# Specification Quality Checklist: Identity and Authentication

**Purpose**: Validate specification completeness and quality before proceeding to planning
**Created**: 2026-09-07
**Feature**: [spec.md](../spec.md)

## Content Quality

- [x] No implementation details (languages, frameworks, APIs)
- [x] Focused on user value and business needs
- [x] Written for non-technical stakeholders
- [x] All mandatory sections completed

## Requirement Completeness

- [x] No [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers remain
- [x] Requirements are testable and unambiguous
- [x] Success criteria are measurable
- [x] Success criteria are technology-agnostic (no implementation details)
- [x] All acceptance scenarios are defined
- [x] Edge cases are identified
- [x] Scope is clearly bounded
- [x] Dependencies and assumptions identified

## Feature Readiness

- [x] All functional requirements have clear acceptance criteria
- [x] User scenarios cover primary flows
- [x] Feature meets measurable outcomes defined in Success Criteria
- [x] No implementation details leak into specification

## Notes

- This feature was not on the original 11-phase roadmap — it surfaced as a genuine blocking gap
  while planning supporthub-web's `001-agent-admin-ui`: `fastify.authenticate` has been a
  complete no-op stub since 002, and `identity/auth`'s login endpoint has never taken a
  password. Numbered 010 in supporthub-api's own sequence since it's a real, immediately-needed
  backend prerequisite, not deferred hardening.
- `User`/`UserRole` (with two seeded-but-passwordless demo accounts,
  `admin@supporthub.internal`/`agent@supporthub.internal`) and the `AuthUser`/`JwtPayload`
  types in `src/common/types` were all found already scaffolded, unwired, and clearly intended
  for exactly this feature since the original pre-speckit scaffold — this is a "finish the
  originally-intended wiring" feature, not a new design invented from nothing.
- Scope is deliberately narrow: real login + real route gating + role checks + a self-identity
  endpoint + admin-created accounts + logout. Password reset, MFA, rate-limiting, and
  registration are explicitly out of scope (Assumptions), matching Phase 11's own "security
  hardening pass" as the more appropriate later home for those.
- All items pass; no revision iterations were needed.
- **Implementation-time finding**: making `fastify.authenticate` genuinely reject invalid/missing
  tokens (FR-004) had a far larger blast radius than this feature's own tasks.md anticipated.
  Dozens of routes across features 002-009 were already declared with `fastify.authenticate` as
  a preHandler — safe to write against a no-op stub, but every one of those pre-existing
  integration tests had been calling them with no `Authorization` header. Making the check real
  broke ~18 integration test files suite-wide, requiring a `tests/helpers/auth.ts` (`loginAs`/
  `authHeader`) and a file-by-file pass adding real bearer tokens, well beyond the mechanical
  `requireRole('ADMIN')` rollout research.md had scoped for. A related, recurring bug: several
  files already declared a local `const token = issueIntegrationToken(...)` for the unrelated
  002 customer-trust-boundary flow, and naming the new admin/agent token variable `token` in the
  same scope produced a `ReferenceError: Cannot access 'token' before initialization` — a genuine
  temporal-dead-zone collision, not a tooling bug — fixed by using a non-colliding name
  (`authToken`/`adminToken`/`agentToken`) per file.
- A second, subtler implementation-time finding: once admin-setup calls in test `beforeAll`
  blocks started actually succeeding (previously they silently 401'd against the no-op stub),
  wildcard/global SLA policies created by one integration test file could genuinely match tickets
  created by another file running against the same shared throwaway Postgres, leaving orphaned
  `sla_run` rows that RESTRICT-violated the FK on cleanup. Fixed by widening the affected files'
  `afterAll` cleanup to delete `sla_run` rows by `ticketId` *and* by `policyId`, not just one or
  the other.