLEANUP).add(
'auto-close-resolutions',
{
jobId: 'auto-close-resolutions',
type: 'auto-close-resolutions',
payload: {},
createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
},
{ repeat: { every: AUTO_CLOSE_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS } },
);
}
+18 -1
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,25 @@
import { queueManager, QueueName } from '@/infrastructure/queue';
import { logger } from '@/infrastructure/observability';
import { slaService } from '@/modules/orchestration/sla';
const BREACH_DETECTION_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
/**
* research.md "Breach detection — one repeatable BullMQ job, not one delayed job per run": a
* single job scheduled to repeat every minute, whose processor calls SlaService's directly-
* callable sweep — the sweep itself contains 100% of the actual logic, so this registration is
* pure scheduling (Constitution Principle VII — durable, survives a restart via BullMQ's own
* persisted repeatable-job state, never an in-memory setInterval).
*/
export function registerSlaWorker(): void {
queueManager.registerWorker(QueueName.SLA, async (job) => {
logger.info({ jobId: job.id, data: job.data }, 'Processing SLA Job');
logger.info({ jobId: job.id }, 'Running SLA breach-detection sweep');
await slaService.runBreachDetectionSweep();
});
void queueManager.getQueue(QueueName.SLA).add(
'detect-breaches',
{ jobId: 'detect-breaches', type: 'detect-breaches', payload: {}, createdAt: new Date().toISOString() },
{ repeat: { every: BREACH_DETECTION_INTERVAL_MS } },
);
}
+1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
export { categoriesRoutes } from './routes';
export { CategoriesService, categoriesService } from './service';
export type { CategoryDTO } from './types';
export { categoriesRepository, CategoriesRepository } from './repository';
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import { Category } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export class CategoriesRepository {
@@ -6,6 +7,13 @@ export class CategoriesRepository {
async findAllCategories(): Promise<unknown[]> {
return this.prisma.category.findMany();
}
/** 008-sla-escalation: existence check for SLAPolicy.categoryId — this stub had no findById
* at all before, a leftover gap from the original scaffold (same class of gap this codebase
* has closed in every prior feature that needed one). */
async findById(id: string): Promise<Category | null> {
return this.prisma.category.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
}
export const categoriesRepository = new CategoriesRepository();
+2 -2
View File
@@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ export type { ProductIntegrationWithProduct } from './repository';
export { decryptCredential, encryptCredential, generateCredentialSecret } from './mapper';
export { issueIntegrationToken, verifyIntegrationToken } from './mapper';
export type { IntegrationTokenClaims, IntegrationTokenClaimsInput } from './mapper';
export { inboundRequestSchema } from './schema';
export type { InboundRequest } from './schema';
export { inboundRequestSchema, identityOnlyRequestSchema } from './schema';
export type { InboundRequest, IdentityOnlyRequest } from './schema';
@@ -20,3 +20,20 @@ export const inboundRequestSchema = z
.strict();
export type InboundRequest = z.infer<typeof inboundRequestSchema>;
/**
* 009-problem-resolution: the identity-only subset of the inbound contract — for a caller
* already acting on an existing ticket (confirm-resolution, reopen) rather than creating one, so
* `source`/`problem` (ticket-creation-specific) aren't required. Every other verification step
* (token validity, replay, scope, revocation) is identical — see
* product-integration-auth.plugin.ts's shared verifyIntegrationIdentity.
*/
export const identityOnlyRequestSchema = z
.object({
productId: z.string().min(1),
tenantId: z.string().min(1),
userId: z.string().min(1),
})
.strict();
export type IdentityOnlyRequest = z.infer<typeof identityOnlyRequestSchema>;
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
import { Assignment } from '@prisma/client';
import { ticketsService } from '@/modules/ticketing/tickets';
import { routingService, RoutingService } from '@/modules/orchestration/routing';
import { orchestrationConfig } from '@/config';
import { eventBus } from '@/events/event-bus';
import { DomainEventName } from '@/events/domain-events';
import { NotFoundError } from '@/common/errors';
import {
assignmentRepository,
AssignmentRepository,
@@ -90,8 +94,68 @@ export class AssignmentEngine {
await ticketsService.updateStatus(ticketId, 'IN_PROGRESS', ticket.version, 'system');
}
// 008-sla-escalation research.md: TICKET_ASSIGNED was defined in domain-events.ts since this
// module's own creation but never published — this is its first real publish, the wiring
// point SLA-run creation subscribes to (src/events/handlers/index.ts). Every caller of
// persistAndTransition — automatic assignment, manual assignment, and escalation's scoped
// re-assignment (assignToSpecificNode, below) — gets this for free.
await eventBus.publish({
eventId: randomUUID(),
eventName: DomainEventName.TICKET_ASSIGNED,
aggregateId: ticketId,
aggregateType: 'Ticket',
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
payload: { ticketId, agentId, strategy, actor },
});
return assignment;
}
/**
* 008-sla-escalation research.md "Escalation firing reuses 007's AssignmentEngine, scoped to a
* specific node": unlike evaluateAndAssign (which re-derives the applicable node from the
* ticket's own context), this assigns to exactly the given node — the shape an escalation rule
* or a manual escalation needs, since the ticket's context hasn't changed, only its status has.
* Throws NotFoundError if the node doesn't exist, so the caller can surface a 404.
*/
async assignToSpecificNode(
ticketId: string,
hierarchyNodeId: string,
actor: string,
reason?: string,
strategyOverride?: string,
): Promise<AssignmentOutcome> {
const resolution = await this.routing.resolveForSpecificNode(ticketId, hierarchyNodeId);
if (!resolution) throw new NotFoundError('Hierarchy node not found.');
const strategyName =
strategyOverride ?? resolution.assignmentStrategy ?? orchestrationConfig.defaultStrategy;
const strategyFn = resolveStrategy(strategyName);
const selected = strategyFn
? await strategyFn(resolution.eligibleAgents, {
hierarchyNodeId,
requiredSkills: resolution.requiredSkills,
})
: null;
if (!selected) {
await this.history.record({
ticketId,
agentId: null,
action: 'unassigned',
strategy: strategyName,
reason,
actor,
});
return { assignment: null, strategy: strategyName };
}
return {
assignment: await this.persistAndTransition(ticketId, selected.id, strategyName, actor, reason),
strategy: strategyName,
};
}
}
export const assignmentEngine = new AssignmentEngine();
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export const ESCALATION_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'ORCHESTRATION_ESCALATION',
} as const;
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
import { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { escalationService, EscalationService } from '../service';
import {
createEscalationPolicySchema,
createEscalationRuleSchema,
updateEscalationRuleSchema,
manualEscalationSchema,
} from '../schema';
function actorFrom(request: FastifyRequest): string {
return request.reqContext?.actorId ?? 'unknown';
}
export class EscalationController {
constructor(private readonly service: EscalationService = escalationService) {}
async createPolicy(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const body = createEscalationPolicySchema.parse(request.body);
const policy = await this.service.createPolicy(body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: policy, meta: null });
}
async listPolicies(_request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const policies = await this.service.listPolicies();
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: policies, meta: null });
}
async createRule(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const body = createEscalationRuleSchema.parse(request.body);
const rule = await this.service.createRule(id, body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: rule, meta: null });
}
async updateRule(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { ruleId } = request.params as { id: string; ruleId: string };
const body = updateEscalationRuleSchema.parse(request.body);
const rule = await this.service.updateRule(ruleId, body);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: rule, meta: null });
}
async deleteRule(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { ruleId } = request.params as { id: string; ruleId: string };
await this.service.deactivateRule(ruleId);
return reply.status(204).send();
}
async escalateManually(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { ticketId } = request.params as { ticketId: string };
const body = manualEscalationSchema.parse(request.body);
const event = await this.service.escalateManually(
ticketId,
body.targetNodeId,
actorFrom(request),
body.reason,
);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: event, meta: null });
}
}
export const escalationController = new EscalationController();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { EscalationController, escalationController } from './escalation.controller';
@@ -1,6 +1,19 @@
import { EscalationEvent } from '@prisma/client';
import { escalationService, EscalationService } from '../service';
/** Thin façade over EscalationService's action methods (research.md/tasks.md put the real
* policy-resolution/rule-matching/firing logic in the service layer) — replaces the original
* `triggerEscalation` stub that always returned `{ escalated: false }`. */
export class EscalationEngine {
async triggerEscalation(_ticketId: string): Promise<{ escalated: boolean }> {
return { escalated: false };
constructor(private readonly service: EscalationService = escalationService) {}
async triggerManualEscalation(
ticketId: string,
targetNodeId: string,
actor: string,
reason: string,
): Promise<EscalationEvent> {
return this.service.escalateManually(ticketId, targetNodeId, actor, reason);
}
}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1,13 @@
export * from './engine/escalation.engine';
export { escalationRoutes } from './routes';
export { EscalationService, escalationService } from './service';
export { EscalationEngine, escalationEngine } from './engine/escalation.engine';
export {
escalationPolicyRepository,
EscalationPolicyRepository,
escalationRuleRepository,
EscalationRuleRepository,
escalationEventRepository,
EscalationEventRepository,
} from './repository';
export { ESCALATION_TRIGGER_TYPES } from './schema';
export { ESCALATION_CONSTANTS } from './constants';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
import { EscalationEvent, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export interface CreateEscalationEventData {
ticketId: string;
ruleId?: string | null | undefined;
fromNodeId?: string | null | undefined;
toNodeId?: string | null | undefined;
reason: string;
triggeredBy: string;
}
export class EscalationEventRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: CreateEscalationEventData): Promise<EscalationEvent> {
return this.prisma.escalationEvent.create({
data: data as Prisma.EscalationEventUncheckedCreateInput,
});
}
async findAllForTicket(ticketId: string): Promise<EscalationEvent[]> {
return this.prisma.escalationEvent.findMany({
where: { ticketId },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' },
});
}
}
export const escalationEventRepository = new EscalationEventRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
import { EscalationPolicy, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export class EscalationPolicyRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: {
name: string;
productId?: string | null | undefined;
}): Promise<EscalationPolicy> {
return this.prisma.escalationPolicy.create({
data: data as Prisma.EscalationPolicyUncheckedCreateInput,
});
}
async findById(id: string): Promise<EscalationPolicy | null> {
return this.prisma.escalationPolicy.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
async findAll(): Promise<EscalationPolicy[]> {
return this.prisma.escalationPolicy.findMany();
}
/** research.md "Escalation policy resolution": prefer a product-specific active policy, fall
* back to a global one (productId null). */
async findApplicable(productId: string): Promise<EscalationPolicy | null> {
const productSpecific = await this.prisma.escalationPolicy.findFirst({
where: { productId, active: true },
});
if (productSpecific) return productSpecific;
return this.prisma.escalationPolicy.findFirst({ where: { productId: null, active: true } });
}
}
export const escalationPolicyRepository = new EscalationPolicyRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
import { EscalationRule, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export interface CreateEscalationRuleData {
policyId: string;
triggerType: string;
condition: object;
targetNodeId: string;
notify: object;
active?: boolean | undefined;
}
export interface UpdateEscalationRuleData {
triggerType?: string | undefined;
condition?: object | undefined;
targetNodeId?: string | undefined;
notify?: object | undefined;
active?: boolean | undefined;
}
export class EscalationRuleRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: CreateEscalationRuleData): Promise<EscalationRule> {
return this.prisma.escalationRule.create({
data: data as Prisma.EscalationRuleUncheckedCreateInput,
});
}
async findById(id: string): Promise<EscalationRule | null> {
return this.prisma.escalationRule.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
async update(id: string, data: UpdateEscalationRuleData): Promise<EscalationRule> {
return this.prisma.escalationRule.update({
where: { id },
data: data as Prisma.EscalationRuleUpdateInput,
});
}
async deactivate(id: string): Promise<EscalationRule> {
return this.prisma.escalationRule.update({ where: { id }, data: { active: false } });
}
/** FR-013: every active rule under this policy matching the given trigger type. */
async findActiveRules(policyId: string, triggerType: string): Promise<EscalationRule[]> {
return this.prisma.escalationRule.findMany({
where: { policyId, triggerType, active: true },
});
}
}
export const escalationRuleRepository = new EscalationRuleRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export * from './escalation-policy.repository';
export * from './escalation-rule.repository';
export * from './escalation-event.repository';
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { escalationController } from '../controller';
/** contracts/sla-escalation-contract.md: every route gated by fastify.authenticate (known
* limitation inherited from 002-007). */
export async function escalationRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
fastify.post(
'/admin/escalation-policies',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.createPolicy(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/escalation-policies',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.listPolicies(req, reply),
);
fastify.post(
'/admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.createRule(req, reply),
);
fastify.patch(
'/admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules/:ruleId',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.updateRule(req, reply),
);
fastify.delete(
'/admin/escalation-policies/:id/rules/:ruleId',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.deleteRule(req, reply),
);
fastify.post(
'/tickets/:ticketId/escalate',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => escalationController.escalateManually(req, reply),
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { escalationRoutes } from './escalation.routes';
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
export const createEscalationPolicySchema = z
.object({
name: z.string().min(1),
productId: z.string().optional(),
})
.strict();
/** research.md "EscalationRule.triggerType is stored, not evaluated": all 10 of doc05 §6's
* values are valid config — only resolution_breach/first_response_breach are ever evaluated by
* this feature's own breach sweep. */
export const ESCALATION_TRIGGER_TYPES = [
'first_response_breach',
'resolution_breach',
'inactivity',
'priority_increase',
'customer_escalation',
'repeated_reopen',
'manual',
'product_defect',
'dependency_timeout',
'critical_incident',
] as const;
export const createEscalationRuleSchema = z
.object({
triggerType: z.enum(ESCALATION_TRIGGER_TYPES),
condition: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),
targetNodeId: z.string().min(1),
notify: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),
active: z.boolean().optional(),
})
.strict();
export const updateEscalationRuleSchema = createEscalationRuleSchema.partial();
export const manualEscalationSchema = z
.object({
targetNodeId: z.string().min(1),
reason: z.string().min(1),
})
.strict();
export type CreateEscalationPolicyBody = z.infer<typeof createEscalationPolicySchema>;
export type CreateEscalationRuleBody = z.infer<typeof createEscalationRuleSchema>;
export type UpdateEscalationRuleBody = z.infer<typeof updateEscalationRuleSchema>;
export type ManualEscalationBody = z.infer<typeof manualEscalationSchema>;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export * from './escalation.schema';
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
import { EscalationEvent, EscalationPolicy, EscalationRule } from '@prisma/client';
import { NotFoundError } from '@/common/errors';
import { ticketsService } from '@/modules/ticketing/tickets';
import { hierarchyRepository } from '@/modules/orchestration/hierarchy';
import { productsRepository } from '@/modules/catalog/products';
import { assignmentEngine, AssignmentEngine } from '@/modules/orchestration/assignments';
import { eventBus } from '@/events/event-bus';
import { DomainEventName } from '@/events/domain-events';
import {
escalationPolicyRepository,
EscalationPolicyRepository,
escalationRuleRepository,
EscalationRuleRepository,
escalationEventRepository,
EscalationEventRepository,
} from '../repository';
import { CreateEscalationPolicyBody, CreateEscalationRuleBody, UpdateEscalationRuleBody } from '../schema';
export class EscalationService {
constructor(
private readonly policies: EscalationPolicyRepository = escalationPolicyRepository,
private readonly rules: EscalationRuleRepository = escalationRuleRepository,
private readonly events: EscalationEventRepository = escalationEventRepository,
private readonly assignments: AssignmentEngine = assignmentEngine,
) {}
/**
* FR-013/FR-014/FR-015: called by the SLA breach sweep (research.md — a direct in-process
* call, not a queued job) for every newly-detected breach. Resolves the applicable policy
* (product-match-or-global), fires one EscalationEvent + scoped re-assignment per matching
* active rule. Records nothing when no policy or no rule matches — the breach itself is
* already durably recorded by the caller (SLARun.breachedAt/firstResponseBreachedAt).
*/
async handleBreach(ticketId: string, triggerType: 'resolution_breach' | 'first_response_breach'): Promise<void> {
const ticket = await ticketsService.getById(ticketId);
const policy = await this.policies.findApplicable(ticket.productId);
if (!policy) return;
const matchingRules = await this.rules.findActiveRules(policy.id, triggerType);
for (const rule of matchingRules) {
await this.fire(ticketId, rule.id, rule.targetNodeId, 'system', `SLA ${triggerType} — rule ${rule.id}`);
}
}
/** FR-016/FR-017: manual escalation to a caller-specified node, rejected if it doesn't exist. */
async escalateManually(
ticketId: string,
targetNodeId: string,
actor: string,
reason: string,
): Promise<EscalationEvent> {
const node = await hierarchyRepository.findById(targetNodeId);
if (!node) throw new NotFoundError('Hierarchy node not found.');
return this.fire(ticketId, null, targetNodeId, actor, reason);
}
private async fire(
ticketId: string,
ruleId: string | null,
targetNodeId: string,
actor: string,
reason: string,
): Promise<EscalationEvent> {
const event = await this.events.create({
ticketId,
ruleId,
// No existing model persists "which hierarchy node is this ticket currently in" — Assignment
// (007) tracks only agentId, never a hierarchyNodeId — so fromNodeId is honestly left null
// rather than fabricated (data-model.md: "if any").
fromNodeId: null,
toNodeId: targetNodeId,
reason,
triggeredBy: actor,
});
await this.assignments.assignToSpecificNode(ticketId, targetNodeId, actor, reason);
// research.md "SLA_BREACHED/ESCALATION_TRIGGERED are also published, for audit, not for
// logic" — no subscriber consumes this; a durable event-log record only.
await eventBus.publish({
eventId: randomUUID(),
eventName: DomainEventName.ESCALATION_TRIGGERED,
aggregateId: ticketId,
aggregateType: 'Ticket',
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
payload: { ticketId, ruleId, targetNodeId, actor, reason },
});
return event;
}
async getHistory(ticketId: string): Promise<EscalationEvent[]> {
return this.events.findAllForTicket(ticketId);
}
async createPolicy(data: CreateEscalationPolicyBody): Promise<EscalationPolicy> {
if (data.productId) {
const product = await productsRepository.findById(data.productId);
if (!product) throw new NotFoundError('Product not found.');
}
return this.policies.create(data);
}
async listPolicies(): Promise<EscalationPolicy[]> {
return this.policies.findAll();
}
async getPolicy(id: string): Promise<EscalationPolicy> {
const policy = await this.policies.findById(id);
if (!policy) throw new NotFoundError('Escalation policy not found.');
return policy;
}
async createRule(policyId: string, data: CreateEscalationRuleBody): Promise<EscalationRule> {
await this.getPolicy(policyId);
const node = await hierarchyRepository.findById(data.targetNodeId);
if (!node) throw new NotFoundError('Hierarchy node not found.');
return this.rules.create({ ...data, policyId });
}
async updateRule(ruleId: string, data: UpdateEscalationRuleBody): Promise<EscalationRule> {
if (data.targetNodeId) {
const node = await hierarchyRepository.findById(data.targetNodeId);
if (!node) throw new NotFoundError('Hierarchy node not found.');
}
return this.rules.update(ruleId, data);
}
async deactivateRule(ruleId: string): Promise<EscalationRule> {
return this.rules.deactivate(ruleId);
}
}
export const escalationService = new EscalationService();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { EscalationService, escalationService } from './escalation.service';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -48,6 +48,29 @@ export class CapabilityLookupService {
),
);
}
/**
* 008-sla-escalation research.md "Escalation firing reuses 007's AssignmentEngine, scoped to a
* specific node": unlike findEligibleAgents (which resolves *which* node(s) match a ticket's
* context), this resolves eligibility for one exact, caller-specified node — the shape
* escalation needs, since it must never re-derive the applicable node from ticket context
* (that could resolve differently than the rule's own targetNodeId). Returns `null` when the
* node doesn't exist, so the caller can treat that as a 404 rather than an empty eligible set.
*/
async findEligibleAgentsForNode(hierarchyNodeId: string, requiredSkills: string[]) {
const node = await this.hierarchy.findById(hierarchyNodeId);
if (!node) return null;
const skillsToMatch = [...new Set([...requiredSkills, ...node.skills])];
const candidates = await agentsRepository.findActiveWithSkillsAndActiveTeam();
const eligibleAgents = candidates.filter((agent) =>
isCapabilityEligible(
agent.skills.map((s) => s.skillTag),
skillsToMatch,
),
);
return { node, eligibleAgents };
}
}
export const capabilityLookupService = new CapabilityLookupService();
@@ -63,6 +63,34 @@ export class RoutingService {
};
}
/**
* 008-sla-escalation research.md: resolves eligibility scoped to one exact hierarchy node
* (an escalation rule's targetNodeId, or a manual escalation's caller-specified node) — never
* re-deriving which node applies from the ticket's context, unlike resolveEligibleAgents
* above. Returns `null` when the node doesn't exist (caller treats that as a 404).
*/
async resolveForSpecificNode(
ticketId: string,
hierarchyNodeId: string,
): Promise<{
eligibleAgents: EligibleAgent[];
assignmentStrategy: string | null;
requiredSkills: string[];
} | null> {
const requiredSkills = await this.deriveRequiredSkills(ticketId);
const result = await this.capabilityLookup.findEligibleAgentsForNode(
hierarchyNodeId,
requiredSkills,
);
if (!result) return null;
return {
eligibleAgents: result.eligibleAgents as EligibleAgent[],
assignmentStrategy: result.node.assignmentStrategy ?? null,
requiredSkills,
};
}
private async deriveRequiredSkills(ticketId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const session = await sessionRepository.findMostRecentByTicketId(ticketId);
if (!session) return [];
@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
import { SLAPolicy } from '@prisma/client';
import { businessCalendarsService, BusinessCalendarsService } from '@/modules/platform/business-calendars';
/**
* FR-004: replaces the original naive `createdDate + targetHours` stub — every due date is
* computed by walking the policy's own business calendar (research.md "Calendar-aware due-date
* arithmetic"), never a flat elapsed-time addition. `businessCalendarId: null` means 24/7 (no
* exclusions), handled by BusinessCalendarsService.computeDueDate itself.
*/
export class SlaDueDateCalculator {
calculateDueTime(createdDate: Date, targetHours: number): Date {
return new Date(createdDate.getTime() + targetHours * 3600 * 1000);
constructor(private readonly calendars: BusinessCalendarsService = businessCalendarsService) {}
async computeDueDates(
policy: SLAPolicy,
from: Date,
): Promise<{ firstResponseDueAt: Date; resolutionDueAt: Date }> {
const [firstResponseDueAt, resolutionDueAt] = await Promise.all([
this.calendars.computeDueDate(policy.businessCalendarId, from, policy.firstResponseMinutes),
this.calendars.computeDueDate(policy.businessCalendarId, from, policy.resolutionMinutes),
]);
return { firstResponseDueAt, resolutionDueAt };
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export const SLA_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'ORCHESTRATION_SLA',
} as const;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { SlaController, slaController } from './sla.controller';
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { slaService, SlaService } from '../service';
import { createSlaPolicySchema, updateSlaPolicySchema } from '../schema';
export class SlaController {
constructor(private readonly service: SlaService = slaService) {}
async createPolicy(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const body = createSlaPolicySchema.parse(request.body);
const policy = await this.service.createPolicy(body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: policy, meta: null });
}
async listPolicies(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { productId } = request.query as { productId?: string };
const policies = await this.service.listPolicies(productId);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: policies, meta: null });
}
async getPolicy(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const policy = await this.service.getPolicy(id);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: policy, meta: null });
}
async updatePolicy(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const body = updateSlaPolicySchema.parse(request.body);
const policy = await this.service.updatePolicy(id, body);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: policy, meta: null });
}
async deactivatePolicy(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
await this.service.deactivatePolicy(id);
return reply.status(204).send();
}
async getRun(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { ticketId } = request.params as { ticketId: string };
const run = await this.service.getRunByTicketId(ticketId);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: run, meta: null });
}
}
export const slaController = new SlaController();
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
import { SLARun } from '@prisma/client';
import { slaService, SlaService } from '../service';
/** Replaces the original `evaluateSlaTargets` stub that always returned `{ status: 'NORMAL' }`
* — a thin façade over SlaService's read path (research.md/tasks.md put the substantive
* resolution/due-date/breach logic in the service layer). */
export class SlaEngine {
async evaluateSlaTargets(_ticketId: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
return { status: 'NORMAL' };
constructor(private readonly service: SlaService = slaService) {}
async evaluateSlaTargets(ticketId: string): Promise<SLARun> {
return this.service.getRunByTicketId(ticketId);
}
}
+13 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,13 @@
export * from './engine/sla.engine';
export * from './calculators/sla-due-date.calculator';
export { slaRoutes } from './routes';
export { SlaService, slaService } from './service';
export { SlaPolicyResolverService, slaPolicyResolverService } from './service';
export type { SlaPolicyScope } from './service';
export { SlaEngine, slaEngine } from './engine/sla.engine';
export { SlaDueDateCalculator, slaDueDateCalculator } from './calculators/sla-due-date.calculator';
export {
slaPolicyRepository,
SlaPolicyRepository,
slaRunRepository,
SlaRunRepository,
} from './repository';
export { SLA_CONSTANTS } from './constants';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
export * from './sla-policy.repository';
export * from './sla-run.repository';
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
import { SLAPolicy, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export interface CreateSlaPolicyData {
name: string;
productId?: string | null | undefined;
categoryId?: string | null | undefined;
problemTypeId?: string | null | undefined;
priority?: string | null | undefined;
firstResponseMinutes: number;
investigationMinutes?: number | null | undefined;
resolutionMinutes: number;
customerResponseMinutes?: number | null | undefined;
businessCalendarId?: string | null | undefined;
}
export class SlaPolicyRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: CreateSlaPolicyData): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.create({ data: data as Prisma.SLAPolicyUncheckedCreateInput });
}
async findById(id: string): Promise<SLAPolicy | null> {
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
async findAll(productId?: string): Promise<SLAPolicy[]> {
if (productId) return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.findMany({ where: { productId } });
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.findMany();
}
async update(
id: string,
data: {
name?: string | undefined;
productId?: string | null | undefined;
categoryId?: string | null | undefined;
problemTypeId?: string | null | undefined;
priority?: string | null | undefined;
firstResponseMinutes?: number | undefined;
investigationMinutes?: number | null | undefined;
resolutionMinutes?: number | undefined;
customerResponseMinutes?: number | null | undefined;
businessCalendarId?: string | null | undefined;
},
): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.update({
where: { id },
data: data as Prisma.SLAPolicyUpdateInput,
});
}
async deactivate(id: string): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.update({ where: { id }, data: { active: false } });
}
/** research.md "SLA policy resolution": every active policy whose own scope fields are each
* either null (wildcard) or match the given ticket context — filtered fully in application
* code (not the DB query) since the wildcard-or-exact-match rule per field isn't expressible
* as a single simple Prisma where clause across four independently-optional dimensions. */
async findActiveCandidates(): Promise<SLAPolicy[]> {
return this.prisma.sLAPolicy.findMany({ where: { active: true } });
}
}
export const slaPolicyRepository = new SlaPolicyRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
import { SLARun, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export interface CreateSlaRunData {
ticketId: string;
policyId: string;
firstResponseDueAt: Date | null;
resolutionDueAt: Date | null;
}
export class SlaRunRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: CreateSlaRunData): Promise<SLARun> {
return this.prisma.sLARun.create({
data: { ...data, status: 'running' } as Prisma.SLARunUncheckedCreateInput,
});
}
async findByTicketId(ticketId: string): Promise<SLARun | null> {
return this.prisma.sLARun.findUnique({ where: { ticketId } });
}
async update(id: string, data: Prisma.SLARunUpdateInput): Promise<SLARun> {
return this.prisma.sLARun.update({ where: { id }, data });
}
/** research.md "Breach detection — one repeatable BullMQ job": every running run whose
* resolution due date has passed — indexed via @@index([status, resolutionDueAt]). */
async findRunningPastResolutionDueAt(now: Date): Promise<SLARun[]> {
return this.prisma.sLARun.findMany({
where: { status: 'running', resolutionDueAt: { lte: now } },
});
}
/** Every running run whose first-response due date has passed and hasn't already been
* flagged (firstResponseBreachedAt null — the idempotency guard, data-model.md). */
async findRunningPastFirstResponseDueAt(now: Date): Promise<SLARun[]> {
return this.prisma.sLARun.findMany({
where: {
status: 'running',
firstResponseDueAt: { lte: now },
firstResponseBreachedAt: null,
},
});
}
}
export const slaRunRepository = new SlaRunRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { slaRoutes } from './sla.routes';
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { slaController } from '../controller';
/** contracts/sla-escalation-contract.md: admin CRUD gated by fastify.authenticate; the read
* route is not (same "read path any caller can use" convention as 003/007). */
export async function slaRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
fastify.post(
'/admin/sla-policies',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => slaController.createPolicy(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/sla-policies',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => slaController.listPolicies(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/sla-policies/:id',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => slaController.getPolicy(req, reply),
);
fastify.patch(
'/admin/sla-policies/:id',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => slaController.updatePolicy(req, reply),
);
fastify.delete(
'/admin/sla-policies/:id',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => slaController.deactivatePolicy(req, reply),
);
fastify.get('/tickets/:ticketId/sla-run', (req, reply) => slaController.getRun(req, reply));
}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export * from './sla-policy.schema';
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
export const createSlaPolicySchema = z
.object({
name: z.string().min(1),
productId: z.string().optional(),
categoryId: z.string().optional(),
problemTypeId: z.string().optional(),
priority: z.string().optional(),
firstResponseMinutes: z.number().int().positive(),
investigationMinutes: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
resolutionMinutes: z.number().int().positive(),
customerResponseMinutes: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
businessCalendarId: z.string().optional(),
})
.strict();
export const updateSlaPolicySchema = createSlaPolicySchema.partial();
export type CreateSlaPolicyBody = z.infer<typeof createSlaPolicySchema>;
export type UpdateSlaPolicyBody = z.infer<typeof updateSlaPolicySchema>;
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export { SlaService, slaService } from './sla.service';
export { SlaPolicyResolverService, slaPolicyResolverService } from './sla-policy-resolver.service';
export type { SlaPolicyScope } from './sla-policy-resolver.service';
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
import { SLAPolicy } from '@prisma/client';
import { slaPolicyRepository, SlaPolicyRepository } from '../repository';
export interface SlaPolicyScope {
productId?: string | null | undefined;
categoryId?: string | null | undefined;
problemTypeId?: string | null | undefined;
priority?: string | null | undefined;
}
function matchesScope(policy: SLAPolicy, ticket: SlaPolicyScope): boolean {
if (policy.productId !== null && policy.productId !== (ticket.productId ?? null)) return false;
if (policy.categoryId !== null && policy.categoryId !== (ticket.categoryId ?? null)) return false;
if (policy.problemTypeId !== null && policy.problemTypeId !== (ticket.problemTypeId ?? null)) {
return false;
}
if (policy.priority !== null && policy.priority !== (ticket.priority ?? null)) return false;
return true;
}
function specificity(policy: SLAPolicy): number {
return [policy.productId, policy.categoryId, policy.problemTypeId, policy.priority].filter(
(f) => f !== null,
).length;
}
/**
* data-model.md "Resolution": among active policies whose scope fields each either wildcard
* (null) or match the ticket's own value, the one with the most non-null (most specific) scope
* fields wins; ties broken by latest updatedAt. Returns null when nothing matches (FR-005 — no
* SLARun is ever created without a real policy match).
*/
export class SlaPolicyResolverService {
constructor(private readonly policies: SlaPolicyRepository = slaPolicyRepository) {}
async findApplicablePolicy(ticket: SlaPolicyScope): Promise<SLAPolicy | null> {
const candidates = await this.policies.findActiveCandidates();
const matching = candidates.filter((p) => matchesScope(p, ticket));
if (matching.length === 0) return null;
matching.sort((a, b) => {
const specDiff = specificity(b) - specificity(a);
if (specDiff !== 0) return specDiff;
return b.updatedAt.getTime() - a.updatedAt.getTime();
});
return matching[0] ?? null;
}
}
export const slaPolicyResolverService = new SlaPolicyResolverService();
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
import { SLAPolicy, SLARun } from '@prisma/client';
import { NotFoundError } from '@/common/errors';
import { ticketsService } from '@/modules/ticketing/tickets';
import { messagesService } from '@/modules/ticketing/messages';
import { escalationService, EscalationService } from '@/modules/orchestration/escalation';
import {
slaPolicyRepository,
SlaPolicyRepository,
slaRunRepository,
SlaRunRepository,
} from '../repository';
import { slaPolicyResolverService, SlaPolicyResolverService } from './sla-policy-resolver.service';
import { slaDueDateCalculator, SlaDueDateCalculator } from '../calculators/sla-due-date.calculator';
import { CreateSlaPolicyBody, UpdateSlaPolicyBody } from '../schema';
export class SlaService {
constructor(
private readonly policies: SlaPolicyRepository = slaPolicyRepository,
private readonly runs: SlaRunRepository = slaRunRepository,
private readonly resolver: SlaPolicyResolverService = slaPolicyResolverService,
private readonly dueDateCalculator: SlaDueDateCalculator = slaDueDateCalculator,
private readonly escalation: EscalationService = escalationService,
) {}
// --- SLAPolicy CRUD ---------------------------------------------------
async createPolicy(data: CreateSlaPolicyBody): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
return this.policies.create(data);
}
async listPolicies(productId?: string): Promise<SLAPolicy[]> {
return this.policies.findAll(productId);
}
async getPolicy(id: string): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
const policy = await this.policies.findById(id);
if (!policy) throw new NotFoundError('SLA policy not found.');
return policy;
}
async updatePolicy(id: string, data: UpdateSlaPolicyBody): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
await this.getPolicy(id);
return this.policies.update(id, data);
}
async deactivatePolicy(id: string): Promise<SLAPolicy> {
await this.getPolicy(id);
return this.policies.deactivate(id);
}
// --- SLARun lifecycle ---------------------------------------------------
async getRunByTicketId(ticketId: string): Promise<SLARun> {
const run = await this.runs.findByTicketId(ticketId);
if (!run) throw new NotFoundError('No SLA run found for this ticket.');
return run;
}
/**
* research.md "SLA-run lifecycle is wired entirely through the existing domain-event bus":
* subscribed to TICKET_ASSIGNED. No-ops if the ticket already has a run (SLARun.ticketId
* @unique — covers re-escalation's second publish, spec.md Assumptions: 1:1 with the first
* assignment only). No-ops if no policy matches (FR-005 — never an invented default).
*/
async handleTicketAssigned(ticketId: string): Promise<void> {
const existing = await this.runs.findByTicketId(ticketId);
if (existing) return;
const ticket = await ticketsService.getById(ticketId);
const policy = await this.resolver.findApplicablePolicy({
productId: ticket.productId,
categoryId: ticket.categoryId,
problemTypeId: null,
priority: ticket.priority,
});
if (!policy) return;
const { firstResponseDueAt, resolutionDueAt } = await this.dueDateCalculator.computeDueDates(
policy,
new Date(),
);
await this.runs.create({
ticketId,
policyId: policy.id,
firstResponseDueAt,
resolutionDueAt,
});
}
/** FR-007: pausing on WAITING_FOR_CUSTOMER records pausedAt and flips status — no-ops if
* there's no run or it isn't currently running. */
async pause(ticketId: string): Promise<void> {
const run = await this.runs.findByTicketId(ticketId);
if (!run || run.status !== 'running') return;
await this.runs.update(run.id, { status: 'paused', pausedAt: new Date() });
}
/**
* FR-008: research.md "Pause/resume — shift the absolute due date by the paused wall-clock
* duration" — resume shifts both due dates forward by exactly `now - pausedAt`, the entire
* durability mechanism (no separate remaining-minutes bookkeeping, no in-memory state).
*/
async resume(ticketId: string): Promise<void> {
const run = await this.runs.findByTicketId(ticketId);
if (!run || run.status !== 'paused' || !run.pausedAt) return;
const pausedMs = Date.now() - run.pausedAt.getTime();
await this.runs.update(run.id, {
status: 'running',
pausedAt: null,
resumedAt: new Date(),
firstResponseDueAt: run.firstResponseDueAt
? new Date(run.firstResponseDueAt.getTime() + pausedMs)
: null,
resolutionDueAt: run.resolutionDueAt
? new Date(run.resolutionDueAt.getTime() + pausedMs)
: null,
});
}
/** FR-010: a run that resolves before its due date is marked completed and is never later
* flagged breached (the breach sweep only ever looks at status: 'running' runs). */
async complete(ticketId: string): Promise<void> {
const run = await this.runs.findByTicketId(ticketId);
if (!run || run.status === 'completed') return;
await this.runs.update(run.id, { status: 'completed', completedAt: new Date() });
}
/**
* FR-009/FR-011/FR-013/FR-014/FR-015: research.md "The breach-detection job reuses
* src/jobs/sla/'s existing stub" — a single, directly-callable, side-effect-only sweep (no
* worker process needed to invoke it, tests call this directly). Marks resolution breaches
* (status -> breached) and first-response breaches (firstResponseBreachedAt, status
* unchanged), then fires escalation for each newly-detected breach.
*/
async runBreachDetectionSweep(): Promise<void> {
const now = new Date();
const resolutionBreaches = await this.runs.findRunningPastResolutionDueAt(now);
for (const run of resolutionBreaches) {
await this.runs.update(run.id, { status: 'breached', breachedAt: now });
await this.escalation.handleBreach(run.ticketId, 'resolution_breach');
}
const firstResponseBreaches = await this.runs.findRunningPastFirstResponseDueAt(now);
for (const run of firstResponseBreaches) {
const messages = await messagesService.listForAgent(run.ticketId);
const hasAgentResponse = messages.some((m) => m.type === 'AGENT_MESSAGE');
if (hasAgentResponse) continue;
await this.runs.update(run.id, { firstResponseBreachedAt: now });
await this.escalation.handleBreach(run.ticketId, 'first_response_breach');
}
}
}
export const slaService = new SlaService();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
import { DateTime } from 'luxon';
export interface WorkingWindow {
start: string; // "HH:mm", in the calendar's own timezone
end: string;
}
/** research.md "BusinessCalendar.workingHours shape": a missing key means zero working hours
* that weekday — never an implicit 24h default (spec.md Edge Cases). */
export type WorkingHours = Partial<
Record<'mon' | 'tue' | 'wed' | 'thu' | 'fri' | 'sat' | 'sun', WorkingWindow>
>;
const WEEKDAY_KEYS: Record<number, keyof WorkingHours> = {
1: 'mon',
2: 'tue',
3: 'wed',
4: 'thu',
5: 'fri',
6: 'sat',
7: 'sun',
};
const MAX_DAYS_SEARCHED = 3650; // ~10 years — a safety cap, never expected to be hit by any
// real SLA policy's minutes, guards against an unbounded loop on malformed input.
function isHoliday(day: DateTime, holidayDates: Date[]): boolean {
return holidayDates.some((h) => DateTime.fromJSDate(h, { zone: day.zone }).hasSame(day, 'day'));
}
/**
* research.md "Calendar-aware due-date arithmetic — a day-by-day walk": walks forward from
* `start` one calendar day at a time in the calendar's own timezone. A holiday date or a weekday
* with no configured window contributes zero available minutes; otherwise the day's working
* window (clipped by `start`'s own time on the first day) contributes up to its own duration.
* Returns the exact timestamp at which `minutes` of business time have elapsed since `start`.
*/
export function addBusinessMinutes(
start: Date,
minutes: number,
calendar: { timezone: string; workingHours: WorkingHours },
holidayDates: Date[],
): Date {
if (minutes <= 0) return new Date(start);
let remaining = minutes;
let cursor = DateTime.fromJSDate(start, { zone: calendar.timezone });
for (let dayGuard = 0; dayGuard < MAX_DAYS_SEARCHED; dayGuard++) {
const weekdayKey = WEEKDAY_KEYS[cursor.weekday];
const window = weekdayKey ? calendar.workingHours[weekdayKey] : undefined;
if (window && !isHoliday(cursor, holidayDates)) {
const [startHour, startMinute] = window.start.split(':').map(Number);
const [endHour, endMinute] = window.end.split(':').map(Number);
let windowStart = cursor.set({
hour: startHour,
minute: startMinute,
second: 0,
millisecond: 0,
});
const windowEnd = cursor.set({
hour: endHour,
minute: endMinute,
second: 0,
millisecond: 0,
});
if (cursor > windowStart) windowStart = cursor; // clip to start's own time on day 1
if (windowStart < windowEnd) {
const availableMinutes = windowEnd.diff(windowStart, 'minutes').minutes;
if (availableMinutes >= remaining) {
return windowStart.plus({ minutes: remaining }).toJSDate();
}
remaining -= availableMinutes;
}
}
cursor = cursor.plus({ days: 1 }).startOf('day');
}
throw new Error('addBusinessMinutes: exceeded maximum search window (10 years)');
}
/** Whether the given instant falls within the calendar's configured working hours — replaces
* the BusinessCalendarsService stub's hardcoded-true isWorkingHour. */
export function isWithinWorkingHours(
instant: Date,
calendar: { timezone: string; workingHours: WorkingHours },
holidayDates: Date[],
): boolean {
const zoned = DateTime.fromJSDate(instant, { zone: calendar.timezone });
if (isHoliday(zoned, holidayDates)) return false;
const weekdayKey = WEEKDAY_KEYS[zoned.weekday];
const window = weekdayKey ? calendar.workingHours[weekdayKey] : undefined;
if (!window) return false;
const [startHour, startMinute] = window.start.split(':').map(Number);
const [endHour, endMinute] = window.end.split(':').map(Number);
const windowStart = zoned.set({ hour: startHour, minute: startMinute, second: 0, millisecond: 0 });
const windowEnd = zoned.set({ hour: endHour, minute: endMinute, second: 0, millisecond: 0 });
return zoned >= windowStart && zoned < windowEnd;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export const BUSINESS_CALENDARS_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'PLATFORM_BUSINESS_CALENDARS',
} as const;
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
import { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { businessCalendarsService, BusinessCalendarsService } from '../service';
import {
createBusinessCalendarSchema,
updateBusinessCalendarSchema,
createHolidaySchema,
} from '../schema';
export class BusinessCalendarsController {
constructor(private readonly service: BusinessCalendarsService = businessCalendarsService) {}
async create(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const body = createBusinessCalendarSchema.parse(request.body);
const calendar = await this.service.create(body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: calendar, meta: null });
}
async list(_request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const calendars = await this.service.list();
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: calendars, meta: null });
}
async getById(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const calendar = await this.service.getById(id);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: calendar, meta: null });
}
async update(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const body = updateBusinessCalendarSchema.parse(request.body);
const calendar = await this.service.update(id, body);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: calendar, meta: null });
}
async addHoliday(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id } = request.params as { id: string };
const body = createHolidaySchema.parse(request.body);
const holiday = await this.service.addHoliday(id, body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: holiday, meta: null });
}
async removeHoliday(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { id, holidayId } = request.params as { id: string; holidayId: string };
await this.service.removeHoliday(id, holidayId);
return reply.status(204).send();
}
}
export const businessCalendarsController = new BusinessCalendarsController();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { BusinessCalendarsController, businessCalendarsController } from './business-calendars.controller';
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
export const BUSINESS_CALENDARS_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'PLATFORM_BUSINESS_CALENDARS',
} as const;
export class BusinessCalendarsService {
async isWorkingHour(_date: Date): Promise<boolean> {
return true;
}
}
export const businessCalendarsService = new BusinessCalendarsService();
export { businessCalendarsRoutes } from './routes';
export { BusinessCalendarsService, businessCalendarsService } from './service';
export {
businessCalendarRepository,
BusinessCalendarRepository,
holidayRepository,
HolidayRepository,
} from './repository';
export type { WorkingWindow, WorkingHours } from './types';
export { BUSINESS_CALENDARS_CONSTANTS } from './constants';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
import { BusinessCalendar, Holiday, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export class BusinessCalendarRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: {
name: string;
timezone: string;
workingHours: Prisma.InputJsonValue;
}): Promise<BusinessCalendar> {
return this.prisma.businessCalendar.create({ data });
}
async findById(id: string): Promise<BusinessCalendar | null> {
return this.prisma.businessCalendar.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
async findByIdWithHolidays(
id: string,
): Promise<(BusinessCalendar & { holidays: Holiday[] }) | null> {
return this.prisma.businessCalendar.findUnique({
where: { id },
include: { holidays: true },
});
}
async findAll(): Promise<BusinessCalendar[]> {
return this.prisma.businessCalendar.findMany();
}
async update(
id: string,
data: {
name?: string | undefined;
timezone?: string | undefined;
workingHours?: Prisma.InputJsonValue | undefined;
},
): Promise<BusinessCalendar> {
return this.prisma.businessCalendar.update({
where: { id },
data: data as Prisma.BusinessCalendarUpdateInput,
});
}
}
export const businessCalendarRepository = new BusinessCalendarRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
import { Holiday, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export class HolidayRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: {
calendarId: string;
date: Date;
description?: string | undefined;
}): Promise<Holiday> {
return this.prisma.holiday.create({ data: data as Prisma.HolidayUncheckedCreateInput });
}
async findAllForCalendar(calendarId: string): Promise<Holiday[]> {
return this.prisma.holiday.findMany({ where: { calendarId } });
}
async findById(id: string): Promise<Holiday | null> {
return this.prisma.holiday.findUnique({ where: { id } });
}
async delete(id: string): Promise<void> {
await this.prisma.holiday.delete({ where: { id } });
}
}
export const holidayRepository = new HolidayRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
export * from './business-calendar.repository';
export * from './holiday.repository';
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { businessCalendarsController } from '../controller';
/** contracts/sla-escalation-contract.md: every admin route gated by fastify.authenticate (known
* limitation inherited from 002-007). */
export async function businessCalendarsRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
fastify.post(
'/admin/business-calendars',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.create(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/business-calendars',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.list(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/business-calendars/:id',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.getById(req, reply),
);
fastify.patch(
'/admin/business-calendars/:id',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.update(req, reply),
);
fastify.post(
'/admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.addHoliday(req, reply),
);
fastify.delete(
'/admin/business-calendars/:id/holidays/:holidayId',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => businessCalendarsController.removeHoliday(req, reply),
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { businessCalendarsRoutes } from './business-calendars.routes';
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
const HH_MM = /^([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d)$/;
const workingWindowSchema = z
.object({
start: z.string().regex(HH_MM, 'start must be HH:mm (24-hour)'),
end: z.string().regex(HH_MM, 'end must be HH:mm (24-hour)'),
})
.strict()
.refine((w) => w.start < w.end, { message: 'start must be before end' });
const WEEKDAY_KEYS = ['mon', 'tue', 'wed', 'thu', 'fri', 'sat', 'sun'] as const;
export const workingHoursSchema = z
.object(Object.fromEntries(WEEKDAY_KEYS.map((k) => [k, workingWindowSchema.optional()])))
.strict();
function isValidTimezone(tz: string): boolean {
try {
return Intl.supportedValuesOf('timeZone').includes(tz);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export const createBusinessCalendarSchema = z
.object({
name: z.string().min(1),
timezone: z.string().refine(isValidTimezone, { message: 'not a valid IANA timezone name' }),
workingHours: workingHoursSchema,
})
.strict();
export const updateBusinessCalendarSchema = createBusinessCalendarSchema.partial();
export const createHolidaySchema = z
.object({
date: z.coerce.date(),
description: z.string().optional(),
})
.strict();
export type CreateBusinessCalendarBody = z.infer<typeof createBusinessCalendarSchema>;
export type UpdateBusinessCalendarBody = z.infer<typeof updateBusinessCalendarSchema>;
export type CreateHolidayBody = z.infer<typeof createHolidaySchema>;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export * from './business-calendars.schema';
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
import { DateTime } from 'luxon';
import { BusinessCalendar, Holiday } from '@prisma/client';
import { NotFoundError } from '@/common/errors';
import {
businessCalendarRepository,
BusinessCalendarRepository,
holidayRepository,
HolidayRepository,
} from '../repository';
import { addBusinessMinutes, isWithinWorkingHours, WorkingHours } from '../calculators/business-hours.calculator';
import { CreateBusinessCalendarBody, UpdateBusinessCalendarBody, CreateHolidayBody } from '../schema';
export class BusinessCalendarsService {
constructor(
private readonly calendars: BusinessCalendarRepository = businessCalendarRepository,
private readonly holidays: HolidayRepository = holidayRepository,
) {}
async create(data: CreateBusinessCalendarBody): Promise<BusinessCalendar> {
return this.calendars.create(data);
}
async getById(id: string): Promise<BusinessCalendar> {
const calendar = await this.calendars.findById(id);
if (!calendar) throw new NotFoundError('Business calendar not found.');
return calendar;
}
async list(): Promise<BusinessCalendar[]> {
return this.calendars.findAll();
}
async update(id: string, data: UpdateBusinessCalendarBody): Promise<BusinessCalendar> {
await this.getById(id);
return this.calendars.update(id, data);
}
async addHoliday(calendarId: string, data: CreateHolidayBody): Promise<Holiday> {
await this.getById(calendarId);
return this.holidays.create({ calendarId, date: data.date, description: data.description });
}
async removeHoliday(calendarId: string, holidayId: string): Promise<void> {
const holiday = await this.holidays.findById(holidayId);
if (!holiday || holiday.calendarId !== calendarId) {
throw new NotFoundError('Holiday not found.');
}
await this.holidays.delete(holidayId);
}
/** Replaces the original stub's hardcoded `true`. */
async isWorkingHour(calendarId: string, instant: Date): Promise<boolean> {
const calendar = await this.calendars.findByIdWithHolidays(calendarId);
if (!calendar) throw new NotFoundError('Business calendar not found.');
return isWithinWorkingHours(
instant,
{ timezone: calendar.timezone, workingHours: calendar.workingHours as WorkingHours },
calendar.holidays.map((h) => h.date),
);
}
/**
* FR-004: the single entry point 008's SLA due-date calculator uses (research.md — through
* this module's public index.ts, never a second calendar-walk implementation). `calendarId:
* null` means 24/7, no exclusions (data-model.md's `SLAPolicy.businessCalendarId` note) — a
* plain minute addition, not a missing-calendar error.
*/
async computeDueDate(calendarId: string | null, from: Date, minutes: number): Promise<Date> {
if (!calendarId) {
return DateTime.fromJSDate(from).plus({ minutes }).toJSDate();
}
const calendar = await this.calendars.findByIdWithHolidays(calendarId);
if (!calendar) throw new NotFoundError('Business calendar not found.');
return addBusinessMinutes(
from,
minutes,
{ timezone: calendar.timezone, workingHours: calendar.workingHours as WorkingHours },
calendar.holidays.map((h) => h.date),
);
}
}
export const businessCalendarsService = new BusinessCalendarsService();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { BusinessCalendarsService, businessCalendarsService } from './business-calendars.service';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export type { WorkingWindow, WorkingHours } from '../calculators/business-hours.calculator';
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
export const INVESTIGATION_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'PROBLEM_INVESTIGATION',
} as const;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { InvestigationController, investigationController } from './investigation.controller';
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
import { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { investigationService, InvestigationService } from '../service';
import { createInvestigationSchema } from '../schema';
export class InvestigationController {
constructor(private readonly service: InvestigationService = investigationService) {}
async record(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { problemId } = request.params as { problemId: string };
const body = createInvestigationSchema.parse(request.body);
const investigation = await this.service.record(problemId, body);
return reply.status(201).send({ success: true, data: investigation, meta: null });
}
async list(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { problemId } = request.params as { problemId: string };
const investigations = await this.service.listForProblem(problemId);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: investigations, meta: null });
}
async listCustomerSafe(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
const { problemId } = request.params as { problemId: string };
const investigations = await this.service.listForProblemCustomerSafe(problemId);
return reply.status(200).send({ success: true, data: investigations, meta: null });
}
}
export const investigationController = new InvestigationController();
@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
export const INVESTIGATION_CONSTANTS = {
MODULE_NAME: 'PROBLEM_INVESTIGATION',
} as const;
export class InvestigationService {
async getInvestigationStatus(_problemId: string) {
return { status: 'PENDING' };
}
}
export const investigationService = new InvestigationService();
export { investigationRoutes } from './routes';
export { InvestigationService, investigationService } from './service';
export type { CustomerSafeInvestigation } from './service';
export { investigationRepository, InvestigationRepository } from './repository';
export { INVESTIGATION_CONSTANTS } from './constants';
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export {};
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export * from './investigation.repository';
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
import { Investigation, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { prismaClient } from '@/infrastructure/database';
export interface CreateInvestigationData {
problemId: string;
investigator: string;
findings: object;
evidence?: object | undefined;
internalNotes?: string | undefined;
status?: string | undefined;
}
export class InvestigationRepository {
constructor(private readonly prisma = prismaClient) {}
async create(data: CreateInvestigationData): Promise<Investigation> {
return this.prisma.investigation.create({
data: data as Prisma.InvestigationUncheckedCreateInput,
});
}
/** research.md "version-row-per-attempt": every investigation is preserved; this is the full
* ordered set, newest first. */
async findAllForProblem(problemId: string): Promise<Investigation[]> {
return this.prisma.investigation.findMany({
where: { problemId },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
});
}
async findMostRecentForProblem(problemId: string): Promise<Investigation | null> {
return this.prisma.investigation.findFirst({
where: { problemId },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
});
}
}
export const investigationRepository = new InvestigationRepository();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
export { investigationRoutes } from './investigation.routes';
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { investigationController } from '../controller';
/** contracts/problem-resolution-contract.md: the write route and the internalNotes-including
* read are agent-facing (fastify.authenticate); the customer-safe read is ungated (same "public
* read path" convention as 003's own ticket status reads). */
export async function investigationRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
fastify.post(
'/admin/problems/:problemId/investigations',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => investigationController.record(req, reply),
);
fastify.get(
'/admin/problems/:problemId/investigations',
{ preHandler: fastify.authenticate },
(req, reply) => investigationController.list(req, reply),
);
fastify.get('/problems/:problemId/investigations', (req, reply) =>
investigationController.listCustomerSafe(req, reply),
);
}

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